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‘This book makes an important contribution to the field of social media 
and copyright. It tackles the real issue of how social media is designed to 
encourage users to engage in generative practices, in a sense effectively 
“seducing” users into practices that involve misuse or infringement of 
copyright, whilst simultaneously normalising such practices.’ 
– Melissa de Zwart, Dean of Law, Adelaide Law School
‘This timely and accessible book examines the regulation of content-
generative activities across five popular social media platforms.... Its in-
depth, critical and comparative analysis of the platforms’ growing efforts 
to align terms of service and technological features with copyright law 
should be of great interest to anyone studying the interplay of law and 
new media.’ 
– Peter K. Yu, Director of the Center for Law 
and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University
How are users influenced by social media platforms when they 
generate content, and does this influence affect users’ compliance 
with copyright laws?
These are pressing questions in today’s internet age, and Regulating 
Content on Social Media answers them by analysing how the behaviours of 
social media users are regulated from a copyright perspective. Corinne Tan, 
an internet governance specialist, compares copyright laws on selected 
social media platforms, namely Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube, Twitter and 
Wikipedia, with other regulatory factors such as the terms of service and 
the technological features of each platform. This comparison enables her to 
explore how each platform affects the role copyright laws play in securing 
compliance from their users. Through a case study detailing the content- 
generative activities undertaken by a hypothetical user named Jane Doe, 
as well as drawing from empirical studies, the book argues that – in spite of 
copyright’s purported regulation of certain behaviours – users are ‘nudged’ 
by the social media platforms themselves to behave in ways that may be 
inconsistent with copyright laws. 
Corinne Tan holds a PhD and LLM from the Melbourne Law School, 
as well as a LLB from the National University of Singapore. She is an 
internet governance, intellectual property and media law scholar and has 
published widely in international law journals.
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Prologue
In this book I  analyse how the content- generative behaviours of social 
media users are regulated from a copyright perspective. My focus is on 
comparing copyright laws with other regulatory factors on social media. 
These factors, being the terms of service and the technological features 
of social media platforms, can alter the effectiveness of the regulation of 
content- generative behaviours by copyright laws. In making this assess-
ment, I examine the regulation of such behaviours across five social media 
platforms, namely Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube, Twitter and Wikipedia. 
Together these popular platforms on which users generate content serve 
as a good sample for my purpose.
In particular, I consider the application of copyright laws to various 
uses on social media and the ways in which this application is aligned 
with the terms of service and the technological features of social media 
platforms. I have chosen to examine the terms of service and the techno-
logical features as they constitute the points of contact between users 
and social media platforms which can be readily surveyed.
I have two reasons for taking this approach. The primary reason 
relates to the dearth of in- depth discussions of how specific social media 
platforms affect the role that laws, including copyright laws, play in 
securing compliance from their users. The examination of the applica-
tion of the terms of service and the influence of the technological features 
on users’ content- generative behaviours is an attempt to address this. 
The second reason is to stimulate more critical reflections on how laws 
should develop to take into account the influence of social media plat-
forms on user behaviours, through reform that gives users more leeway 
for the activities in which they engage. This is crucial as the platforms are 
becoming increasingly ubiquitous. With this book I will demonstrate how 
the regulation of users’ content- generative behaviours by copyright laws, 
the terms of service and the technological features can be analysed in a 
structured way, even in a space as random as social media.
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In this respect I will refer to the copyright laws of three jurisdictions – 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia – as well as to the 
terms of service and the technological features of the five social media plat-
forms. I will also use a case study detailing the content- generative activi-
ties undertaken by a hypothetical user named Jane Doe and other users on 
the relevant social media platforms. This provides an anchor around which 
to conduct specific discussions on how copyright laws and the other two 
factors can regulate users’ content- generative behaviours. Finally, I draw 
further from earlier empirical studies to support the arguments I will make 
in this book.
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Introduction
I. Regulation on social media
In this book, I analyse how the content- generative behaviours of social 
media users are regulated from a copyright perspective. My focus is 
on comparing copyright laws with other regulatory factors on social 
media. These factors, being the terms of service and the technological 
features of social media platforms, can operate to alter the effectiveness 
of the regulation of content- generative behaviours by copyright laws. In 
leading up to this assessment, I examine the regulation of such behav-
iours across five social media platforms  – namely Facebook, Pinterest, 
YouTube, Twitter and Wikipedia – by copyright laws, the terms of service 
and the technological features. Choosing to do so allows me to confine 
my analysis of a law’s application to the diverse activities occurring on 
social media in a tangible way; it also accommodates a richer analysis of 
the application of a particular legal regime (ie, copyright laws) to these 
activities.
The sample of social media platforms I have selected for the book 
comprises popular platforms1 on which users generate content. Each 
of these platforms falls under one of the four (out of a total of six) cat-
egories of social media under Kaplan and Haenlein’s classification 
system  – namely social networking sites, content communities, blogs 
and collaborative projects.2 This gives me the opportunity to scrutinise, 
at a micro- level, how effectively copyright laws regulate users’ content- 
generative behaviours on the chosen social media platforms.
The importance of studying how user behaviours are regulated on 
social media arises from the fact that the predominant experiences of 
users on the internet are increasingly those on social media platforms. 
Internet users are found to spend more time on social media than before.3 
In spite of the proliferative use of social media platforms, as well as social 
media’s unique characteristics and business models, a lack of specific 
consideration has been given to how social media platforms affect the 
 
 
 
 
 
regulaTing ConTenT on soCial Media2
  
role played by laws – including copyright laws – in securing compliance 
from their users.
To date, research on the regulation of social media draws mainly 
from internet governance studies.4 DeNardis and Hackl have highlighted 
the focus given in internet governance studies to governmental policies 
and global institutions.5 They have further called for more consideration 
to be given to the direct policymaking role of private intermediaries and 
the accompanying phenomenon of the privatisation of human rights.6 
According to DeNardis and Hackl, existing scholarship has tended to 
focus on political transformation on social media, the use of social 
media for self- representation and the expansion of freedom of expres-
sion through social media.7 On the other hand, there is a growing area of 
inquiry concerned with private information intermediaries such as social 
media platforms. The ways in which these platforms enact governance 
via their user policies and design choices8 deserve more attention than 
they have received to date.
DeNardis and Hackl have also discussed the question of privatised 
governance by social media in their work. Their discussion on the extent 
to which social media platforms promote or constrain rights has been 
concerned mainly with three thematic areas relating to free expression. 
These areas pertain to: firstly, anonymous speech and individual privacy; 
secondly, the ability to express ideas; and thirdly, technical facilities, or 
‘affordances’, of interoperability and permission- less innovation.9 With 
this book, I intend to expand our understanding of how social media plat-
forms can alter the effectiveness of the regulation of content- generative 
behaviours by copyright laws.
Recent controversies have brought the question of governance by 
social media to the fore.10 In particular – and of topical interest to this 
book – are the filing of legal actions against Twitter in California for fail-
ing to respond to takedown requests in relation to professionally taken 
photographs,11 Twitter’s removal of plagiarised jokes in response to its 
receipt of takedown notices12 and Richard Prince’s sale of artworks incor-
porating images shared by other users on the Instagram platform.13
In this respect, DeNardis has argued that as content intermediar-
ies such as social media platforms wield great power over the global 
flow of information, the challenges they pose to individual civil liberties 
through their privatised forms of governance are escalating.14 She has 
also noted their direct manipulation of the distribution of content and 
their facilitation of transactions among users.15 The acknowledgement 
of the incursion of human rights on social media and the need for user 
empowerment have spurred further research in these areas.16 While we 
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are increasingly aware that social media platforms influence our behav-
iours, we often fail to articulate exactly how we are so influenced, or 
‘nudged’.17 In response to these concerns, this book pays attention to the 
processes by which social media platforms influence the behaviours of 
users through the specific means of their terms of service and technologi-
cal features.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that social media plat-
forms have features that distinguish them from cyberspace in general. 
According to Mayfield, social media embodies five specific characteristics – 
namely participation, conversation, connectedness, community and 
openness.18 In short, social media platforms allow users the opportuni-
ties to interact with others; enable two- way conversations; facilitate 
interactive dialogues among users;19 encourage users to reach out to oth-
ers, communicate with and develop communities; link users with others 
who share a certain commonality; and ensure that there are relatively 
few barriers to the accessing of information or the making of comments 
on social media. Social media platforms have been defined as providing 
three specific technological facilities, or ‘affordances’: the intermediation 
of user- generated content (UGC); the possibility of interactivity among 
users and direct engagement with content; and the ability for an indi-
vidual to articulate network connections with other users.20 Other defi-
nitions more generally characterise social media platforms by reference 
to their abilities to exchange information in an interactive manner with 
dispersed groups of recipients,21 or as applications that allow for UGC.22
Common to these definitions is the recognition that social media 
platforms diminish the distinction between the amateur and the profes-
sional content creator. They comprise ‘social’ technologies that allow 
users to create, modify and disseminate content. This is an allowance 
previously afforded to a small group of content producers who decided 
which content would be distributed. Social media platforms are thus 
unique in that they enable users to be both producers and consumers of 
content.23 Furthermore, they extend the ‘dis- intermediating’ power of 
the internet to the masses24 in relation to the creation, modification and 
dissemination of content. Firstly, in respect of creation, all users, not only 
professionals,25 are encouraged to create content because it is easy to do 
so with the technological features made available to them on the plat-
forms. Secondly, in respect of modification, such platforms create inter-
activity between their content and their users, thereby allowing a range 
of different forms of modification by readers of content, who go beyond 
their previously passive roles on the internet to various levels of activ-
ity on social media. Thirdly, in respect of dissemination, the extended 
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reach that the platforms have is unprecedented. For instance, when an 
Australian political commentator decided to share a witty observation 
on Twitter, her single message reached 149,000 ‘followers’.26 Moreover, 
content can be distributed much faster than before, as users experience 
a new degree of autonomy in cyberspace.27 On this note, Elkin- Koren has 
observed that the emerging structures of digital production are no longer 
bilaterally confined to the producer- consumer or author- user relation-
ships. Rather, they constitute a tripartite relationship consisting of the 
relevant individual user, a wider community of networked users and the 
facilitating commercial platform.28 This tripartite relationship is espe-
cially pronounced on social media, where the content shared by users is 
easily accessible by a broad community.
Furthermore, social media platforms have facilitated changes in 
content which is part of a continually evolving discussion, rather than a 
fixed product.29 Social media platforms effect these changes by lowering 
the threshold required for user participation through their technologies – 
even regular unskilled users can now make minor contributions to an 
overall collaborative work.30 In allowing for these minor contributions,31 
users are given the opportunity to experience participation with sim-
ple activities32 before moving on to activities requiring greater personal 
effort and engagement.33 Additionally, most users have social, rather 
than financial, motivations for creating, modifying and disseminating 
content. For example, users who contribute entries to the Wikipedia plat-
form do so because of the shared sense of community among users and 
the desire for reciprocity, among other things.34
Social media platforms have also changed the economics of content 
creation and distribution. The costs of running these platforms are irre-
coverable via the traditional route carved by copyright laws, given that 
such platforms do not own the content on them under their terms of ser-
vice and are not the copyright holders.35 Notwithstanding this, revenue 
is earned usually through the building of value- added services around 
the content available, such as an advertising or a micropayments licens-
ing system.36 Advertising remains the most common revenue model 
for social media platforms, where the advertiser pays only when a user 
clicks on an advertisement.37 Indeed, most social media platforms offer 
free services to their users and are known to adopt advertiser- supported 
business models38 that, among other things, sort, aggregate, monetise 
or other wise create social and economic value around content.39 Social 
media platforms can thus increase the revenue they earn by attracting 
more users to their platforms, so that there will be a correspondingly 
higher volume of advertising clicks and actions.40
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Social media platforms therefore have a strong incentive to grow 
their audiences. Moreover, network effects, or the effects that the num-
ber of users of a service has on the value of that service to others,41 also 
play a part. Other users will be incentivised to join a social media plat-
form when it expands its user base. This is due to the fact that social 
media platforms appear to be designed around users’ interactions with 
the content available on such platforms. Thus the probability of a user 
finding content on a social media platform useful is likely to increase 
when there are more users contributing to the shared pool of content. 
Social media platforms want their users to share content with other 
users in their networks. When there are more users on a network and 
access to content is effortless, advertisers will be willing to engage the 
platforms, making them more economically viable.42 In light of the 
business models adopted by social media platforms and their financial 
incentive to increase the volume of content shared, the question of gov-
ernance by social media becomes all the more important to address.43 
I  direct myself, in this book, to answering the consequential question 
that necessarily arises: how can this influence of social media platforms, 
as exemplified by their terms of service and technological features, affect 
users’ compliance with copyright laws when they engage in content- 
generative activities?
II. Regulation of content- generative behaviours 
from a copyright perspective
Many users on social media are, with startling regularity, engaging 
in behaviours that could potentially fall within the scope of copyright 
infringement.44 The ubiquitous employment of social media platforms 
by users to create, modify and disseminate content has expanded the 
possibilities of copyright laws applying to the content- generative activi-
ties in which users engage. As noted by Wu, a giant ‘grey zone’ exists in 
copyright legislation, which includes millions of uses that ‘do not fall in a 
clear category but are often infringing’.45 This grey zone arguably grows 
larger with the proliferation of social media platforms, and their increas-
ing technological enablement. Moreover, because the sharing of content 
on social media transcends national borders, the application of laws in 
these virtual spaces is uncertain.46 The restricted abilities of countries 
to enforce their legislation, including copyright laws, owing to the sheer 
volume of content and the de- centralisation of media producers,47 make 
this uncertainty more acute.
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Against this backdrop, recent movements highlight that copy-
right laws are perceived to be restrictive and in urgent need of reform.48 
Scholars have called for reforms to copyright laws, so that they reflect 
the way users actually behave in their digital interactions.49 This, how-
ever, raises the question of whether the law should be adjusted simply 
because this is the way users behave: in some cases the behaviours may 
be ones that, as a matter of policy, the law should not acknowledge. At 
the same time, the rhetoric of the intellectual property industries calling 
for stronger intellectual property rights comprises terms such as ‘innov-
ation’, ‘wealth creation’, ‘incentive’ and ‘creative’50 – precisely the terms 
that also appear to support the resistance against expanding copyright 
on social media.
The regularity of technical infringement, the uncertain application 
of copyright laws and the merging of arguments for and against copy-
right make a strong case for copyright reform to look beyond striking a 
balance between interests that are less distinct. Social media users who 
are both producers and consumers not only require the incentives51 to 
create under copyright laws; they also need the freedom to use content 
to express themselves through copyright exceptions. My inquiry into how 
the terms of service and the technological features of social media plat-
forms can influence users’ content- generative behaviours provides cause 
to reflect on the extent to which copyright laws actually regulate the ways 
in which users behave.
On a broader level, understanding the ability of copyright laws to 
regulate the content- generative behaviours of social media users may 
prove to be a good springboard upon which the abilities of other laws52 
to regulate behaviours on social media can be examined. In this book 
I choose to take the copyright perspective, and to use copyright laws as a 
pivot for my analysis. Through surveying the influences that cause dilem-
mas in one area of law such as copyright, broader lessons may be drawn 
from the book in relation to other applicable laws on social media. This 
goes beyond a consideration of how the challenges posed to copyright’s 
effective regulation of content- generative behaviours can be resolved.
If society moves towards the ambient networked computing environ-
ment described by Hildebrandt53  – a world in which the impact of 
technological features on user behaviours is less explicit and visible – 
decisions may be made instead by an active set of cooperating devices, 
not by the users themselves. When this happens, users exercise less 
autonomy in decision- making and are hence more vulnerable to influ-
ence. While the copyright regime is expected to regulate content- 
generative behaviours on social media, I question the extent to which 
 
 
 
 
 
 
inTroduCTion 7
  
copyright laws continue to govern the content- generative activities of 
users in reality. Subjecting users to the risks of copyright infringement 
on social media may then be tantamount to adopting the copyright 
view of the universe Litman describes, which does not take the vantage 
point of these users into account.54 In spite of copyright’s purported 
regulation of content- generative behaviours, I argue that users act in 
response to ‘nudges’.55 These ‘nudges’, or the influences users face on 
social media when they generate content, arise from the governance 
of users’ behaviours by social media. In particular, the terms of service 
and the technological features on social media platforms can affect 
the awareness and perceptions of copyright laws in users, and so influ-
ence such behaviours. This gives rise to the question as to whether it 
is unfair, in this environment of mixed signals and conflicting expecta-
tions, that users continue to be widely exposed to the risks of copy-
right infringement for the activities they regularly undertake on these 
platforms.
Studies on social media can be the subject of research from a var-
iety of fields including communications,56 human factors,57 computer 
science,58 sociology59 and political science.60 The governance of and by 
social media is a subset of the wider study of internet governance, situ-
ated within an even broader realm of internet studies.61 In this book, my 
aim is to develop a line of inquiry and to extract the arguments resulting 
from such inquiry, rather than to advance existing theoretical founda-
tions.62 My focus is on the practical implications for users, whose com-
pliance with copyright laws can be affected by social media platforms. 
Throughout my inquiry I ask and answer questions in a way that acknowl-
edges the multiple influences users face on social media platforms. This 
ultimately makes a case for future areas of research – whether for copy-
right reform or relating to the form of contribution such platforms can 
make towards aligning their terms of service and technological features 
with copyright laws.
While I am not furnishing neatly packaged solutions in the book, 
my analysis of the factors regulating content- generative behaviours 
makes it more comprehensible for users to understand the influences to 
which they are subject on social media. The book belongs to the field of 
critical information studies that describes the multidisciplinary conflu-
ence of work that focuses on the ways in which information and culture 
are regulated by their relationships with creativity, commerce and other 
human affairs.63 The orientation of this field allows researchers to put 
laws in dialogue with other forces, whether economic, technological, cul-
tural or otherwise. With my inquiry in the book, I offer interested users 
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and regulators a way of considering whether the behaviours encouraged 
or constrained on social media are in line with laws, whether those of 
copyright or other laws.
III. Approach
The scholarship around the regulation of cyberspace serves as a good start-
ing point for my inquiry in this book, notwithstanding that social media 
platforms warrant separate analyses from those conducted on cyberspace. 
More than a decade ago the regulation of cyberspace, or cyberlaw, emerged 
as a new legal domain to be studied.64 Opponents to cyberlaw’s emergence 
argued against its usefulness as a distinct field by claiming that cyberspace, 
by its very nature, could not be regulated, not even by the government.65 
In response, other scholars have contended that cyberlaw is a unique field 
of study because of the regulation of cyberspace through technological 
standards, premised on the argument that ‘code is the law’.66 Another view 
might well be that cyberspace is not too different from any other area of 
human activity to be in need of special study in its own right.
In this book I consider the application of copyright laws to various 
uses on social media, and explore how this application is aligned with 
the terms of service and the technological features of the selected social 
media platforms.67 Where there are inconsistencies between the applica-
tion of either of the regulatory factors with copyright laws, I argue that 
they can compromise the effectiveness of copyright laws in regulating 
content- generative behaviours. I have chosen to examine these two fac-
tors as they constitute the points of contact between the social media 
platforms and their users when the latter generate content on these plat-
forms. While users have to accept the terms of service of such platforms 
before they use their services,68 the technological features are the inter-
faces users interact with when they generate content on the platforms.69 
Both factors can be readily observed for the purpose of the book and are 
hence included in my inquiry.
To illustrate more specifically the ways in which the surveyed fac-
tors (ie, copyright laws, the terms of service and the technological fea-
tures) regulate the content- generative behaviours of users, I  employ a 
case study that details the content- generative activities undertaken by a 
hypothetical user, Jane Doe, and other users on the selected social media 
platforms. This case study is modelled after the activities of users that 
can occur on these platforms; it provides an anchor around which the 
discussions can be conducted. This takes place one activity at a time.
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Notwithstanding my attempt in this book to depict the usual 
content- generative activities that can occur on the five social media plat-
forms, including Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube, Twitter and Wikipedia 
using the case study, it has its limitations. I can never fully replicate the 
varied phenomena on social media nor capture the complete range of 
diverse activities that occur on social media platforms in the book. In 
addition, the terms of service and the technological features are not 
static features and will be frequently updated by the platforms. The terms 
and the features referred to here are those of the platforms as at 7 June 
2017. Nevertheless, in trying to compare copyright laws with these other 
regulatory factors, I have developed a structured way to assess how the 
effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of copyright laws in regulating content- 
generative behaviours is affected by such factors on social media.
In my consideration of the application of copyright laws, I will refer 
to the copyright laws of three jurisdictions – the United States (US), the 
United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. I will also draw from earlier empirical 
studies that illuminate users’ perspectives and awareness of copyright laws. 
The US is the country in which the entities operating the social media plat-
forms are registered.70 The copyright laws of the other two common law 
jurisdictions are referred to in order to illustrate how variations between 
the copyright laws of these three jurisdictions, in spite of some commonali-
ties, may yield different outcomes when a user considers: firstly, if content 
is copyright protected; and secondly, if his or her content- generative activ-
ity is copyright infringing. Having different laws apply to the questions of 
subsistence and infringement of copyright,71 given that the generation of 
content on social media occurs online and cannot be confined geographi-
cally, is now a reality – social media users come from all over the world.
IV. Structure
With this approach in mind, Chapter One sets the foundation upon which 
I make my arguments in this book. In Chapter One, I discuss the adopted 
definitions of ‘social media’, together with those of ‘UGC’. I also set out the 
types of UGC that are included within the scope of the book. In this chapter 
I explain my reasons for confining the discussion in the book to the content- 
generative activities of users resulting in content across four categories of 
social media platforms – namely, collaborative projects, blogs, content com-
munities and social networking sites. At the end of the chapter I narrate a 
case study detailing the content- generative activities of a hypothetical user, 
Jane Doe, and other users on the selected social media platforms.
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In Chapter Two I discuss the copyright subsistence and infringe-
ment issues that arise from the application of copyright laws to 
content- generative activities on social media platforms, and highlight 
the challenges posed in addressing these issues. I then apply the spe-
cific copyright laws of the US, the UK and Australia to the content- 
generative activities of Jane Doe and other users in the case study, 
in order to illustrate how these issues may be resolved in relation to 
each activity. This application of copyright laws constitutes the first of 
four hypothetical scenarios, which allows for the subsequent evalua-
tion of the consistency of the copyright regimes with each of the pri-
vate regimes (ie, the terms of service and the technological features). 
Through scenario one, I demonstrate why it is not possible for any regu-
lar user of social media to have the requisite understanding of copy-
right laws to know how they apply to the content- generative activities 
he or she undertakes. I also show that the application of the copyright 
laws of the three jurisdictions to the same activities can result in differ-
ent outcomes being reached on the copyright liabilities of users based 
in each jurisdiction.
In Chapter Three I  examine the standard form contracts entered 
into by users across the five selected social media platforms, in order to 
identify the key terms that govern or have implications for the content- 
generative activities of these users. I also apply the terms of service to the 
content- generative activities of Jane and other users in the case study 
under scenario two. This scenario shows that the application of the terms 
of service to content- generative activities cannot be conducted on a com-
prehensive basis as there is a dearth of case law in this area – particu-
larly in the UK and Australia. I then consider the extent of alignment and 
incompatibility that the terms of service have with the copyright regimes, 
and note that there are potential incompatibilities on a number of issues 
among the regimes.
In Chapter Four I  identify the technological features that encour-
age and constrain users from creating, modifying and disseminating 
content. I also consider how the technological features encourage or con-
strain the content- generative activities Jane Doe and other users under-
take in the case study under scenario three. I then go on to examine the 
extent of alignment and incompatibility the technological features have 
with the copyright regimes, and discuss the implications of the spread of 
the technological features on social media platforms which encourages 
and constrains users when they engage in content- generative activities. 
In rounding up, I  set out what the observations from the discussion in 
Chapter Four, and from scenario three, mean for users.
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In Chapter Five I  review earlier empirical studies conducted on 
the perceptions and awareness users have of either intellectual property 
in general or of copyright laws more specifically. I  analyse these find-
ings with the discussions conducted in the earlier chapters of the book. 
I  then draw on scenarios one, two and three  – considered in Chapters 
Two, Three and Four respectively – to understand how copyright laws, 
the terms of service and the technological features regulate, in toto, the 
content- generative behaviours of users across the five selected social 
media platforms. Under scenario four of Chapter Five I bring together the 
conclusions arrived at in the earlier hypothetical scenarios to evaluate 
the consistency of regulatory signals that users receive from each of these 
factors regarding the content- generative activities that are legitimate on 
the platforms.
To do so, I assess the extent to which the positions reached are the 
same in relation to the application of the following pairs of factors: the 
copyright regimes and the terms of service; the copyright regimes and 
the technological features; and the terms of service and the technological 
features. Through this evaluation I arrive at some observations.
Finally, in my concluding chapter, I summarise the arguments that 
I  have made in the earlier chapters and my recommendations for law 
reform. I also outline future areas of research.
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Chapter one
Scope of study and a day 
in the life of Jane Doe
In this chapter I first set out the adopted definitions of social media and 
UGC (ie, user-generated content), along with the inclusions of certain 
types of UGC within the scope of this book. I then explain why I have cho-
sen to confine the discussion in the book to content- generative activities 
occurring on certain categories of social media platforms.
At the end of this chapter I describe a day in the life of Jane Doe, a 
hypothetical user of social media. Together with other users, she engages 
in content- generative activities across a few social media platforms, 
including those surveyed in this book. These activities constitute a case 
study, which assist in anchoring the discussions in the later chapters of 
the book.
I. Defining social media and user- generated content
Among the characterisations of social media discussed earlier,1 social 
media has been defined specifically to mean ‘a group of internet- based 
applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations 
of web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of UGC’.2 The term 
‘social media’ is distinct from the related concepts of web 2.0 and UGC. 
While web 2.0 refers collectively to the ‘architecture of participation’3 
or the technological platforms for the evolution of social media, UGC 
describes instead the various forms of content that are created and shared 
with the public by users of social media services.4 Due to the character-
istics embodied by web 2.0 involving the development of internet- based 
applications designed to be user- centric and to facilitate collaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regulaTing ConTenT on soCial Media18
  
among users in the creation and modification of content, there is an 
increased generation of both original and derivative UGC online.5
UGC is referred to under a few labels. The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has defined ‘user- 
created content’ in a 2007 study as: (i) content ‘made publicly available 
over the internet’; (ii) content which reflects a ‘certain amount of creative 
effort’; and (iii) content which is ‘created outside of professional routines 
and practices’.6 This OECD definition of ‘user- created content’ has been 
frequently cited in other research.7
Another term, ‘amateur creative digital content’ (ACDC),8 similarly 
refers to UGC. The word ‘creative’ in ACDC conveys the sense that the 
content on social media platforms is derived from the creative labour of 
amateurs.9 This arguably mirrors the substance of the second limb of the 
OECD definition. On the other hand, the word ‘amateur’ in ACDC implies 
both the positive sense of a commitment to a pastime and the negative 
sense of a lack of skill or knowledge.10 The quality of ‘non- professionalism’ 
conveyed by the latter brings to mind the substance of the third limb of 
the OECD definition.
Ultimately, the existence of these alternative labels for UGC is of 
little significance – they are discussed mainly to clarify the type of con-
tent with which this book is concerned. For my purpose in the book, the 
term UGC will be employed over other substitute terms including ‘user- 
created content’ or ACDC. To substantiate the meaning given to UGC fur-
ther, I note that there is also a definition of UGC as content possessing 
‘an element of either originality, transformativity or a combination of the 
two’.11 This definition seems to complement the OECD definition – this 
is because content possessing either originality or resulting from trans-
formative uses, or indeed encompassing both qualities, will also reflect 
an adequate amount of creative effort to satisfy the second limb of the 
OECD definition. To develop further on its meaning, not all UGC com-
prises content originally authored by the relevant users. Instead, UGC 
can be produced from transformative uses. For instance, when one draws 
on myriad pieces of original content in remixing video clips (on a plat-
form such as YouTube), or juxtaposes two or more different images to 
create mash- ups of photographs (on a platform such as Pinterest), UGC 
results from these transformative uses.
Given these broad definitions of UGC, it is appropriate to set out 
the types of UGC that are excluded from, and included within, this book’s 
scope. With reference to the first limb of the OECD definition, UGC refers 
to content that is publicly accessible and that is published in some context. 
This publication requirement excludes bilateral messages such as emails.12
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With reference to the second limb of the OECD definition, UGC 
refers to new or adapted content embodying creative effort. As UGC that 
is a by- product of transformation raises concerns of copyright infringe-
ment by users,13 therefore, I  am concerned with the activities resulting 
in adapted content, in relation to my consideration of users’ compliance 
with copyright laws when undertaking these activities. UGC that is ori-
ginal content involving no adaptation, derivation or copying on the part of 
a user14 is also within the book’s purview, mainly in relation to addressing 
first if such UGC is copyright protected, before the question of infringe-
ment follows.
At the same time, it has been suggested that UGC should not 
refer to content that has been appropriated wholesale from another 
source. For instance, an episode of a television show copied by a user 
and shared on a content platform such as YouTube is not classified as 
UGC.15 Nonetheless, such content taken wholesale will be included 
within this book’s scope, as infringement issues clearly arise for con-
sideration where content is uploaded without the permission of copy-
right holders.
With reference to the third limb of the OECD definition, UGC 
refers to content created outside of professional practices, and that does 
not have a commercial market.16 At the initial stages of the participa-
tive web, UGC was produced with social incentives in mind, such as 
the desire for self- expression and status, rather than with the expect-
ation of remuneration.17 This last characteristic of non- commercialism 
is increasingly unreliable as an identifying element of UGC,18 as ama-
teur users often evolve into professionals after an initial phase of 
non- commercial activity. Indeed, commercial interests can co- exist 
with altruistic motivations behind the production of content on social 
media.19
Moreover, the point of time when commercial motivations arise 
in an amateur creator requires a subjective enquiry into his or her 
intention, which may not be ascertainable. In applying this qualifier in 
the third limb, more allowance for deviation should be tolerated. If the 
requirement for absence of commercial motivation is applied restrict-
ively, it can effectively exclude a substantially large amount of UGC 
from this book’s scope. The creation of content beyond a professional 
routine nevertheless remains a useful concept in general to distinguish 
UGC from content conventionally produced by commercial entities.20 
Notwithstanding this, given the limitations of the third limb of the 
OECD definition, it should not be rigidly applied in determining if any 
content in question is UGC.
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In the following section, I will explain – with reference to existing 
classifications of UGC and social media – why I have chosen to look at the 
content- generative activities occurring across certain categories of social 
media platforms.
II. Choice of social media platforms
It is important to identify both the type of UGC with which the book is 
concerned and the context in which the UGC is created, modified and 
disseminated, in order to decide which social media platforms to survey 
for the book. This is because the production of different types of UGC is 
linked to the specific UGC distribution platforms.21
In this respect I have decided to confine the book to evaluating the 
activities which generate what Troscrow et al identify as ‘creative con-
tent’22 or ‘individual textual, audio, image, video and multimedia produc-
tions that are distributed online through software platforms including 
blogs and podcast repositories’. These platforms include, among others, 
Facebook, Pinterest, Twitter, YouTube (four out of five social media plat-
forms surveyed for this book), Tumblr and Flickr, as well as citizen jour-
nalism sites.23
At the same time I have drawn on Kaplan and Haenlein’s classifica-
tion of social media24 to focus on four specific categories of social media.25 
These categories are: collaborative projects; blogs; content communities; 
and social networking sites.26 Because virtual game and social worlds 
raise special issues, I have excluded the last two categories of Kaplan and 
Heinlein’s classification from consideration.27 Given the chosen focus 
of the book, I will investigate in particular the application of copyright 
laws to the content- generative activities, and explore how these align 
with the terms of service and the technological features, across selected 
social media platforms from the four categories. I have selected at least 
one platform28 from each of these four categories for survey in the book.
III. A day in the life of Jane
It is timely to give examples of how content can be created, modified 
and shared on multiple social media platforms by a hypothetical user 
named Jane Doe, along with other users, all in a single day. In this case 
study my focus on content- generative activities resulting in ‘creative con-
tent’ on four categories of social media informs my choice of the social 
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media platforms Jane and other users generate content on. The plat-
forms surveyed for the purpose of the book and henceforth included as 
platforms used under the case study will include: the social networking 
site Facebook;29 the content communities Pinterest30 and YouTube;31 the 
blog Twitter;32 and the collaborative project Wikipedia.33 With the case 
study modelled after the usual content- generative activities occurring 
on social media, I  can then consider how the similar activities of Jane 
and the other users are practically regulated by copyright laws, the terms 
of service and the technological features in the subsequent chapters of 
the book. I have also made references in the case study to social media 
platforms not surveyed in the book, such as the blog WordPress. Such 
references are useful in illustrating the methodical way in which the 
regulatory factors on another social media platform outside the book’s 
scope can be considered.
Jane wakes up one morning to a ‘bespoke’ alarm call from an appli-
cation on her mobile device.34 Her friend Elly has recommended to her 
a music video clip of her favourite singer uploaded by the singer’s man-
agers on YouTube, and Jane has chosen to have the video clip played, 
through the application, as her alarm this morning. She is pleasantly sur-
prised with her friend’s good choice, opens her Pinterest account while 
still in bed and ‘pins’ the video on her pin- board named ‘My Favourite 
Things’, with the comment ‘Use as your wake- up call!’ This addition on 
her pin- board is viewed by over two hundred of her ‘followers’ in their 
‘home feeds’, comprising both close friends and strangers, all of whom 
have decided to ‘follow’35 Jane’s interests on Pinterest.
Jane jumps out of bed and promptly dresses for work. Her workplace 
is an hour’s ride from her home, but this does not concern her. There are 
just so many ways she can entertain herself on the train, as she has done 
every single weekday morning. She whips out her mobile phone and logs 
into her Facebook account to check what her friends are up to. Through 
her ‘news feed’ she gets to view the posts of others within her network. 
One of her friends, Evangeline, wrote a commentary about income ine-
quality – Jane reads it, and could not help agreeing more, so much so that 
she is inspired to share the post with others. To re- post this commentary 
of Evangeline’s on her own ‘Timeline’, there are a few options available to 
Jane. She can choose either to do a manual selection of the text, followed 
by a ‘copy and paste’, or she can choose more conveniently to click the 
‘Share’ option tab positioned right under her friend’s commentary. In the 
first scenario, it may not be clear to a third party reading the post from 
Jane’s ‘Timeline’ that Evangeline is the original author, unless Jane makes 
the effort to attribute Evangeline as the author, perhaps by incorporating 
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a short note to that effect. In the latter scenario, if Jane chooses to use the 
‘Share’ option, the source of the content, being Evangeline, will be clearly 
reflected in the post on Jane’s ‘Timeline’.
What if Jane decided to include her views and to incorporate them 
as part of the post, just above or below the original commentary writ-
ten by Evangeline? In this case, Jane’s comment is not distinguishable 
from Evangeline’s original commentary, at least to readers of such post. 
What if these views of Jane’s are substantive in quantum and quality, and 
not mere one- liner comments to Evangeline’s original post? Alternatively 
Jane may simply decide to insert her views as a ‘comment’ on Facebook, 
placed under the original post from Evangeline. Running through 
these options in her head, Jane decides instead to weave her views into 
Evangeline’s commentary, such that the commentary as a whole puts 
forward a coherent argument. Unfortunately, the content contributed by 
Evangeline can no longer be separately identified in Jane’s commentary. 
Nevertheless, Jane posts this commentary, which incorporates her com-
ments to Evangeline’s original commentary, on her Facebook ‘Timeline’.
If Jane does not expressly attribute Evangeline as the original author 
of the content that Jane drew from in her commentary, Evangeline’s 
identity will be obscured. Is Jane’s commentary copyright protected? 
What are Evangeline’s rights in relation to preventing Jane’s use in this 
instance? Does Facebook, through its terms of service and technological 
features, encourage Jane and other users to engage in content- generative 
activities that respect the copyrights of other users such as Evangeline, or 
is one witnessing the contrary instead?
Still logged into her Facebook account, Jane glances at her watch 
and realises that she has half an hour to go before she arrives at her des-
tination. Her Twitter account runs in the background and she decides to 
take this time to check her ‘Twitter feed’. She notes, to her delight, that 
her favourite celebrity blogger Small- Steps36 just ‘tweeted’ ‘New Post  – 
Welcoming a New Member into our Family’. A link to this latest post on 
Small- Steps’ WordPress site has been included within the ‘tweet’. Jane 
immediately clicks on this link, and at the top of Small- Steps’ blog post, 
she spots a photograph of Small- Steps’ newborn baby, just delivered yes-
terday evening at a local hospital.
A brilliant idea comes to Jane’s mind, and she immediately searches 
for other photographs of newborn babies on the pin- boards of other 
Pinterest users using the key search term ‘newborn’. To her delight, lots of 
results show up on this search. Jane carefully selects the photographs that 
appeal to her, crops some of them and forms a collage with the selected 
images. In creating this collage, Jane uses the aid of some photo- editing 
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applications on her mobile phone. She is proud of this collage and decides 
to title it ‘Remedy for an Aging Population’ before sharing the collage on 
her pin- board on Pinterest. She is given the option, on Pinterest’s interface, 
as to whether she wants to simultaneously share the ‘pin’ on Facebook. 
Feeling it a waste not to share it, she decides to do so, and her collage 
appears accordingly on her Facebook ‘Timeline’. She also shares the col-
lage on Twitter, by incorporating the link to her pin- board in a ‘tweet’. At 
the same time Jane decides to log into her WordPress account, so that she 
can share her collage with the readers of her blog and express at greater 
length the thoughts she had while creating the collage.
When Jane finally reaches work, a group of her colleagues 
approaches her and tell her that they agree very much with her latest 
commentary on income inequality on Facebook  – in fact, they think 
that her commentary makes a very original and credible argument. 
One of her colleagues Zee has strong convictions in sharing informa-
tion for public benefit and decides unilaterally to add this information 
on ‘income inequality’ posted by Jane on her ‘Timeline’ to the content 
page on ‘income inequality’ on Wikipedia. Zee holds the opinion that list-
ing the source of the new information he contributed (ie, being a user’s 
Facebook ‘Timeline’) may defeat the credibility of the information, and 
he decides against attributing Jane as the source of the comment. Jane 
is not aware of this, nor that subsequent to Zee’s sharing of her commen-
tary, other content contributors to Wikipedia will eventually develop on 
Jane’s original expression of her idea. Due to Zee’s contribution of Jane’s 
commentary, the content page on ‘income inequality’ on Wikipedia is 
modified into something quite different from what it once was.
On returning home after a hard day at work, Jane winds down by 
watching video clips on YouTube. Feeling her creative juices churning 
again, she decides to share a new video clip on YouTube, as well as on the 
‘Timeline’ of her Facebook page, created by way of ‘vidding’,37 so that her 
final clip comprises extracted footages from different video clips available 
on YouTube. This video clip she creates incorporates scenes shared by the 
producers of her favourite television series, ‘Making Good’, with scenes 
from other random video clips shared of the same television series, albeit 
not uploaded by the producers nor with their consent. This video clip is 
intended to reflect Jane’s interpretation and thoughts of how a character, 
by whom she is particularly intrigued, develops in the series. Later that 
evening Cheryl – someone Jane does not know – chances on Jane’s video 
clip on YouTube. She decides to take screen captures of a few images from 
the clip and to display these screenshots as thumbnail images on her web-
site, for aesthetic purposes and to tell a different story.
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With reference to the events above, what are Jane’s rights against 
Zee and Cheryl, in relation to her commentary and her video clip respect-
ively, under copyright laws? What are the rights of the producers of the 
television series ‘Making Good’ against Jane? How can social media plat-
forms such as Facebook, Wikipedia and YouTube influence Jane, Zee and 
Cheryl’s compliance with copyright laws, when they generate content on 
these platforms?
Before going to sleep that night, Jane thinks of her use of mul tiple 
social media platforms and the comments that she has received – from 
friends, colleagues, and readers whom she does not personally know – 
for the content she has shared on Facebook, Pinterest, Twitter, WordPress 
and YouTube. She is grateful that through technology she can widen her 
reach to so many different audiences. She does not anticipate that, in the 
next couple of weeks, the collage she shared on Pinterest, Facebook and 
Twitter, while on her way to work that morning, will spread like wild-
fire on social media, and that the original photographs included in the 
collage will be recognised by all the mothers of the newborns featured. 
Some of the photographs have been cropped, while others, remaining 
un- cropped, have been photo- edited such that the edited photographs 
can be differentiated from the originals.
Quite a few avid social media users adopt Jane’s style of creating this 
collage. Several selectively crop a portion of her collage to create their own 
versions for dissemination on Pinterest, Facebook and Twitter. Meanwhile 
Jane’s collage also catches the attention of a magazine editor, Jasper. He 
considers using it on the cover page for his magazine’s next issue, since 
its feature article will be on the falling birth rates in developed countries.
Further questions arise from these events. What are the rights of 
the users who own the copyrights to the original photographs against 
Jane? Will other users who have adapted and disseminated Jane’s collage 
fall foul of copyright laws? What are the rights of Jane, as well as of the 
users who own the copyrights to the original photographs, against Jasper, 
if he uses Jane’s collage as described? Is an application of the terms of 
service and the technological features on platforms such as Pinterest, 
Facebook and Twitter consistent with an application of copyright laws to 
the content- generative activities of Jane and other users?
There could be more questions raised than there are answers for 
them. Indeed, there are endless possibilities for the content- generative 
activities that can occur on social media and their consequential implica-
tions under copyright laws. Within this book’s limitations, my focus on the 
activities described in the case study will make more tangible the ways in 
which copyright laws, the terms of service and the technological features 
regulate the content- generative behaviours of social media users.
  
Table 1.1 Overview of the formats of content generated and the content-generative activities occurring across four categories of social media
Type of social media 
platform
Examples Description of main activities  
on social media platform
Formats and descriptions of 
content
Content- generative activities that may 
attract copyright liabilities
Collaborative Projects Wikis
Wikipedia
Wikia
To add, delete and/ or modify 
content
Text: Original works written or 
adapted from other works
Photographs or images: Photographs 
or images taken, modified and/ or 
posted
Music and audio: Music and audio 
files recorded, edited and/ or posted
Videos: Video files recorded, edited 
and/ or posted, such video files being 
remixes of existing content, original 
home- made content or a combination 
of the two
Using, in part, the original work of another 
person to contribute to the content on wikis
Using, in part, the derivative or transforma-
tive work of another person (not being the 
original author) to contribute to the content 
on wikis
(continued)
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Type of social media 
platform
Examples Description of main activities  
on social media platform
Formats and descriptions of 
content
Content- generative activities that may 
attract copyright liabilities
Blogs
 
Single-Author 
or Multi-
Author Blogs:
Blogger
WordPress
LiveJournal
To create entries at desired  
intervals on any topic, for the  
purpose of providing  
commentaries on various  
subjects, to serve as online  
diaries and/ or to advertise  
brands online
To allow for interactivity with  
readers, who are in most  
instances allowed to leave com-
ments and respond to other  
readers via widgets
All of the above pertaining to 
Collaborative Projects apply here
All of the above pertaining to Collaborative 
Projects apply here, but in respect of contrib-
uting to the content on blogs
Commenting on, criticising or targeting the 
original work of another person for ridicule
Using, in part, the original work of another 
person to comment on something else, 
although the secondary work retains its 
underlying relevance to the original work
Re- contextualising the original work without 
modification, but changing the meaning 
of the original work, so that the secondary 
work is perceived differently by others
Changing the purpose of the original work 
within an expressive contexti
Micro- blogs:
Tumblr
Twitter
Same as above, but entries of  
digital content are smaller
To allow for more interactivity  
with readers, who are allowed  
to re- post the entries to  
demonstrate consensus
All of the above pertaining to 
Collaborative Projects apply here
All of the above pertaining to Single-Author 
or Multi-Author Blogs apply here, in respect 
of the smaller entries
Table 1.1 (Cont.)
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Type of social media 
platform
Examples Description of main activities  
on social media platform
Formats and descriptions of 
content
Content- generative activities that may 
attract copyright liabilities
Content Communities YouTube
Vimeo
Instagram
IMDB
Rotten 
Tomatoes
Pinterest
HubPages
Etsy
To upload and/ or view content
To allow for interactivity, since 
viewers are allowed to leave 
comments
All of the above pertaining to 
Collaborative Projects apply here
All of the above pertaining to Single- Author 
or Multi- Author Blogs apply here, particu-
larly in respect of mash- ups and remixes
Social Networking  
Sites
Facebook
LinkedIn
Google Plus
All of the above pertaining to 
blogs and Content Communities 
apply here
What is written on Collaborative 
Projects applies only to a limited 
extent (particularly in respect of 
deleting or modifying content, 
other than by way of giving com-
ments to an original post), mainly 
due to the absence of the common 
goal to produce content with com-
bined effort
All of the above pertaining to 
Collaborative Projects apply here
All of the above pertaining to Single- Author 
or Multi-Author Blogs apply here
i  These categories of uses are the types of transformative uses for which the fair use doctrine in the US arises for consideration. See David Tan, ‘The 
Transformative Use Doctrine and Fair Dealing in Singapore’ (2012) 24 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 832, 846– 8. A fifth category was recognised in David 
Tan, ‘The Lost Language of the First Amendment in Copyright Fair Use: Leval’s “Transformative Use” Doctrine Twenty- Five Years On’ (2016)  
26 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 311, 324– 5. This fifth category relates to changing the purpose of the original  
work within a technological context (for example, time- shifting for later viewing) and is therefore not relevant for consideration in respect of the content- 
generative activities occurring on social media.
new
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IV. Conclusion
Table 1.1 above lists the content- generative activities that occur on social 
media platforms such as collaborative projects, blogs, content commu-
nities and social networking sites. It also articulates an overview of the 
formats of content that is generated and the activities that potentially 
attract copyright liabilities. The platforms surveyed in this book are high-
lighted in bold.
With the defined focus of this chapter in mind, I will discuss, in the 
next chapter, copyright’s regulation of the content- generative behaviours 
of social media users, especially the challenges posed by the copyright 
laws of the US, the UK and Australia. I will also consider the implications 
of the strict application of copyright laws to the content- generative activi-
ties of Jane and the other users in the case study.
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Chapter Two
Regulation by copyright laws
In this chapter I  consider the application of copyright laws of the US, 
the UK and Australia to the content- generative activities of social media 
users. I  begin by discussing the following copyright subsistence and 
infringement issues: the types of subject matter that are protected by copy-
right laws; originality and authorship requirements; fixation, recording 
or reduction to material form; the scope of rights protected, including 
moral rights; available remedies; exceptions to copyright infringement, 
in particular, the fair use doctrine in the US and the fair dealing excep-
tions in the UK and in Australia; and finally, conflict of laws issues. I also 
outline the challenges posed in addressing these issues.
I then apply the copyright laws of each of the three jurisdictions to 
the content- generative activities undertaken by Jane and other users in 
the case study, under the first of four hypothetical scenarios in this book. 
I do not seek here to determine with finality how the copyright issues will 
be resolved in relation to each activity. Specific analysis is possible only 
in the context of particular disputes. My purpose is rather to provide a 
general overview of the interaction between copyright laws and the gen-
eration of content in the social media context.
The application of copyright laws in this chapter to the case study 
constitutes scenario one of this book. It allows for the evaluation of the con-
sistency of the copyright regimes, with each of the terms of service and the 
technological features, under subsequent scenarios in the later chapters.
I. Relevant copyright standards
The clause on intellectual property rights in the US Constitution provides 
for the promotion of ‘the progress of science and useful arts, by securing 
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for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries’.1 The US Supreme Court has reiter-
ated in its decisions that copyright exists to promote creative expression 
and its dissemination, so as to encourage others to build freely upon the 
ideas contained within copyright works.2 In the UK the goal for copyright 
is similarly articulated in the first statute providing for the regulation of 
copyright, the Statute of Anne 1709;3 its preamble described the act as 
one for ‘the encouragement of learning’.4 Australian copyright law has 
this same goal as its British counterpart.5
The respective copyright statutes in the US, the UK and Australia 
have been shaped, to some extent, by the obligations assumed by each 
country under international instruments such as the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention)6 
and the Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(TRIPS Agreement).7 In the following sub- sections I will refer to the copy-
right principles contained in the Copyright Act of 1976 in the US (US 
Copyright Act),8 the Copyright, Patents and Designs Act 1988 in the UK 
(UK Copyright Act)9 and Australia’s Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (Australian 
Copyright Act).10 In particular, given that copyright laws protect digi-
tal content, including content on social media, I will discuss the poten-
tial application of the copyright laws of these three jurisdictions to the 
content- generative activities on social media. I will also set out the chal-
lenges faced in addressing copyright issues pertaining to these activities. 
This will enable me to examine how social media platforms can alter the 
effectiveness of copyright laws in regulating users’ content- generative 
behaviours.
a. subsistence: works and other subject matter protected 
by copyright
Given the dual role of users as producers and consumers of content on 
social media, it is important for users to know whether the content they 
create and share on social media is copyright protected, and if this enti-
tles them to rights against other users. In addition, users may like to know 
whether the primary content they use from social media to create second-
ary content is entitled to copyright protection in its own right. For exam-
ple, are ‘status updates’ on Facebook and ‘tweets’ on Twitter protected 
under the copyright laws of the US, the UK and Australia? Addressing 
questions on copyright subsistence requires a preliminary assessment as 
to whether the particular content falls under the categories of works and 
other subject matter protected.
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The categories of copyright- protected works are set out in a non- 
exhaustive list protected under the US Copyright Act. The content available 
across the five social media platforms surveyed is in textual, image, audio 
and video formats, and the categories of works that are principally relevant 
to this book include: literary works; musical works; dramatic works; ‘picto-
rial, graphic and sculptural works’;11 audiovisual works; sound recordings; 
and architectural works.12 Additionally, compilations of pre- existing materi-
als or data, as well as derivative works – albeit not of materials used unlaw-
fully or not contributed by the author in question13 – are copyright protected.
In contrast, copyright protection under the UK Copyright Act14 and 
the Australian Copyright Act15 extends to a finite group of works and 
other subject matter.16 This group includes literary, dramatic, musical 
and artistic works, as well as sound recordings and films. As a ‘broadcast’ 
is broadly defined in the UK17 to include any internet transmission that 
takes place simultaneously on the internet, broadcasts are relevant for 
consideration in the book. On the other hand, a ‘broadcast’ in Australia18 
is more narrowly defined and will not be relevant. Additionally, because 
of the limited definitions of ‘published editions’ in the UK19 and the refer-
ences made to ‘published editions’ in Australia,20 published editions are 
not relevant to this book.
At the same time, as minor contributions of content are incorporated 
through incremental activities on social media and are regular occur-
rences on social media, users are likely to be confused on whether content 
created or used by them with minimal effort is protected under copyright 
laws. Mature copyright systems protect expressions, but not ideas, facts 
and other building blocks of literary and artistic expression.21 In the US 
such material, whether or not embodied in copyright- protected works 
and subject matter, is expressly excluded from copyright protection.22 
For instance, the US Copyright Office Regulations provide, as examples of 
materials not protected by copyright and of which applications for regis-
trations will not be entertained, ‘words and short phrases such as names, 
titles and slogans’ and, among other things, ideas, plans and so on.23 The 
axiom that copyright protection only covers the expression of ideas has 
been described as an amorphous characterisation rather than a principled 
guidepost.24 As such, courts in the US have developed two doctrines to fill 
the gaps.25
With reference to Goldstein and Hugenholtz’s description of the 
doctrines, the first is the doctrine of merger and the second, ‘scènes à faire’. 
Under these two doctrines expressions will not be copyright protected if 
the underlying ideas can be expressed in only one or a limited number of 
ways.26 While the first doctrine usually applies to functional works, such 
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as rules, forms and computer programs, the second applies mainly to fic-
tional works, including novels and dramas.27 Because the second doctrine 
withholds copyright protection from elements such as narrated incidents 
that are preordained by un- protectable ideas, including basic plot,28 this 
could mean that a fair amount of content on social media platforms  – 
being expressions which flow from the commonplace ideas shared on the 
platforms – is not copyright protected. An example of such content is a 
status update on Facebook, say a photograph of the blue skies on a sunny 
day, accompanied by a comment that reads: ‘Perfect weather for a stroll 
today!’ This comment on its own will not be copyright protected. Also, as 
users can undertake content- generative activities simultaneously in rela-
tion to the same content on social media, they may frequently arrive at 
similar expressions that necessarily follow the same idea.
The two doctrines in the US described above are employed to 
effectuate the distinction between ideas and expressions.29 This idea– 
expression dichotomy similarly applies in the UK and in Australia, and 
results in the non- protection of ideas under copyright laws.30
b. subsistence: originality
Whether content generated on social media is protected under copyright 
laws will be determined by the originality of such content. This concept 
of originality under copyright laws31 is closely linked to the concept of 
authorship, which will be discussed next.
The measure for originality entitling a work to copyright protection 
is the independent creation by its author (as opposed to copying from 
other works) and the exercise of some minimal degree of creativity.32  
In the US, originality is the touchstone of copyright protection.33 
Differentiating between a mechanical arrangement of content that is not 
copyright protected and a compilation that is – provided that there is some 
creative effort found in the arrangement or selection of material – can be 
challenging.34 For example, is a collage incorporating a few images shared 
previously on Pinterest deserving of copyright protection on this meas-
ure? If the material variation test35 is used to counter the ambiguity of the 
definition of ‘creativity’,36 the question that arises will be whether the sec-
ondary work contained more than a trivial variation vis- à- vis the original 
work and is hence copyright protected. Nevertheless, the analysis to be 
undertaken in respect of such variations in terms of number, size, abstract 
significance and so on necessarily entails multiple subjective judgements 
which can result in different outcomes.
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In the UK37 and in Australia,38 the statutory requirement of original-
ity for copyright protection only applies in relation to literary, dramatic, 
musical and dramatic works; it does not apply in relation to other subject 
matter such as sound recordings, films and broadcasts.39 In both jurisdic-
tions, copyright protection has to be the result of a person’s ‘skill, labour 
or experience’, in addition to being more than a copy of earlier content.40 
It is worth noting that the threshold to be met for the originality require-
ment in all three jurisdictions is fairly low.41
Further, in the UK, the requirement of sufficient skill and/ or labour 
is suggested to operate as a proviso de minimis (ie, a court will refuse 
to consider trifling matters) and henceforth excludes works in which 
the degree of literary composition is slight from copyright protection.42 
Similarly, in Australia, Ricketson has suggested that the application of the 
de minimis principle results in the denial of copyright protection in works 
on the basis that they are not original, or alternatively are ‘insubstantial’ 
in purely quantitative terms.43 There is also the consideration that con-
ferring copyright protection on single words or phrases may intrude too 
much on the rights of the public,44 in the case of which the real reason 
for denying copyright protection is suggested to be one of public policy.45 
In this respect English and Australian courts have not recognised as 
copyright- protected works the following: an advertisement consisting of 
four common sentences;46 the title of a song;47 the word ‘Exxon’, which 
is a well- known trademark;48 a short series of words communicating the 
need for assistance;49 and headlines.50
The question then is whether simple activities such as the posting 
of a brief ‘status update’ on Facebook, commenting on content shared 
on Pinterest or YouTube and ‘tweeting’ on Twitter, as well as making 
minor edits on Wikipedia, result in content that is copyright protected. 
Given that much of the content on social media platforms will be short 
or insubstantial works, add- ons and revisions, ascertaining whether con-
tent is copyright protected in an instance will require consideration of 
the following:
 (i) The application of the idea– expression dichotomy discussed in 
sub- section (A);
 (ii) The satisfaction of the originality requirement; and/ or
 (iii) The application of the de minimis principle (ie, copyright- protected 
works need to comprise a certain minimal amount of content).
For example, a ‘tweet’  – limited to a maximum of 140 characters on 
Twitter  – may not be copyright protected because of either or all of 
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the following reasons:  the ‘tweet’ consists of facts or ideas; the ‘tweet’ 
is insufficiently original; or the ‘tweet’ fails to meet the basic quantita-
tive requirement.51 The joke of the freelance writer Olga Lexell, which 
reads:  ‘Saw someone spill their high end juice cleanse all over the 
sidewalk and now I know God is on my side’52 is therefore more likely 
to be copyright protected than a ‘tweet’ that reads:  ‘Loving the sunny 
Melbourne’, given that all three of the reasons apply in the case of the 
latter ‘tweet’.
The rate at which content is simultaneously created, modified and 
disseminated by social media users gives rise to additional considera-
tions. The degree of originality between successive versions of content53 
(for instance, where derivative material is based upon pre- existing mate-
rial)54 required for copyright protection, as well as the point at which con-
tent contributed as an add- on or revision becomes a copyright- protected 
work in terms of quantum, raise issues that are difficult to resolve.55 
Richard Prince’s recent sale of the enlarged images shared by other users 
on Instagram as artworks comes to mind here.56 In between an original 
image first shared by the relevant Instagram user and the subsequent art-
work incorporating this image sold by Prince, a few successive versions 
of the modified image were possibly generated on Instagram – this hap-
pens when users, including Prince, comment on the image. The ‘modified 
composites’ of the images circulating on Instagram which incorporate 
other users’ (including Prince’s) comments are arguably not derivative 
works; there is little originality and authorial activity57 to qualify them 
as warranting separate consideration. It is far from certain, however, 
whether Prince’s artworks will qualify as copyright- protected derivative 
works by virtue of his enlargement and re- contextualisation of the rel-
evant images.
Indeed, there is no clear approach under existing authorities that 
can definitively address the issues raised above, to give certainty as to 
whether specific content on social media (whether new or a successive 
version of content) is copyright protected. Moreover, given the three cri-
teria highlighted above, it is foreseeable that a large volume of content on 
social media may not be copyright protected under the copyright laws of 
all three jurisdictions.
C. subsistence: authorship
Next the authors of content on social media, in whom copyright resides, 
have to be identified. While the US Copyright Act expressly provides that 
copyright vests in the author or authors of the work, and that the authors 
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of a joint work are co- owners of the copyright of such work,58 the term 
‘author’ remains undefined. A ‘joint work’ has been defined as a work pre-
pared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions 
be merged into inseparable parts of a unitary whole.59 This requirement 
for contemporaneous intention has been suggested to be satisfied even 
where participants do not know one another and have not worked within 
the same time frame, so long as each participant contributed with the 
intention of integrating his or her contribution into a unitary product.60 
Examples of such joint works, each created by multiple authors holding 
the intention to merge their contributions into a single product, are the 
content pages on Wikipedia.
At the same time, under the UK Copyright Act, an ‘author’ is defined 
as the person who creates a work,61 and ‘a work of joint authorship’ is 
defined as a work produced by the collaboration of two or more authors 
and in which the contribution of each author is not distinct from the 
other(s).62 In Australia the term ‘author’ is defined only in relation to a 
photograph under the Australian Copyright Act;63 similarly, ‘a work of 
joint authorship’ refers to a work that is produced by the collaboration 
of two or more authors and in which the contributions of each author 
are inseparable from one another.64 In view of these definitions in the UK 
and in Australia, it is less clear if content pages on Wikipedia are ‘works 
of joint authorship’. Although the history of a content page sets out the 
individual contribution made to that page by each user, each user’s con-
tribution to, or editing of, a single sentence in the page can be so minor 
that it may be practically unfeasible to distinguish the individual contri-
bution of one user from another. If this is the case, such content pages on 
Wikipedia are ‘works of joint authorship’.
Further, in spite of the provision for joint authorship under the 
copyright laws of all three jurisdictions, it may be arduous to identify 
the users who have authored content on social media together. This is 
because such content frequently comprises parts from several users 
that are inseparable from one another, as per the definitions given for 
works jointly authored. Previous criticisms of copyright laws for failing 
to accommodate the realities of contemporary writing practices still hold 
true today,65 as collaborative writing practices are shoehorned into the 
conventional human- centric concept of authorship.66 While it remains 
crucial to identify the human authors of works jointly authored, it may be 
tedious to do so in relation to all such content on social media. For exam-
ple, a user can write a segment for an article that incorporates existing 
contributions from other contributors on Wikipedia. Although all of the 
authors of this article are joint authors, their identification through their 
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usernames67 is subject to their retention of their Wikipedia user accounts. 
Also, more often than not, the Wikipedia platform will be attributed as 
the source of the relevant content – in this sense, the identification of the 
joint authors of content on Wikipedia takes a back seat.
In this respect Ginsburg, in critiquing the techno- postmodernist 
view of the ‘death of the author’ and the rising importance of the 
reader,68 highlights that under this view, the reader no longer draws from 
the authored works of others. Instead, the reader casts the contents of 
his or her bucket into the ‘constantly changing stream of reader- modified 
creations’.69 In this sense, the reader is characterised as a creator, as read-
ing is an act of creative interpretation in which readers give meaning to 
the texts they peruse.70 Social media users are active participants: they 
interact with, and continuously contribute to, existing works, often to the 
same extent as the original producers of these works.71 At the same time, 
Bently’s observation that the author is a notion to be sustained only for 
an instant72 is also relevant to the generation of content on social media. 
This is particularly the case as social media platforms are designed to 
allow for a great extent of collaborative participation from their users, in 
creating, modifying and disseminating content. Because active interac-
tion with content is so often encouraged on social media, with no single 
user able to impose his or her unilateral significance as creator73 over a 
piece of content, the palpable challenge faced is in deciding on whom 
copyright protection is vested.74 For the reasons given above, these dilem-
mas around the designation of authorship (whether single, joint or mul-
tiple) and the identification of authors are amplified when it comes to 
content generated on collaborative projects such as Wikipedia.75
d. subsistence: fixation, recording or reduction to material form
Where originality and authorship requirements standards are met, the 
issue of fixation, recording or reduction to material form comes into play. 
It has been argued that the content created on some categories of social 
media  – for instance, social networking platforms such as Facebook 
and blogs (especially micro- blogs such as Twitter)  – and which is not 
stored separately elsewhere does not meet the fixation standard, or its 
equivalent, for copyright protection.76 This is because content on such 
platforms is incredibly fluid, and hence can be deleted just as quickly as 
it is posted.77 For example, Twitter only displays the 3,200 most recent 
‘tweets’.78 Although old ‘tweets’ are not displayed on Twitter, these 
‘tweets’ are stored and hence copyright protected; moreover, they can 
still be located.79 Further, some social media platforms may invite the 
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continual participation of users with regard to the collaborative content 
on such platforms. Wikipedia, a long- term collaborative project that is 
open- ended, and that allows users to create, modify and share content 
over an indefinite period of time, is one example of such a platform. On 
the Wikipedia platform, given that content is constantly evolving, it is dif-
ficult to identify at which point content, and further what content, is fixed, 
recorded or reduced to material form, and thus copyright protected.80
In the US copyright protection is conferred on an original work 
when it is ‘fixed in any tangible medium of expression’ by or under the 
authority of the author.81 So long as the embodiment of the work in a 
copy ‘is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration’,82 the nature of the medium is immaterial. In this respect the 
term ‘copies’ is broadly defined and refers to material objects, other than 
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any known method (whether 
existing now or later developed) and from which a work can be commu-
nicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Therefore 
copyright protection is granted to a work that is fixed, wherever that fix-
ation takes place, whether on a web page of a social media platform or 
otherwise.
In the UK copyright only subsists in literary, dramatic and musical 
works that are ‘recorded, in writing or otherwise’.83 Furthermore, an ‘art-
istic work’ is defined to mean, among others, a painting, drawing or 
photograph (ie, defined also as a recording of light or other radiation on 
any medium).84 In addition, ‘sound recordings’ and ‘films’ are broadly 
defined to include recordings on any medium.85 Similarly, in Australia, 
in respect of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, reference is 
made instead to works that are reduced to writing or some other material 
form,86 the latter of which is defined to include any form of storage of the 
work.87 ‘Sound recordings’ and ‘cinematograph films’ in Australia are also 
broadly defined.88 Thus, in both the UK and in Australia, I argue that the 
wide definitions in relation to recording or reduction to material form, 
as the case may be, include the recording or storing of content on social 
media – such content can thus be copyright protected.
Finally, following the satisfaction of the fixation requirement, 
or its equivalent, copyright subsists in works and other subject matter 
only when conditions tied to the publication or authored status of such 
works or other subject matter are met. For instance, in the US published 
works (being literary, musical, dramatic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, 
audiovisual or architectural works, as well as sound recordings, compi-
lations and derivative works)89 are copyright protected if, among other 
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things,90 they are first published in the US or in a foreign nation that is a 
treaty party.91 Sound recordings are copyright protected only if they are 
first fixed in a treaty party.92 Unpublished works, on the other hand, are 
granted copyright protection regardless of the nationality or domicile of 
the author.93
It is noted that the term ‘publication’ is defined as the distribution 
of copies of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership.94 
On the face of this definition, content on social media may be considered 
unpublished in the US, as such content is not distributed to the public by 
sale or other transfer of ownership. Thus copyright’s protection of con-
tent on social media could exist irrespective of the nationality or domicile 
of the relevant author.95 There is hence no need to determine the pre-
cise venue of first publication or fixation of content on social media plat-
forms: the treatment of content on social media as unpublished obviates 
this difficulty.96 This would mean that content created by social media 
users without any connection to the US, but which meets the other copy-
right subsistence requirements discussed above, is copyright protected 
in the US.
In the UK a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, sound 
recording or film qualifies for copyright protection if such work, sound 
recording or film is first published in the UK, or the author is a qualify-
ing person (such as a British citizen or a person resident in the UK).97 
The term ‘publication’ is, however, defined more broadly than in the US 
to include not only the issue of copies, but also the making available of 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works to the public by means of an 
electronic retrieval system.98 While there is no definition of the term ‘cop-
ies’, the definition of ‘copying’ is instructive. In this respect ‘copying’ can 
include, among other things, the storing of a literary, dramatic, musical 
or artistic work in any medium by electronic means, as well as the making 
of copies that are transient or incidental to the use of such work.99 By the 
application of these definitions, content shared on social media consti-
tute published works in the UK.
In Australia the requirements for copyright protection are similar 
and refer, among other things, to the place of first publication, or the 
nationality or domicile of the author if the relevant work is published.100 
The term ‘publication’ is widely defined as occurring when reproductions 
of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works are supplied, whether by 
sale or otherwise, to the public.101 Therefore content on social media can 
constitute published works in Australia, just as in the UK. For such works 
to be copyright protected in either jurisdiction, the first publication, 
nationality or residency requirements mentioned earlier will need to be 
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met.102 While nationality and domicile are relatively easy to ascertain if 
the users who authored the content can be identified, the same cannot be 
said of identifying the country of first publication, given the global reach 
of content shared on social media.
This problem is somewhat mitigated by the principle of national 
treatment stipulated under article 5(1) of the Berne Convention which 
requires the country in which protection is claimed to treat foreign and 
domestic authors alike.103 Although it may be challenging to identify 
the venue of first publication, it is more likely than not that the nation-
ality and domicile of a user is that of a contracting party to the Berne 
Convention, given that very few countries are not contracting parties.104 
In general, so long as a user is a national or resident in a Berne Convention 
country, and other copyright subsistence requirements are met, the con-
tent he or she creates on social media will be copyright protected, even if 
the venue of first publication (if published) cannot be ascertained.
This means that, because all three countries are members of the 
Berne Convention,105 just as content created by a social media user resi-
dent in the UK can receive copyright protection as unpublished content 
in the US, content created on social media by a person resident in the US 
will similarly receive copyright protection as published content in the UK, 
pursuant to The Copyright (Application to Other Countries) Order 1993 
in the UK.106 The same content, if available online in Australia, being 
published in a Berne Convention country, is hence copyright protected 
by virtue of the Copyright (International Protection) Regulations 1969 in 
Australia.107
e. infringement: scope of protection
Once the copyright subsistence requirements are satisfied and the rele-
vant content (whether on social media or otherwise) is found to be 
copyright protected, the next step is to inquire into the specific rights 
infringed by the activities undertaken with regard to such content. 
A copyright holder is entitled to a bundle of exclusive rights under the 
US Copyright Act.108 Unless otherwise stated, these rights are held by 
authors of the full range of works that content on social media platforms 
can constitute, namely: literary works; musical works; dramatic works; 
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audi-
ovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural works.109 The most 
basic right in the bundle to which a copyright holder is entitled is the 
right of reproduction.110 As mentioned earlier, the term ‘copies’ is liber-
ally defined. It refers to the material objects in which a work is fixed and 
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from which a work can be communicated, either directly or with the aid 
of a machine or device.111 This broad definition of ‘copies’ includes the 
reproductions of pre- existing content when users interact with such con-
tent on social media. Such reproductions can occur, for example, when 
users share another user’s ‘status update’ on Facebook, ‘re- pin’ a ‘pin’ on 
Pinterest or ‘re- tweet’ another user’s ‘tweet’ on Twitter.
Under the UK Copyright Act, the right of reproduction is one among 
others in a similar bundle of rights.112 ‘Copying’113 can mean, among oth-
ers:  the storing of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work in any 
medium by electronic means (ie, in a material form);114 the making of a 
copy in two dimensions of a three- dimensional work;115 in relation to a 
film or broadcast, the making of a photograph of the whole or substan-
tial part of any image forming part of the film or broadcast;116 and the 
making of copies that are transient or incidental to some other use of a 
work.117 This right of reproduction of a literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work in a material form is similarly set out under the Australian 
Copyright Act.118 In respect of sound recordings and cinematograph films, 
copyright holders have the equivalent right to make copies of the rele-
vant subject matter.119
The term ‘material form’ is widely defined to include any form of 
storage of a work or adaptation, or a substantial part of the work or adap-
tation; at the same time the term ‘copy’ refers to any article or thing in 
which the visual images or sounds comprising a cinematograph film are 
embodied.120 Further, a work, sound recording or film is reproduced if 
it is converted into or from a digital or machine- readable format.121 In 
addition, the right of reproduction under Australian copyright legisla-
tion can be infringed when a two- dimensional work is produced from 
a three- dimensional artistic work.122 There are some exceptions from 
infringement, including one that applies to the taking of a photograph 
of a sculpture situated permanently in a public place.123 There will, how-
ever, be an infringement if a photograph of a privately owned sculpture 
is shared on a platform such as Pinterest. Therefore some content- 
generative activities on social media, such as those described above, 
can involve the infringement of the right to reproduce existing content, 
whether reference is made to this right in the US, the UK or Australia.
The challenge faced is in differentiating these activities from other 
activities which involve de minimis uses (ie, the forms of copying that 
are too trivial for copyright laws to apply) and hence do not amount to 
infringement. In the US, whether the right of reproduction has been 
infringed is determined by the standard of substantial similarity. The 
allegedly infringing work is compared with the original work – both to 
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ascertain the amount of the original work that has been copied, as well 
as the observability of the original work in the allegedly infringing work 
(particularly in the case of visual works).124 In the UK and in Australia, 
the standard is couched in different terms. The reproduction of the whole 
or a substantial part of the original work in the allegedly infringing work 
can amount to infringement.125 In any case, the application of the stand-
ard of substantial similarity in the US may not give rise to a different out-
come from that reached in the UK and in Australia (ie, when the test of 
whether a substantial part of the original work has been reproduced is 
applied). This is given that the latter also involves looking at the similari-
ties between the original and the allegedly infringing works.126
Secondly, the right of a copyright holder to prepare derivative works 
under the US Copyright Act127 may be infringed, for example, when other 
users’ ‘pins’ are modified to form collages on Pinterest or when ‘vid-
ding’ results in new video clips on YouTube. The definition of a ‘deriva-
tive work’ under the US Copyright Act refers to ‘a work based upon one 
or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, 
art reproduction, abridgement, condensation or any other form in which 
a work may be recast, transformed or adapted’ and further states that ‘a 
work consisting of editorial revisions … or other modifications which, as 
a whole, represent an original work of authorship’ is a ‘derivative work’.128 
The allegedly infringing derivative work also has to be ‘substantially simi-
lar’ to the original before it is seen as infringing.129
Further, the scope of application of this right to prepare derivative 
works is unclear. There are uncertainties as to whether material derived 
from an original work which does not qualify for copyright protection 
separately as a secondary work can infringe the derivative works right130 
(although, in any case, the right of reproduction could still be infringed 
if there is substantial similarity). If the view that a derivative work must 
be original and qualify for copyright protection for the derivative work’s 
right to be infringed is adopted, the derivative work’s right will only be 
relevant in a fairly narrow range of situations131 with respect to content 
on social media.
Notwithstanding this, Prince’s sale of art works compris-
ing images shared on Instagram could be an example falling within 
this range of situations.132 These resulting art works can be argued 
to be sufficiently modified (ie, in presentation and scale) by virtue 
of Prince changing the purpose133 of the Instagram images to create 
original works of authorship, and are hence derivative works. They 
may also appear to be substantially similar to the original images as 
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these images are readily observable in the art works134 (although the 
wholesale embodiment of the images within the art works alone is not 
determinative), such that they are infringing of the rights to prepare 
derivative works.135
In the UK there is instead the right to make adaptations of works, 
or to do anything in relation to such adaptations.136 This right of adapta-
tion is only restricted by copyright in a literary, dramatic or musical work 
(but not an artistic work).137 ‘Adaptation’ is further defined under the UK 
Copyright Act. The forms of adaptations include, among others: in rela-
tion to a literary work, a translation of the work or a version of the work 
in which the story is conveyed mainly by pictures in a form suitable for 
reproduction; or, in relation to a musical work, an arrangement or tran-
scription of the work.138 Under the Australian Copyright Act, this right is 
also referred to as the right of adaptation, and only attaches to a literary, 
dramatic or musical work (but not an artistic work).139 What an ‘adapta-
tion’ means is also similarly defined.140 Additionally, in both jurisdictions, 
a copyright holder enjoys further rights to do anything in relation to the 
adaptation of a literary, dramatic or musical work.141 In the UK and in 
Australia, given that the definitions of ‘adaptation’ are different from the 
definition of a ‘derivative work’ in the US, the right to make adaptations 
or to do anything in relation to these adaptations is potentially relevant 
for consideration in relation to different types of content- generative 
activities. The modification of content, undertaken by users on social 
media discussed earlier (ie, those that result in derivative works in the 
US), can, however, be considered in relation as to whether the right of 
reproduction has been infringed.
Thirdly, the right to distribute142 is another right in the bundle. It 
is described, under the US Copyright Act, as the right ‘to distribute cop-
ies or phonorecords of the copyright work to the public by sale or any 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending’.143 As men-
tioned earlier, the term ‘copies’ refers to material objects in which a work 
is fixed and from which a work is communicated.144 In spite of the lack 
of express stipulation, the digital transmission of content has been held 
to fall within the exercise of the exclusive right to distribute.145 Further, 
although the transmission of content on social media platforms to the 
users of such platforms – for example, the sharing of a ‘status update’ on 
Facebook, a ‘tweet’ on Twitter or information on Wikipedia – is not occur-
ring by sale or any other transfer of ownership, a US court is expected to 
take a broader view of a copyright holder’s right to distribute his or her 
content, so as to uphold the exclusive rights held by copyright holders in 
the digital age.146 In this respect, the right to distribute can be infringed 
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through the usual dissemination or making available147 of content on 
social media.
In the UK the equivalent to the right to distribute is the right to issue 
copies of a work to the public.148 In light of the express exclusion of the sub-
sequent distribution of copies previously put into circulation (from the 
exercise of this right) under the UK Copyright Act,149 this right will not be 
infringed by the regular dissemination of content on social media, inso-
far as such dissemination involves content already circulated. Under the 
Australian Copyright Act, the right to publish is provided for in relation 
to literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works.150 This right to (first) 
publish under section 31(1)151 is distinguished from the notion of publi-
cation for the subsistence of copyright under section 32.152 As in the UK, 
the right to publish is arguably not infringed by the typical dissemination 
of content on social media, so long as the content has already been made 
available to the public. Nonetheless, there are limited situations – such 
as the sharing of content known privately on social media for the first 
time (for example, when a private copy of a copyright- protected collage 
is converted into a digital copy and shared on social media, or when an 
image of a private sculpture is disseminated for the first time) – which 
can infringe this right of first publication.
Fourthly, a copyright holder has the right to perform publicly,153 
among others, works such as literary, dramatic or musical works, motion 
pictures or audiovisual works, as well as sound recordings (by means of 
digital audio transmissions). The term ‘performance’ is defined broadly. 
Also, the US Copyright Act makes clear that there is actionable infringe-
ment when there is a transmission of a performance of a copyright work, 
and explains what performing a work publicly means (includes perform-
ing at a place open to the public or transmitting or otherwise commu-
nicating a performance to the public, by means of any device or process, 
notwithstanding that the performance is received in separate places at dif-
ferent times).154 Furthermore, the right to display publicly155 applies (in 
addition to literary, musical or dramatic works) to pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works, as well as individual images of motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works, and is defined broadly enough to include the 
showing of a copy of a work, either directly or by means of a ‘film, slide, 
television image, or any other device or process’.156
Displaying a work publicly is as widely defined as performing a 
work publicly, and includes displaying the work at a place open to the 
public or transmitting or otherwise communicating the display of the 
work, by means of any device or process, notwithstanding that the dis-
play is received in separate places at different times.157 A place open to the 
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public can include a limited space which can accommodate only a few 
people at any one time, and the performance and display of a work are 
considered as ‘public’ irrespective of the composition of the audience.158 
Additionally, a copyright holder has the right to perform a sound record-
ing publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.159
These broad definitions of public performance and display are 
intended to accommodate technological changes. This means that some 
content- generative activities on social media – in particular, the dissemi-
nation of content – can infringe the exclusive right of a copyright holder 
to perform and display publicly his or her content. An example of the for-
mer (ie, right to perform publicly) is the uploading of a television episode 
on YouTube, while an example of the latter (ie, right to display publicly) 
is the ‘pinning’ of a photograph of a private sculpture on Pinterest – both 
without the relevant copyright holders’ consent.
In the UK the equivalent rights are the rights to perform, show or play 
a work in public and to communicate a work to the public.160 The performance 
of a literary, dramatic or musical work includes any mode of visual or acous-
tic presentation, including a presentation by means of a sound recording, 
film or broadcast of the work.161 The UK Copyright Act further provides that 
where copyright is infringed by virtue of the performance, playing or show-
ing of a work, ‘by means of apparatus for receiving visual images or sounds 
conveyed by electronic means’, the person by whom the images or sounds 
are sent is not responsible for the infringement.162 Moreover, the com-
munication to the public of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, 
sound recording, film or broadcast has been broadly defined to include the 
broadcasting of the work or the making available of the work to the public 
by electronic transmission, in a way that members of the public access such 
copyright work from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.163
Given these technologically neutral definitions, the dissemination 
of content on social media can infringe the rights to perform, play, show 
or communicate to the public in the UK. This ‘public’, whether in relation 
to the rights to issue copies (as discussed earlier), to perform, show or 
play, or to communicate,164 has been construed as referring to an inde-
terminate number of recipients, or a fairly large number of persons.165 
More specifically, in respect of a performance made to a limited group of 
persons, the ‘public’ has been interpreted to refer to a ‘copyright owner’s 
public’.166 Such public is considered in relation to the copyright owner – 
where a copyright owner would be exercising his or her statutory right in 
performing before an audience described as the owner’s ‘public’ or part 
of his or her ‘public’, any performance without the owner’s consent to this 
audience or ‘public’ will infringe his or her copyright.167
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In relation to the right to communicate, the concept of ‘public’ has 
been recently qualified in a decision made by the European Court of Justice 
to refer to a ‘new public’ that was not taken into account by the copyright 
holder when he or she authorised the initial exercise of his or her copy-
right.168 The consent of the copyright holder is needed for a communica-
tion made to the ‘new public’.169 Given that the applicability of the concept 
of ‘new public’ in the UK is uncertain,170 some content- generative activities, 
such as those discussed above (ie, the activities on YouTube and Pinterest) 
will likely involve the (unauthorised) exercise of the right to communicate.
In the same vein, a copyright holder of a literary, dramatic or 
musical work has the exclusive right to perform the work in public 
under the Australian Copyright Act,171 as well as the right to commu-
nicate a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work to the public.172 
‘Performance’ has been defined broadly to refer to ‘any mode of vis-
ual or aural presentation … by the use of a record or by any other 
means’.173 The term ‘communicate’ is also defined widely to refer to the 
making available online or electronic transmission of a work or subject 
matter.174 There are equivalent rights in respect of sound recordings 
and cinematograph films, namely, the right to cause the sound record-
ing or film to be seen or heard in public and the right to communicate the 
sound recording or film to the public.175 While the term ‘public’ includes 
a small portion of the public, the phrase ‘to the public’ emphasises the 
nature of the recipient as a member of the public, even if in a private 
situation.176 Audiences in a private situation can constitute the ‘copy-
right owner’s public’ if a work is performed in a commercial setting.177 
It is further noted that ‘to the public’ is defined as the public within 
or outside Australia.178 Thus these rights to perform, communicate or 
cause to be seen or heard in public can be infringed on social media. 
Like in the UK, the right to communicate to the public, in particular, 
is frequently infringed through similar activities to those given in the 
earlier examples.
Among the exclusive rights discussed above, I note that the rights 
to reproduce,179 to make available (in the US)180 and to communicate 
to the public (in the UK181 and in Australia182) will be the most relevant 
rights for consideration in relation to content- generative activities on 
social media.
f. infringement: other rights
Further to the copyrights above, other rights – such as moral rights – held 
by the authors of content can be infringed on social media. Moral rights 
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essentially allow the creators of works to control the treatment and pres-
entation of such works by others.183 The infringement of these rights is 
relevant for consideration in the UK or in Australia, but not in the US, for 
the reasons given below.
The Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)184 that provides for the ‘rights 
of attribution and integrity’185 in the US applies to a very narrow subset of 
works of visual art. This includes paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures 
and still photographic images produced for exhibition purposes, existing 
in single copies or as limited editions.186 As such, moral rights of attribu-
tion and integrity vest only in a very narrow group of persons, being the 
authors of works of visual art.187
Pursuant to the VARA, an author is entitled to: the right of attribu-
tion (ie, the right to claim authorship);188 the right against false attri-
bution (ie, to prevent use of his or her name as the author of any work 
he or she did not create);189 the right to prevent use of his or her name 
where there is a distortion, mutilation or modification of the work that 
would be prejudicial to his or her honour or reputation;190 the right to 
prevent modification of his or her work that would be prejudicial to his 
or her honour or reputation;191 and the right to prevent any intentional 
or grossly negligent destruction of a work of recognised stature.192 The 
right of attribution is suggested to be broad enough to object to misattri-
bution  – this happens, for example, when one’s work is plagiarised 
by another and the plagiarist is credited for the work instead of the 
author.193 The right of integrity is, however, limited by the condition that 
a cause of action for its violation only arises where there is a distortion, 
mutilation or modification that is prejudicial to the author’s honour or 
reputation.194
On the other hand, in the UK, moral rights are held in a broader 
range of works and films. For instance, an author of a literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work195 or the director of a film has the right of attribu-
tion (ie, right to be identified) under the UK Copyright Act.196 Although the 
right against misattribution of a work or film to another is not expressly 
provided for, such right to object to incorrect attribution is one that is 
assumed to fall under the general right to attribution.197 In general, this 
right of attribution arises when literary, dramatic, musical and artistic 
works, as well as films, are published commercially or made available to 
the public, whether by way of issue of sound recordings, films or other 
communication to the public, as applicable.198 There can, however, only 
be infringement of the right of attribution if the author or director has 
previously asserted his or her moral rights – this assertion may be general 
or specific.199
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Separately, there is a right against the false attribution of author-
ship in the UK.200 In the same way, the right of integrity is held in a simi-
larly broad range of works and films, and is violated when a modified 
or adapted work is distorted, mutilated201 or otherwise prejudicial to 
the honour or reputation202 of the author or director.203 Because of the 
wider application of moral rights in the UK, these rights can be infringed 
on social media. For example, the author’s moral right of attribution204 
may be infringed when a commentary shared as a ‘status update’ by a 
Facebook user is plagiarised by another user and shared on Facebook or 
another platform, without identification of the first user as the author. 
A  separate example in which the author’s moral right of integrity205 is 
potentially infringed occurs when a user takes a photograph of an art 
work and vandalises it digitally.
Likewise moral rights under the Australian Copyright Act are 
held broadly in, among others, literary, dramatic, musical and artis-
tic works, as well as cinematograph films,206 but without the require-
ment of assertion. In Australia these basic authorial entitlements are 
divided into three main rights: the right of attribution of authorship; 
the right of integrity; and the right not to have the authorship falsely 
attributed.207 The right against false attribution of authorship differs 
from its namesake in the UK and refers instead to an author’s right not 
to have another identified as the author of his or her work,208 as well 
as his or her right not to have such work altered by another and dealt 
with so as to indicate that the alterations were made by the latter.209 
Separately, the author’s right of integrity to a work is defined as the 
right not to have the work subject to derogatory treatment,210 or that 
which results in a material distortion, mutilation or alteration to the 
work, or otherwise, that is prejudicial to the author’s honour and repu-
tation.211 Moral rights in Australia can be similarly infringed through 
the undertaking of the content- generative activities discussed in the 
paragraph above.
Even where content resulting from generative activities on social 
media meets the subsistence requirements under copyright laws for 
authorship, originality and fixation  – and is henceforth copyright 
protected – users who are authors of content on social media will not be 
entitled to the moral rights specified under the VARA. This is because dig-
itised content on social media falls outside the narrow definition of works 
of visual art under the VARA.212 Although moral rights have a broader 
scope of application in the UK than in the US, there is a requirement of 
assertion to be fulfilled213 in relation to the right of attribution. Typically, 
this requirement will not be met on social media.214
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The right of attribution has, however, a broader scope of appli-
cation in Australia, given the lack of a requirement of assertion there. 
Therefore, with reference to copyright laws in the UK or in Australia, a 
user will hold moral rights (other than the right of attribution in the UK) 
to content resulting from his or her generative activities on social media, 
provided that other subsistence requirements under the respective copy-
right laws are met. Such moral rights can be infringed when other social 
media users interact with this content, through modifying and dissemi-
nating such content.
There are alternative avenues to protect the rights of attribution 
of authors in each of the US, the UK and Australia. They are, however, 
imperfect215 and subject to the satisfaction of substantive requirements 
under the relevant rights management provisions. Under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),216 the intentional removal or alteration 
of ‘copyright management information’ – by a person knowing, or having 
reasonable grounds to know, that the removal or alteration will, among 
others, facilitate or conceal an infringement of any right – is prohibited. 
The term ‘copyright management information’ is defined to include the 
information conveyed in connection with digital copies or displays of a 
work, such as the name of and other identifying information about the 
author or the copyright holder of the work, as well as about the writer, 
performer or director of an audiovisual work (with the exception of pub-
lic performances of works by radio and television broadcast stations).217
‘Copyright management information’ is interpreted to extend to 
any information embedded in a copyright work, independent of the 
use of an automated copyright protection or management system to 
do so  – this includes, for instance, information crediting the author of 
a photograph.218 The copyright management provisions allow for the 
enforcement of moral rights – in particular, the right of attribution219 – 
except that such rights to prevent the removal or alteration of ‘copyright 
management information’ extend more broadly to other categories of 
works220 beyond works of visual art under the VARA.
It has been suggested that the provisions are ineffective in ensur-
ing, among other things, the maintenance of authorship attribution, as 
many claims against the alteration or removal of ‘copyright management 
information’ are likely to flounder on the statutory double intent stand-
ard.221 There is, first, a requirement of knowledge (or reasonable grounds 
for such knowledge) for the removal or alteration to, inter alia, facilitate 
or conceal copyright infringement, and secondly, another requirement 
of knowledge that the information is removed or altered without the 
copyright holder’s authorisation.222 Thus, so long as the double intent 
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standard is met, these provisions are breached in similar circumstances 
to those in which the moral right of attribution is infringed (for instance, 
when the commentary of a Facebook user is plagiarised by another or 
when the information identifying the author of an image digitally cre-
ated and shared on Pinterest is removed).
The equivalent provision to this under the UK Copyright Act refers 
to the rights of a copyright holder against a person’s knowing removal 
or alteration of ‘electronic rights management information’ that is asso-
ciated with a copy of a copyright work, or appears in connection with 
the communication of the copyright work to the public, by a person 
who knows, or has reason to believe, that by doing so, he or she is, inter 
alia, facilitating or concealing a copyright infringement.223 Further, it is 
required that the person knows that he or she has no authority from the 
copyright holder to do so.224
Also, the rights management provisions extend to prohibit the removal 
or alteration of such information when a person, among other things, distrib-
utes or communicates to the public copies of a copyright work.225 The term 
‘rights management information’ is similarly defined to include information 
which identifies the author or the copyright holder of the work.226 These pro-
visions are breached where the moral right of attribution227 is infringed, in 
the same situations as those highlighted above. Just as in the US, the double 
intent standard needs to be satisfied for the prohibition to apply.228
At the same time, under the Australian Copyright Act, a copyright 
holder can bring an action against a person who removes or alters elec-
tronic rights management information relating to a work or subject 
matter  – if the person knew, or ought reasonably to know, that such 
removal or alteration would, inter alia, facilitate or conceal a copyright 
infringement of the work or subject matter.229 In addition, the person has 
removed or altered the information without the permission of the copy-
right holder.230 This right to bring an action extends to when such person, 
among other things, distributes or communicates a copy of the work or 
subject matter to the public in which the electronic rights management 
information has been removed or altered.231 The term ‘electronic man-
agement rights information’ is defined to refer to electronic information 
that is attached to, or embodied in, a copy of the work or subject matter, 
or appears in connection with a communication of such work or subject 
matter, and which, among other things, identifies the author or copyright 
holder of the work or subject matter.232 Again, the right to bring an action 
potentially arises where the moral right of attribution is infringed.233 This 
can happen in relation to the examples given earlier, so long as the double 
intent standard is satisfied (as in the US and the UK).234
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g. infringement: remedies
Where there is infringement of copyright- protected content on social 
media, the next step will be to ascertain the remedies available to the rele-
vant copyright holder. This consequentially highlights the risks that users 
face in undertaking content- generative activities that potentially infringe 
the copyrights held by others. Generally, if a copyright work originated in 
the US, or in a country with which the US does not have copyright treaty 
relations, registration is a pre- requisite to the commencement of copy-
right infringement actions.235 In addition, the requirement of timely regis-
tration (ie, before commencing an action for infringement of copyright in 
an unpublished work, or within three months after the first publication of 
the published work) has to be satisfied if the copyright holder intends to 
elect to recover statutory damages,236 in addition to the usual remedies of 
inter alia, injunctions, damages and account of profits.237
The implications of registration (and non- registration) are signifi-
cant, particularly if one considers that the statutory damages recoverable 
with respect to infringement for any one work is in a wide range – between 
US$ 750 and US$ 30,000, ‘as the court considers just’.238 Additionally, 
if the copyright holder proves wilful infringement, the court may in its 
discretion award up to US$ 150,000 of statutory damages.239 A  case 
where the maximum statutory damages were awarded is Agence France 
Presse v Morel (Morel).240 In this case the jury found that there was wilful 
infringement by the news agencies of the photojournalist Daniel Morel’s 
copyrights in his eight photographs of the Haitian earthquake shared on 
Twitter. Morel was awarded in excess of US$ 300,000 in actual damages 
and profits, as well as the maximum US$ 1.2 million in statutory dam-
ages (based on the award of US$ 150,000 for each of the eight photo-
graphs).241 Notwithstanding that infringing users are potentially subject 
to hefty copyright damages – in view of the availability of a large volume 
of content, including the images shared on social media, and the ease 
with which images can be extracted for publication offline (as illustrated 
by the Morel case) – registering copyrights in the content on social media 
may not be an easy burden for copyright holders to discharge, particu-
larly within the short time frame of three months provided.242
On the other hand, it is not necessary to register for copyright pro-
tection in the UK and in Australia, nor are there any registration systems 
in these countries. In the UK the remedies available to copyright hold-
ers include injunctions, damages and accounts of profits.243 Where the 
defendant in an action for infringement did not know, and had no reason 
to believe, that copyright subsisted in the work, the copyright holder is 
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not entitled to damages, but can still be awarded an injunction and/ or 
account of profits.244 Additional damages may be awarded in special cir-
cumstances, as ‘the justice of the case’ requires.245 Such circumstances 
considered by the court include the flagrancy of the infringement and the 
defendant’s benefit from the infringement.246
Similarly, in Australia either damages or an account of profits can 
be awarded, together with an injunction, to compensate copyright hold-
ers whose copyrights are infringed.247 Damages are not available to a 
copyright holder, if the defendant in question was not aware, and had no 
reasonable grounds to suspect, that his or her act constituted an infringe-
ment. In such a situation, an account of profits may be awarded instead.248 
Additional damages, if appropriate in the specific circumstances, can also 
be awarded.249 The circumstances considered in Australia in the court’s 
assessment of damages are wider than those in the UK. They include, in 
addition to the flagrancy of the infringement and the defendant’s benefit 
from the infringement, the conduct of the defendant after the infringing 
act and whether the infringement involved the conversion of a work or 
other subject matter from hard copy into digital form.250
Therefore, under the US Copyright Act, copyright holders of content251 
on social media can choose to register their content, prior to commencing 
copyright infringement actions against their respective defendants. The 
millions of users interacting with such content on social media on an 
 everyday basis are therefore vulnerably positioned, as they are exposed to 
potentially massive awards of statutory damages. In contrast, under the 
UK Copyright Act and Australian Copyright Act, the quantum of damages 
awarded (whether ordinary or additional) does not fall within as wide a 
range as the statutory damages in the US.252 Moreover, defendant- users 
may be able to establish, within the social media context, that they had no 
reasonable grounds to suspect that copyright subsisted in the (allegedly) 
infringed works253 or that their acts constituted infringement.254 If that is 
the case, social media users who infringe the copyrights of others through 
their content- generative activities will likely be subject to the imposition 
of injunctions and/ or accounts of profits, instead of damages.
h. infringement: fair use and fair dealing exceptions
Users who infringe the copyrights held by others when they engage in 
content- generative activities on social media can consider whether their 
uses are exempt from copyright infringement under copyright exceptions, 
such as the fair use and fair dealing exceptions.255 Through permitting 
some exercise of the copyright holders’ exclusive rights by others, even 
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without their consent, these copyright exceptions balance the rights of 
copyright holders to remuneration against the public’s interest in access-
ing copyright- protected works. These exceptions have been argued to 
create space for cultural engagement on social media by allowing for the 
re- interpretation and remixing of copyright- protected content.256
Content- generative activities undertaken by users on social media 
platforms can give rise to concerns of the infringement of more than one 
right. For example, when a user creates a collage with photographs taken 
by others of sculptures, including private sculptures, he or she potentially 
infringes multiple rights under the US Copyright Act.257 The scope of copy-
right exceptions becomes a more pressing concern than before, because 
the creation, modification and dissemination of content on social media 
often – as illustrated earlier – involve the rights to reproduce,258 to make 
available (in the US)259 and to communicate to the public (in the UK260 
and in Australia).261 The possibilities for infringement increase in propor-
tion to the frequency of these activities. As noted above, the prospect of 
statutory damages is a particularly grave concern for potential infringers.
In this respect, the fair use doctrine in the US serves as a safety 
valve against the rigid application of copyright laws and remedies.262 It 
exempts uses for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching, scholarship and research from copyright infringement, as well 
as acts of parody, satire and even artistic appropriation.263 Further, in 
ascertaining whether the use made of a work is a fair use, the four fac-
tors to be considered include: the purpose and character of the use; the 
nature of the copyright work; the substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyright work; and the effect of the use on the potential 
market for or value of the copyright work.264
At the same time the ‘transformative- ness’ (of a use) – or the alter-
ation of the original work with new expression, meaning or message265 – 
has been recognised as a key element of the fair use analysis in the US.266 
Broad categories of transformative uses demonstrating a change in pur-
pose or character under the fair use doctrine267 have been identified.268 
These include, among other things:  commenting on or criticising the 
original work, or targeting the original work for parody;269 using the orig-
inal work to comment on something else;270 re- contextualising the origi-
nal work through changing the meaning of the work;271 and changing the 
purpose of the original work within an expressive context.272 Although a 
large number of content- generative activities on social media are argu-
ably for purposes such as criticism and comment, it will be impossible 
to predict which specific activity is exempt as fair use and which is not, 
as each of the four factors can be decided differently on the facts of each 
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case. Unsurprisingly then, the application of the doctrine confounds not 
only judges,273 but also users of content.
The fair dealing exceptions in the UK and in Australia exempt speci-
fied categories of purposes from copyright infringement. Although a bal-
ance is also sought between the private interests of copyright holders 
and the wider public interests in the dissemination of ideas, British and 
Australian legislators have taken a more prescriptive approach. In the UK 
there are fair dealing exceptions for the purpose of research and private 
study,274 as well as for the purpose of criticism, review and news report-
ing.275 These exceptions are conditional on a sufficient acknowledgement 
being made, except in respect of fair dealing for the purpose of private 
study.276 Further, fair dealing exceptions for the purposes of quotation, as 
well as for caricature, parody or pastiche, were introduced recently, pur-
suant to The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotation and Parody) 
Regulations 2014.277 Unlike the newly extended fair dealing exception for 
the purpose of criticism, review, quotation and news reporting, there is 
no requirement of acknowledgement under the new fair dealing excep-
tion for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche.278
In Australia the fair dealing exceptions are similar and are for the 
purposes of criticism or review,279 reporting news280 and research or 
study.281 An additional category of fair dealing for the purpose of parody 
or satire282 was introduced under the Copyright Amendment Act 2006.283 
As in the UK, the application of the fair dealing exceptions for the pur-
poses of criticism or review, or for reporting news, are conditional upon 
giving the requisite acknowledgement of the relevant copyright work – 
there is no similar condition in relation to the fair dealing exception for 
the purpose of parody or satire.284 It is worth noting that the Australian 
Law Reform Commission has recommended in its report on copyright 
reform that the fair use exception be introduced as an extension of 
Australia’s existing fair dealing exceptions.285 This recommendation has 
recently been provisionally endorsed by the Productivity Commission in 
its Draft Report on Intellectual Property Arrangements.286
Among these available categories of fair dealing in the UK and 
in Australia, I  argue that the fair dealing exception for the purpose of 
research or study will be of lesser use to users keen to defend their content- 
generative activities undertaken on social media platforms against copy-
right infringement than the exceptions for other purposes. In particular, 
the fair dealing exceptions for the purposes of caricature, parody or pas-
tiche in the UK,287 as well as for parody or satire in Australia288 respect-
ively, are arguably the most relevant to social media users. This is in view 
of the nature of the content- generative activities in which they engage on 
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social media. Taking the example of Australia, before the new exception 
was introduced into the Australian Copyright Act in 2006, the other fair 
dealing exceptions, including the exception for the purpose of criticism 
or review,289 were hard to rely on to excuse parodic or satirical uses due 
to their restrictive interpretations.290
Notwithstanding this, both fair dealing exceptions – whether for the 
purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche in the UK or for the purpose of 
parody or satire in Australia  – are still untested by litigation.291 In addi-
tion, the terms ‘caricature, parody or pastiche’, as well as ‘parody or satire’, 
remain undefined in their respective statutes, giving courts a considerable 
scope to interpret these terms. In this respect, as a pastiche refers to a work 
made from a selection of materials and styles from one or more sources,292 
its broader meaning may make the ‘caricature, parody or pastiche’ defence 
in the UK more suited for exempting uses – particularly when users modify 
content on social media – than the ‘parody or satire’ defence in Australia.
On the other hand, however, the newly extended fair dealing 
exception for the purpose of quotation (whether for criticism, review or 
otherwise) in the UK may be of limited use in exempting social media 
uses. This is given that it is conditional upon: the availability of the origi-
nal work to the public; the use of the quotation being a fair dealing of the 
work; the extent of quotation being no more than is required for its spe-
cific purpose; and its accompaniment by a sufficient acknowledgement 
(unless this is impossible for reasons of practicality or otherwise).293 On 
the face of it, while the first condition may be easily satisfied on social 
media, the same cannot be said for the other three conditions.294
On the whole, because the fair dealing exceptions in the UK and in 
Australia are more prescriptive than the fair use doctrine in the US, ascer-
taining whether a use is exempt as a fair dealing exception is more straight-
forward. Nonetheless, this too involves addressing questions of degree 
and impression, and can reasonably lead to different determinations.295
i. Conflict of laws issues
Before social media users can ascertain whether they have infringed the copy-
rights held by others, they have to decide which laws govern the subsistence 
of copyright in the relevant content, as well as their potentially infringing 
activities. In general, the expansion of digital communications compromises 
the reach and practicality (of enforcement) of territoriality- based domestic 
copyright laws.296 The rapid generation of huge volumes of content on social 
media exacerbates the problems introduced by the fact that cyberspace is 
inherently borderless. Due to the global reach of social media platforms, the 
creation, modification and dissemination of content consequentially occur 
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among users situated in different jurisdictions. However, the principle of ter-
ritoriality to which copyright laws are subject makes it difficult to localise any 
dispute around content on a social media platform to a single jurisdiction.
These transnational disputes occur, for example, when the copy-
right in a work held by a copyright holder in the US is infringed by 
users resident in other jurisdictions, such as the UK and Australia. If the 
infringement action is commenced in either the UK or Australia, refer-
ence may be made to the rights of the copyright holder of such work in 
the US. On the other hand, if the action is instead commenced in the US, 
it will be related to infringing activities occurring outside the US, includ-
ing but not limited to the UK and Australia (given the nature of the inter-
net).297 A user is exposed to the challenge of identifying which copyright 
laws apply and hence faces greater uncertainty over the legitimacy of the 
content- generative activities he or she undertakes.298
Currently, there is no clear direction provided under existing inter-
national conventions, or otherwise, on the private international law of 
intellectual property. It has been suggested that this lack of direction may 
explain why provisions in international intellectual property instruments 
resembling conflicts principles are sometimes adopted without any 
attempt to relate them to any coherent principle of private international 
law.299 For instance, while the principle of national treatment stipulated 
in article 5(1) of the Berne Convention requires the country in which pro-
tection is claimed to treat foreign and domestic authors alike, it is not 
read as a conflicts rule.300 Also, notwithstanding the reaffirmation of the 
principle of national treatment in article 3(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, 
the article is seen to operate as a constraint on the choice of law rules that 
a country adopts rather than as a mandate of a particular rule.301
In addition, the view that article 5(2) of the Berne Convention 
endorses the lex loci protectionis (ie, the law of the jurisdiction for which 
protection is sought) is the majority view, but one not without its detrac-
tors.302 The international flow of copyright- protected content and the 
ubiquity of content disseminated online – both effects amplified on social 
media – have evoked doubts around the applicability of the lex loci pro-
tectionis choice of law rule, given that lex loci protectionis may not cap-
ture the complete set of ‘affinities’, or connecting factors, that govern the 
conduct of users online.303 As such, the breadth of private international 
intellectual property law today gives little guidance to potential litigants 
involved in copyright disputes relating to content on social media.
There are, however, initiatives that have proposed possible solutions 
regarding the jurisdiction, choice of law and the enforcement of judge-
ments in transnational intellectual property disputes, such as the principles 
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adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI Principles) in 2007304 and the 
Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property prepared by the 
European Max Planck Group (CLIP Principles) in 2011.305 Under both the 
ALI Principles306 and the CLIP Principles,307 a person may be sued in any 
state in which he or she is resident. The same person can also be sued in 
any state in which he or she has acted to initiate or further the alleged 
infringement, or if such person has directed his or her activities to that 
state.308 Thus there is more than one jurisdiction in which the action can be 
commenced. Finally, there are rules dealing with ubiquitous infringement 
under both sets of principles that recognise the problem of having a multi-
tude of applicable laws and attempt to solve that by referring to the law 
or laws of the state or states with the closest connection to the dispute.309 
The difference between the two is that the ALI Principles refer to both 
parties,310 but the CLIP Principles refer mainly to the infringer’s 
location.311 Even with the guidance of these principles, the factors taken 
into account to ascertain the state (and hence the applicable law) having the 
closest connection with the infringement – including the residency of the 
parties312 (or the infringer),313 as well as the principal markets toward which 
the parties directed their activities314 (or the place where the harm caused 
by the infringement is substantial in relation to the infringement in its 
entirety)315 – will prove challenging to identify in the case of social media.
While there are no clear answers, the following preliminary questions 
could guide a copyright holder in ascertaining where he or she can enforce 
his or her rights in relation to content- generative activities on social media:
 (i) Which court has the jurisdiction to govern the dispute?
 (ii) Which governing law will this court apply? Will the same gov-
erning law apply across the various copyright subsistence and 
infringement issues?
 (iii) Will judgements given by the court be recognised and enforced in 
other jurisdictions?
In the next chapter, I will discuss how the terms of service of social media 
platforms attempt to address some of the above questions and the result-
ing implications for social media users.
j. summary
Table 2.1 below serves as a summary of the above discussion relating to 
the application of copyright laws in the US, the UK and Australia to the 
content- generative activities of social media users, and the unique chal-
lenges arising from such application.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.1 Summary of the application of copyright laws in the US, the UK and Australia to the content- generative activities of social 
media users
No. Copyright 
issues
Jurisdictions Other comments
US UK Australia
1 Subject matter 
protected
Literary works
Musical works
Dramatic works
Pictorial works
Graphic works
Sculptural works
Audiovisual works
Sound recordings
Architectural works
Compilations and derivative  
works (excluding material 
used unlawfully or pre- existing 
material not contributed by the 
author in question)
Literary works
Dramatic works
Musical works
Artistic works
Broadcasts
Sound recordings
Films
Literary works
Dramatic works
Musical works
Artistic works
Sound recordings
Cinematograph films
Idea– expression dichotomy across the three juris-
dictions (ie, only expressions, not ideas, are enti-
tled to copyright protection)
Doctrine of merger and ‘scènes à faire’ are concepts 
that fill the gaps in this distinction in the US
2 Originality Requirement of creativity
‘Sweat of the brow’ insufficient
Result of ‘skill, labour or 
experience’
Result of ‘skill, labour or 
experience’
Even then, original words on their own, or short 
phrases, may not qualify for copyright protection 
in the UK and in Australia
Whether content crosses the threshold for original-
ity is always a question of degree and depends on 
the factual circumstances
Consider also the application of the de minimis princi-
ple (ie, copyright- protected works need to comprise a 
minimal amount of content)
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No. Copyright 
issues
Jurisdictions Other comments
US UK Australia
3 Authorship Term ‘author’ is not defined, 
although the term ‘joint 
work’ is
Requirement of contemporane-
ous intentions of joint authors 
for the creation of a joint work
Term ‘author’ is defined 
simply (ie, person who 
creates a work)
‘Work of joint authorship’ 
is also defined
Term ‘author’ is defined (only 
in relation to a photograph)
‘Work of joint authorship’ is 
also defined
May be tedious to identify all the human authors 
of content on social media
Dilemmas around the designation of authorship 
(whether single, joint or multiple) and the identi-
fication of the authors are amplified with regard to 
content generated on collaborative projects such 
as Wikipedia
4 Fixation, record-
ing or reduction 
to material form
Requirement of fixation 
in a tangible medium of 
expression – work has to be 
sufficiently stable to permit its 
communication,
or otherwise communicated 
for more than a transitory 
period
Requirement of being 
recorded, in writing or 
otherwise (for literary, dra-
matic and musical works)
See also the definitions for 
an artistic work (means, 
inter alia, any painting, 
photograph [also defined 
as a recording of light or 
other radiation on any 
medium], and so on) and 
broadcast
Sound recordings and 
films – requirement of 
being recordings on any 
medium
Requirement of being reduced 
to writing or some other mate-
rial form (for literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic works)
See also the broad definitions 
for sound recordings and 
cinematograph films
Content on social networking sites and blogs 
(especially micro- blogs) may not meet the fixation 
requirement – or its equivalent – for copyright pro-
tection, since it may be deleted after a short while 
and is not stored separately
There are also long- term collaborative projects 
such as the Wikipedia platform, where the con-
tinual participation of users is invited, and as such 
it is challenging to identify at which point content 
(and what content, if so) is fixed, recorded, or 
reduced to material form
Table 2.1 (Cont.)
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(continued)
No. Copyright 
issues
Jurisdictions Other comments
US UK Australia
Limited definitions of 
‘publication’
(ie, distribution of copies … by 
sale or other transfer of owner-
ship) and ‘copies’ (ie, material 
objects) apply, such that con-
tent on social media is taken 
to be unpublished – copyright 
subsists irrespective of the 
nationality or domicile of the 
author
Therefore, there is no need to 
determine the precise venue of 
first publication or fixation
Definitions of ‘publica-
tion’ and ‘copying’ much 
broader, such that content 
on social media will con-
stitute published works – 
copyright will only  
subsist if the author is a 
British citizen or resident, 
or if the country of first 
publication is the UK
Need to determine the 
precise venue of first 
publication, if the require-
ment of nationality or 
domicile is not met
Definition of ‘publication’ is 
broadly defined, such that 
content on social media will 
constitute published works – 
copyright will only subsist if the 
author is an Australian citizen 
or resident, or if the country of 
first publication is Australia
Need to determine the precise 
venue of first publication, if the 
requirement of nationality or 
domicile is not met
Furthermore, the venue of first publication may be 
hard to ascertain on social media
In the US, this issue is obviated from consid-
eration. In the UK and in Australia identifying 
the venue of first publication may be needed – 
although this problem is mitigated in view of 
the principle of national treatment in the Berne 
Convention and the convention’s wide membership
So long as the user is a national or resident of a 
Berne Convention country, the content is likely to 
be copyright protected if other subsistence require-
ments are met, regardless of where the content is 
first published (if published)
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No. Copyright 
issues
Jurisdictions Other comments
US UK Australia
5 Scope of 
protection
Right of reproduction (applies 
to, inter alia: literary, musical 
and dramatic works; pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works; 
motion pictures and other audi-
ovisual works; sound record-
ings; and architectural works)
Note that the term ‘copies’ is 
liberally defined to refer to 
material objects in which a 
work is fixed, and from which 
a work can be communicated, 
either directly or with the aid 
of a machine or device
Right of reproduction 
(applies to, inter alia, 
literary, dramatic,  
musical and artistic 
works, as well as films)
Note that the references 
to ‘copying’ are broad and 
can include the storing of 
a work in any medium by 
electronic means, as well 
as the making of copies 
that are transient or inci-
dental to some other use 
of the work
Right of reproduction (applies 
to, inter alia, literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic works, as well 
as to sound recordings and cin-
ematograph films)
Note that in relation to this 
right, references are made to 
conversion into or from a digi-
tal format
The right of reproduction in the US, the UK and 
Australia can be infringed when users engage in 
some content- generative activities on social media
Right to prepare derivative 
works (applies to, inter alia, all 
the categories of works listed 
above) – note the preparation 
of a derivative work, even 
prior to fixation, can be an 
infringement
Uncertainties as to whether 
material derived from original 
work which does not qualify for 
copyright protection separately 
as a secondary work can infringe 
the derivative work’s right
Right to make adapta-
tions of works, or to do 
anything in relation to 
these adaptations (applies 
to, inter alia, literary, dra-
matic and musical works, 
but not artistic works)
May be exercised when 
undertaking content- 
generative activities (for 
instance, the translation 
of a literary work, convey-
ing a story in a different 
version with pictures, 
arranging or transcribing a 
musical work, and so on)
Right to make adaptations of 
works, or to do anything in 
relation to these adaptations 
(applies to, inter alia, literary, 
dramatic and musical works, 
but not artistic works)
May be exercised when undertak-
ing content- generative activities 
(for instance, the translation of a 
literary work, conveying a story 
in a different version with pic-
tures, arranging or transcribing a 
musical work, and so on)
Given the differences in the definitions of a ‘deriva-
tive work’ in the US and ‘adaptation’ in the UK 
and in Australia, the right to make adaptations or 
to do anything in relation to such adaptations is 
potentially relevant for consideration in relation to  
different types of content- generative activities on 
social media
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US UK Australia
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No. Copyright 
issues
Jurisdictions Other comments
US UK Australia
Right to distribute (applies to, 
inter alia, all the categories of 
works listed above). Note that 
this right is broadly interpreted 
such that digital transmission 
(including the transmission 
of content on social media) is 
included within the exercise of 
this right
Right to issue copies to 
the public (applies to, 
inter alia, literary, dra-
matic, musical and artistic 
works, as well as sound 
recordings and films). 
Note that the description 
of this right excludes 
subsequent distribution 
of copies already put 
into circulation; as such, 
this right will not be 
infringed by the regular 
dissemination of content 
on social media (insofar 
as such dissemination 
involves content already 
circulated)
Right to (first) publish (applies 
to, inter alia, literary, dramatic, 
musical and artistic works) – 
distinguished from the notion 
of publication for the subsist-
ence of copyright
This right will only be infringed 
in limited circumstances (ie, 
in relation to content that has 
not been made available to the 
public)
The rights to distribute in the US can be infringed 
by the usual dissemination of content on 
social media
The rights to issue copies to the public in the UK, 
as well as to (first) publish in Australia, are not 
infringed by the usual dissemination of content on 
social media
Right to perform (applies to, 
inter alia, literary, musical and 
dramatic works, motion pic-
tures, other audiovisual works 
and sound recordings [ie, by 
digital audio transmission])  
and the right to display (applies 
to, inter alia, literary, musical 
and dramatic works, pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works, 
as well as individual images of 
motion pictures and other audi-
ovisual works). Note that ‘audi-
ovisual works’, as well as what 
it means to perform or display a 
work publicly, are very broadly 
defined – these rights are fre-
quently exercised on
social media
Right to perform, show 
or play a work in public 
(applies to, inter alia, 
literary, dramatic and 
musical works, sound 
recordings, films and 
broadcasts) and the right 
to communicate a work 
to the public (applies to, 
inter alia, literary, dra-
matic, musical and artistic 
works, sound recordings, 
films and broadcasts) – 
note that the right to 
perform, show or play, as 
well as the right to com-
municate, is defined very 
broadly to include elec-
tronic means and trans-
missions. In particular, 
the right to communicate 
is frequently exercised on 
social media
Right to perform a work in pub-
lic (applies to, inter alia, literary, 
dramatic and musical works) 
and the right to communicate 
a work to the public (applies 
to, inter alia, literary, dramatic, 
musical and artistic works) – 
note that the terms ‘perfor-
mance’ and ‘communicate’ are 
defined broadly to include elec-
tronic transmissions
Equivalent rights are available in 
respect of sound recordings and 
cinematograph films (ie, right 
to cause to be seen or heard in 
public [as applicable], as well as 
the right to communicate to the 
public)
In particular, the right to commu-
nicate is frequently exercised on 
social media
Among the bundle of rights, the rights to repro-
duce, to make available in the US (ie, to distribute, 
perform and display) and to communicate in the 
UK and in Australia are the most relevant rights 
for consideration in relation to content- generative 
activities on social media
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Right to distribute (applies to, 
inter alia, all the categories of 
works listed above). Note that 
this right is broadly interpreted 
such that digital transmission 
(including the transmission 
of content on social media) is 
included within the exercise of 
this right
Right to issue copies to 
the public (applies to, 
inter alia, literary, dra-
matic, musical and artistic 
works, as well as sound 
recordings and films). 
Note that the description 
of this right excludes 
subsequent distribution 
of copies already put 
into circulation; as such, 
this right will not be 
infringed by the regular 
dissemination of content 
on social media (insofar 
as such dissemination 
involves content already 
circulated)
Right to (first) publish (applies 
to, inter alia, literary, dramatic, 
musical and artistic works) – 
distinguished from the notion 
of publication for the subsist-
ence of copyright
This right will only be infringed 
in limited circumstances (ie, 
in relation to content that has 
not been made available to the 
public)
The rights to distribute in the US can be infringed 
by the usual dissemination of content on 
social media
The rights to issue copies to the public in the UK, 
as well as to (first) publish in Australia, are not 
infringed by the usual dissemination of content on 
social media
Right to perform (applies to, 
inter alia, literary, musical and 
dramatic works, motion pic-
tures, other audiovisual works 
and sound recordings [ie, by 
digital audio transmission])  
and the right to display (applies 
to, inter alia, literary, musical 
and dramatic works, pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works, 
as well as individual images of 
motion pictures and other audi-
ovisual works). Note that ‘audi-
ovisual works’, as well as what 
it means to perform or display a 
work publicly, are very broadly 
defined – these rights are fre-
quently exercised on
social media
Right to perform, show 
or play a work in public 
(applies to, inter alia, 
literary, dramatic and 
musical works, sound 
recordings, films and 
broadcasts) and the right 
to communicate a work 
to the public (applies to, 
inter alia, literary, dra-
matic, musical and artistic 
works, sound recordings, 
films and broadcasts) – 
note that the right to 
perform, show or play, as 
well as the right to com-
municate, is defined very 
broadly to include elec-
tronic means and trans-
missions. In particular, 
the right to communicate 
is frequently exercised on 
social media
Right to perform a work in pub-
lic (applies to, inter alia, literary, 
dramatic and musical works) 
and the right to communicate 
a work to the public (applies 
to, inter alia, literary, dramatic, 
musical and artistic works) – 
note that the terms ‘perfor-
mance’ and ‘communicate’ are 
defined broadly to include elec-
tronic transmissions
Equivalent rights are available in 
respect of sound recordings and 
cinematograph films (ie, right 
to cause to be seen or heard in 
public [as applicable], as well as 
the right to communicate to the 
public)
In particular, the right to commu-
nicate is frequently exercised on 
social media
Among the bundle of rights, the rights to repro-
duce, to make available in the US (ie, to distribute, 
perform and display) and to communicate in the 
UK and in Australia are the most relevant rights 
for consideration in relation to content- generative 
activities on social media
  
No. Copyright 
issues
Jurisdictions Other comments
US UK Australia
6 Other rights Moral rights of attribution and 
integrity apply only to works of 
visual art
Right of attribution – possibly 
broad enough to object to 
misattribution
Right against false attribution
Moral rights of attribution 
and integrity apply to, 
inter alia, literary, dra-
matic, musical and artistic 
works, as well as films
Right of attribution – note 
that right against misat-
tribution assumed to 
exist, even if not clearly 
provided for
Right against false 
attribution
Not withstanding the 
above, there is a require-
ment of assertion (ie, that 
the author or director has 
asserted his or her moral 
right of attribution)
Moral rights of attribution and 
integrity apply to, inter alia, 
literary, dramatic, musical 
and artistic works, as well as 
cinematograph films
Right of attribution of 
authorship
Right against false attribution 
(note that this refers instead to 
what is called misattribution 
in the US and in the UK [ie, the 
right of an author or director 
not to have another identified 
as the author or director of his 
or her work or film])
No requirement for assertion
Users who are authors of content on social media 
will not hold moral rights to such digitised con-
tent, which falls outside the definition of works of 
visual art under the VARA
On the other hand, users who are authors of con-
tent on social media can hold moral rights in their 
content resulting from content- generative activities 
under both the UK Copyright Act (other than the 
right of attribution, as the requirement of asser-
tion will not likely be fulfilled) and the Australian 
Copyright Act, provided that other copyright sub-
sistence requirements are met – these moral rights 
of attribution and integrity can conceivably be 
infringed when users interact with such content, 
through modifying and disseminating the content
Under the right of integrity, the 
right of an author to prevent 
use of his or her name when 
there is distortion of a work 
that would be prejudicial to his 
or her honour or reputation
Under the right of integrity, the 
right to prevent modification of 
his or her work that would be 
prejudicial to his or her honour 
or reputation
Under the right of integrity,  
the right to prevent any  
intentional or grossly  
negligent destruction of a  
work of recognised stature
Right of integrity to work 
(which can be violated 
when a modified work 
is, inter alia, distorted or 
otherwise prejudicial to 
the honour or reputation 
of the author of a work,  
or director of a film)
In general, moral rights 
are of a broader applica-
tion as they are held by 
copyright holders in a 
broader range of works 
(including literary, dra-
matic, musical and artistic 
works, as well as films)
Under the right of integrity, 
the right not to have the work 
subject to derogatory treatment 
(further defined to mean any-
thing that results in, inter alia, a 
distortion to the work or is preju-
dicial to the author’s honour or 
reputation)
Clearly stipulated that the right 
of integrity is violated by a per-
son who engages in various acts 
in respect of the derogatorily 
treated
In general, moral rights are of a 
broader application as they are 
held by copyright holders in a 
broader range of works (includ-
ing literary, dramatic, musical 
and artistic works, as well as 
films)
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6 Other rights Moral rights of attribution and 
integrity apply only to works of 
visual art
Right of attribution – possibly 
broad enough to object to 
misattribution
Right against false attribution
Moral rights of attribution 
and integrity apply to, 
inter alia, literary, dra-
matic, musical and artistic 
works, as well as films
Right of attribution – note 
that right against misat-
tribution assumed to 
exist, even if not clearly 
provided for
Right against false 
attribution
Not withstanding the 
above, there is a require-
ment of assertion (ie, that 
the author or director has 
asserted his or her moral 
right of attribution)
Moral rights of attribution and 
integrity apply to, inter alia, 
literary, dramatic, musical 
and artistic works, as well as 
cinematograph films
Right of attribution of 
authorship
Right against false attribution 
(note that this refers instead to 
what is called misattribution 
in the US and in the UK [ie, the 
right of an author or director 
not to have another identified 
as the author or director of his 
or her work or film])
No requirement for assertion
Users who are authors of content on social media 
will not hold moral rights to such digitised con-
tent, which falls outside the definition of works of 
visual art under the VARA
On the other hand, users who are authors of con-
tent on social media can hold moral rights in their 
content resulting from content- generative activities 
under both the UK Copyright Act (other than the 
right of attribution, as the requirement of asser-
tion will not likely be fulfilled) and the Australian 
Copyright Act, provided that other copyright sub-
sistence requirements are met – these moral rights 
of attribution and integrity can conceivably be 
infringed when users interact with such content, 
through modifying and disseminating the content
Under the right of integrity, the 
right of an author to prevent 
use of his or her name when 
there is distortion of a work 
that would be prejudicial to his 
or her honour or reputation
Under the right of integrity, the 
right to prevent modification of 
his or her work that would be 
prejudicial to his or her honour 
or reputation
Under the right of integrity,  
the right to prevent any  
intentional or grossly  
negligent destruction of a  
work of recognised stature
Right of integrity to work 
(which can be violated 
when a modified work 
is, inter alia, distorted or 
otherwise prejudicial to 
the honour or reputation 
of the author of a work,  
or director of a film)
In general, moral rights 
are of a broader applica-
tion as they are held by 
copyright holders in a 
broader range of works 
(including literary, dra-
matic, musical and artistic 
works, as well as films)
Under the right of integrity, 
the right not to have the work 
subject to derogatory treatment 
(further defined to mean any-
thing that results in, inter alia, a 
distortion to the work or is preju-
dicial to the author’s honour or 
reputation)
Clearly stipulated that the right 
of integrity is violated by a per-
son who engages in various acts 
in respect of the derogatorily 
treated
In general, moral rights are of a 
broader application as they are 
held by copyright holders in a 
broader range of works (includ-
ing literary, dramatic, musical 
and artistic works, as well as 
films)
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Right to prohibit the removal or 
alteration of ‘copyright manage-
ment information’ – the rel-
evant provision allows for the 
enforcement of moral rights, 
except that it extends more 
broadly to other categories of 
works (ie, literary, musical, dra-
matic, pictorial, graphic, sculp-
tural and audiovisual works, as 
well as sound- recordings, archi-
tectural works, compilations 
and derivative works)
Right against a person’s 
knowing removal or alter-
ation of ‘electronic rights 
management information’, 
which is associated with a 
copy of a copyright work 
or appears in connection 
with the communication 
to the public of a copyright 
work (includes a literary, 
dramatic, musical or artis-
tic work, broadcast, sound 
recording or film)
Right against a person’s 
removal or alteration of ‘elec-
tronic rights management 
information relating to a work 
or subject matter (includes a 
literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work, sound recording 
or cine matograph film)
These rights arise for enforcement where the 
moral right of attribution is infringed, except that 
there is a requirement for knowledge (or reason-
able grounds for knowledge or belief) that the 
removal or alteration will, inter alia, facilitate 
or conceal a copyright infringement, in addition 
to the requisite knowledge that the removal or 
alteration is done without the authorisation of the 
copyright holder – the relevant provisions provide 
an alternative avenue for the enforcement of the 
rights of attribution, albeit imperfect and subject 
to the satisfaction of the double intent standard
7 Remedies for 
infringement
Registration is a pre- requisite 
to the institution of copyright 
infringement actions
Additional requirement of 
timely registration for statu-
tory damages (ie, three months 
after the first publication of a 
work, or before the commence-
ment of a copyright action for 
an unpublished work)
No registration 
requirement
Grant of injunctions, 
damages and/ or accounts 
of profits are possible 
remedies
No registration requirement
Grant of injunctions, damages 
and/ or accounts of profits are 
possible remedies
Registration requirement in the US is not an easy 
burden to discharge, but when discharged, a very 
large sum of damages can be awarded if infringe-
ment is found to be wilful
Users are therefore exposed to a wider range of 
statutory damages in the US than in the UK and 
Australia (although the awards of additional dam-
ages can still be high in Australia)
Statutory damages recoverable 
in a wide range of between 
US$ 750 and US$ 30,000, with 
respect to an infringement for 
any one work
In the case of wilful infringe-
ment, court can award up to US$ 
150,000 of statutory damages
Note that damages are not 
likely to be awarded when 
the defendant did not 
know, and had no reason 
to believe, that copyright 
subsisted in the relevant 
work
Note that damages are not 
likely to be awarded when the 
defendant was not aware, and 
had no reasonable grounds to 
suspect, that his or her act con-
stituted an infringement
Also, in the UK and in Australia, defendant- users 
may be able to defend themselves against awards 
of damages for infringement, through establish-
ing that they had no reason to believe copyright 
subsisted in the relevant content on social media, 
or that they had no reasonable grounds to suspect 
that their acts were infringing
8 Defences such  
as fair use and 
fair dealing
Fair use doctrine Fair dealing exceptions 
(ie, for the purposes of 
criticism, review, quota-
tion and news reporting, 
as well as caricature, 
parody or pastiche)
Fair dealing exceptions (ie, 
for the purposes of criticism 
or review, reporting news and 
parody or satire)
Unpredictability around the application of the fair 
use doctrine in the US to the content- generative 
activities of social media users
The fair dealing exceptions for the purpose of 
caricature, parody or pastiche in the UK, and for 
the purpose of parody or satire in Australia, are 
the more relevant defences to social media users – 
although both are untested, the UK defence is pos-
sibly wider than its Australian counterpart
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Right to prohibit the removal or 
alteration of ‘copyright manage-
ment information’ – the rel-
evant provision allows for the 
enforcement of moral rights, 
except that it extends more 
broadly to other categories of 
works (ie, literary, musical, dra-
matic, pictorial, graphic, sculp-
tural and audiovisual works, as 
well as sound- recordings, archi-
tectural works, compilations 
and derivative works)
Right against a person’s 
knowing removal or alter-
ation of ‘electronic rights 
management information’, 
which is associated with a 
copy of a copyright work 
or appears in connection 
with the communication 
to the public of a copyright 
work (includes a literary, 
dramatic, musical or artis-
tic work, broadcast, sound 
recording or film)
Right against a person’s 
removal or alteration of ‘elec-
tronic rights management 
information relating to a work 
or subject matter (includes a 
literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work, sound recording 
or cine matograph film)
These rights arise for enforcement where the 
moral right of attribution is infringed, except that 
there is a requirement for knowledge (or reason-
able grounds for knowledge or belief) that the 
removal or alteration will, inter alia, facilitate 
or conceal a copyright infringement, in addition 
to the requisite knowledge that the removal or 
alteration is done without the authorisation of the 
copyright holder – the relevant provisions provide 
an alternative avenue for the enforcement of the 
rights of attribution, albeit imperfect and subject 
to the satisfaction of the double intent standard
7 Remedies for 
infringement
Registration is a pre- requisite 
to the institution of copyright 
infringement actions
Additional requirement of 
timely registration for statu-
tory damages (ie, three months 
after the first publication of a 
work, or before the commence-
ment of a copyright action for 
an unpublished work)
No registration 
requirement
Grant of injunctions, 
damages and/ or accounts 
of profits are possible 
remedies
No registration requirement
Grant of injunctions, damages 
and/ or accounts of profits are 
possible remedies
Registration requirement in the US is not an easy 
burden to discharge, but when discharged, a very 
large sum of damages can be awarded if infringe-
ment is found to be wilful
Users are therefore exposed to a wider range of 
statutory damages in the US than in the UK and 
Australia (although the awards of additional dam-
ages can still be high in Australia)
Statutory damages recoverable 
in a wide range of between 
US$ 750 and US$ 30,000, with 
respect to an infringement for 
any one work
In the case of wilful infringe-
ment, court can award up to US$ 
150,000 of statutory damages
Note that damages are not 
likely to be awarded when 
the defendant did not 
know, and had no reason 
to believe, that copyright 
subsisted in the relevant 
work
Note that damages are not 
likely to be awarded when the 
defendant was not aware, and 
had no reasonable grounds to 
suspect, that his or her act con-
stituted an infringement
Also, in the UK and in Australia, defendant- users 
may be able to defend themselves against awards 
of damages for infringement, through establish-
ing that they had no reason to believe copyright 
subsisted in the relevant content on social media, 
or that they had no reasonable grounds to suspect 
that their acts were infringing
8 Defences such  
as fair use and 
fair dealing
Fair use doctrine Fair dealing exceptions 
(ie, for the purposes of 
criticism, review, quota-
tion and news reporting, 
as well as caricature, 
parody or pastiche)
Fair dealing exceptions (ie, 
for the purposes of criticism 
or review, reporting news and 
parody or satire)
Unpredictability around the application of the fair 
use doctrine in the US to the content- generative 
activities of social media users
The fair dealing exceptions for the purpose of 
caricature, parody or pastiche in the UK, and for 
the purpose of parody or satire in Australia, are 
the more relevant defences to social media users – 
although both are untested, the UK defence is pos-
sibly wider than its Australian counterpart
(continued)
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9 Conflict of laws Little guidance on the private international law of intellectual property
Principle of national treatment articulated in the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement 
is not a conflicts rule
Lex loci protectionis (ie, law of the jurisdiction for which protection is sought) is the default 
view – but has its detractors, since it does not capture the complete set of affinities that gov-
ern the conduct of users online
More than one jurisdiction, as well as applicable law, can be identified under both the ALI 
Principles and the CLIP Principles, in transnational disputes
Challenge of identifying the jurisdiction, as well as 
applicable law, for disputes relating to copyright- 
protected content on social media. It is thus 
uncertain for social media users to ascertain the 
legitimacy of their content- generative activities 
under copyright laws
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II. Scenario one: the application of copyright laws
The case study of Jane in Chapter One serves as the basis on which the 
copyright laws discussed in this chapter can be applied to the content- 
generative activities undertaken by Jane and other users. Jane’s day will 
be dissected to allow for a consideration of the copyright issues arising 
from each activity she and other users undertake, in chronological order. 
I then consider the possible grounds of liability and whether exceptions 
apply under the respective copyright laws for each activity. For this 
purpose, I  assume that the relevant connecting factors for protection 
under each law (nationality, residence, place of first publication and so 
on) are met.316
a. jane’s use of the music video clip on youTube as 
her morning alarm
Under the US Copyright Act the video clip in its entirety is a copyright- 
protected ‘audiovisual work’; the lyrics in it constitute a literary work, 
while the music in it constitutes a musical work. This same video clip is 
a copyright- protected film comprising a literary work (ie, in the lyrics) 
and a musical work (ie, in the musical score) under the UK Copyright 
Act and the Australian Copyright Act. I  argue that Jane’s use of the 
video clip infringes the right of reproduction in the US, the UK and 
Australia.317
Although the right of reproduction is arguably infringed, Jane’s 
use is likely to qualify as a fair use in the US. Given that her use is pri-
vate and non- commercial, at least two of the four fair use factors – the 
purpose and character of use, as well as the effect of the use on the 
potential market for the copyright work – are likely to tip the balance 
in her favour.318 This is in spite of the possibility that another factor, 
being the substantiality of the portion used,319 does otherwise. In the 
UK Jane’s use does not fall within the fair dealing exceptions, including 
the exceptions for the purposes of criticism, review, quotation and news 
reporting,320 or caricature, parody or pastiche.321 Furthermore, the pri-
vate copying exception under The Copyright and Rights in Performances 
(Personal Copies for Private Use) Regulations 2014322 is fairly narrow and 
may not excuse Jane’s use. Although Jane makes a personal copy for pri-
vate use each time she uses the video clip as her morning alarm, I argue 
that she does not satisfy the condition of having lawfully acquired the 
video clip on a permanent basis, by her use of the relevant application 
on her mobile phone. Finally, Jane’s use is not exempt in Australia, as 
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her use does not fall within the fair dealing exceptions for the purposes 
of criticism or review,323 parody or satire,324 or reporting news.325 In 
addition, the exceptions for private and domestic uses will not apply to 
Jane’s use for two reasons. Firstly, the video clip is not included within 
the categories of copyright- protected material under these private and 
domestic use exceptions;326 secondly, there is a condition of ownership 
under most of these provisions.327
The above suggests that Jane has infringed the copyright laws in 
the UK and Australia, but not in the US.328
b. jane’s ‘pinning’ of the youTube music video clip on   
her pin- board titled ‘My favourite Things’ on Pinterest
Jane’s ‘pinning’ of the video clip on Pinterest may infringe the right to 
distribute329 held by the copyright holder of the video clip under the US 
Copyright Act. The position is different under the UK Copyright Act, as the 
description of the right to issue copies to the public330 specifically excludes 
subsequent distribution of copies already put into circulation  – in this 
case, the video clip is already shared on YouTube. Under the Australian 
Copyright Act the right to (first) publish331 is also not infringed by Jane’s 
‘pinning’, given that the video clip has already been made available to the 
public on YouTube.
In addition, a case can likely be made out for Jane’s infringement 
of the copyright holder’s rights  to perform and to display a work pub-
licly in the US;332 to perform, show or play a work in public, as well as to 
communicate the work to the public in the UK;333 and to perform, cause 
to be seen or heard in public, as well as to communicate the work and copy-
right protected subject matter to the public in Australia.334 As the audience 
of the video clip shared on Jane’s pin- board comprises an expanding 
group of users who choose to ‘follow’ Jane or this pin- board in particular, 
and who can access the video clip in separate places at different times on 
the Pinterest platform, the requirement for performing or displaying a 
work ‘publicly’ is met in the US.335 At the same time this falls within the 
broad definition of a communication to the public in the UK.336 Further, 
the indeterminate number of Pinterest users to whom the video clip is 
performed, showed, played and communicated constitutes this ‘public’ 
in the UK,337 and also in Australia (in relation to the performance and 
causing to be seen or heard).338 Finally, Jane’s use falls under the broad 
concept of a communication to the public in Australia.339
Jane’s use is less likely to qualify as a fair use in the US than is the 
case under sub- section (A)  above, as her ‘pinning’ of the video clip is 
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more likely to have an adverse impact on the potential market for the 
video clip, even if the purpose of sharing the video clip remains non- 
commercial in nature. Jane’s ‘pinning’ is similarly not exempt as a fair 
dealing or private use in the UK and in Australia.
The above indicates that Jane has infringed the copyright laws in all 
three jurisdictions.
C. jane’s use of evangeline’s earlier commentary on facebook 
to create her own commentary
Evangeline’s commentary constitutes a literary work, whether in the US, 
the UK or Australia, if other subsistence requirements such as originality, 
authorship and fixation (or their equivalents) are met. In general, it will be 
more likely for the commentary to qualify for copyright protection in the 
UK and Australia than in the US, given the higher originality requirement 
in the last. As the author can be identified (ie, Evangeline), the require-
ment of authorship is not likely to pose a barrier to the recognition of the 
commentary as a copyright- protected literary work. In addition, fixation 
(and its equivalent) requirements are broadly defined, and are therefore 
likely to be satisfied. When the other copyright subsistence requirements 
are met, Evangeline’s commentary will be copyright protected, whether 
she is a national or resident of the US, the UK or Australia.340
On the basis that the original commentary is copyright protected, 
I argue that Jane will not infringe Evangeline’s right to prepare derivative 
works.341 This is because Jane’s commentary has to be ‘substantially simi-
lar’ to Evangeline’s before it can be considered to be an infringing work. 
Given that Jane has woven her views into Evangeline’s commentary to 
create a new one and that Evangeline’s contribution is no longer iden-
tifiable in Jane’s commentary, there is arguably no infringement of the 
derivative works right as there is no substantial similarity342 between the 
original commentary and Jane’s new commentary.343
In the UK and in Australia, an equivalent to this right is the right to 
make adaptations of works and such an adaptation includes, among other 
things, the translation of a literary work.344 While the term ‘translation’ is 
not defined, Jane’s creation of her own commentary using Evangeline’s 
commentary is not a translation, by the term’s ordinary meaning. In spite 
of the non- infringement of this right, Jane may infringe Evangeline’s 
right to reproduce in both the UK and Australia,345 particularly if Jane is 
seen to have taken a substantial part of Evangeline’s commentary.346 In 
this case, it will not matter if Jane’s commentary is otherwise different 
from Evangeline’s.
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Additionally, I argue that Jane infringes Evangeline’s right of attri-
bution as an author of the commentary under the Australian Copyright 
Act.347 This is not the case under the US Copyright Act, which applies very 
narrowly to works of visual art,348 or the UK Copyright Act. In the case 
of the latter, the assertion requirement in the UK349 has not been met as 
Evangeline has not asserted her right to be identified. This is in spite of 
the fact that the identity of Evangeline as the author of the commen-
tary is known to Jane, who extracted Evangeline’s commentary from her 
Facebook ‘Timeline’.
As no rights are infringed in the US, discussing whether the fair use 
doctrine will apply to excuse Jane’s use of Evangeline’s commentary is 
not necessary. The UK fair dealing exception for the purpose of criticism, 
review, quotation and news reporting,350 as well as the Australian fair deal-
ing exception for the purpose of criticism or review,351 could have applied 
to exempt Jane’s use, but for the lack of acknowledgement of Evangeline’s 
earlier commentary. Further, Jane’s infringement of Evangeline’s right 
of attribution (ie, non- identification of Evangeline) under the Australian 
Copyright Act is not likely to be reasonable in the circumstances.352
This suggests that Jane has infringed the copyright laws in the UK 
and Australia, but not in the US.
d. jane’s use of multiple photographs of newborn babies available 
on the pin- boards of other Pinterest users to create a collage to 
share on Pinterest
Under the US Copyright Act each of the photographs, as well as the 
overall collage that Jane creates, will fall under the definition of ‘picto-
rial, graphic and sculptural’ works. Under the UK Copyright Act and the 
Australian Copyright Act, each of the photographs and the overall collage 
is an artistic work.
The originality, authorship and fixation (or their equivalents) 
requirements are easily met for copyright to subsist in the individual pho-
tographs and in the collage. The collage is not however a ‘joint work’ in 
the US, as the mutual intention of the individual authors (ie, of each pho-
tograph) to merge their works into a joint piece is absent. Similarly, in the 
UK and in Australia, the collage will not qualify as a ‘work of joint author-
ship’ as there is no collaboration among the authors of each of the photo-
graphs forming the collage. As such, Jane is the sole author of the collage.
Furthermore, it is noted that Jane crops only some of the origi-
nal photographs, but not all, to create the collage. At first appearance, 
she could have exercised more than one exclusive right in the bundle of 
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rights held by the copyright holder to each photograph, namely, the right 
to reproduce, the right to prepare derivative works, the right to distribute 
and the right to display in the US, as well as the equivalent rights in the 
UK and in Australia. Firstly, the discussion under sub- section (A) can be 
referred to in respect of the right of reproduction – Jane’s use infringes 
this right under the US Copyright Act, the UK Copyright Act and the 
Australian Copyright Act.
Secondly, in respect of the right to prepare derivative works, because 
the individual components in Jane’s collage can be recognised in the 
overall collage, there is arguably substantial similarity between each of 
these components (ie, photographs) and Jane’s collage. Hence the right 
to prepare derivative works held by the relevant copyright holder(s) in 
the US is probably infringed. The equivalent right to make adaptations of 
works in the UK and in Australia does not apply in respect of artistic works 
such as photographs, therefore addressing the issue of such infringement 
is not necessary.
Thirdly, the discussion under sub- section (B) can be referred to in 
respect of the rights to distribute and to display. While Jane’s sharing of 
the collage infringes the right to distribute in the US, the right to issue 
copies to the public in the UK and the right to (first) publish in Australia 
will not be infringed. On the other hand, Jane’s use infringes each copy-
right holder’s rights to display (in the US) and to communicate the work 
to the public (in the UK and in Australia).
In summary, Jane’s use has infringed:  the rights to reproduce, 
to prepare derivative works, to distribute and to display under the US 
Copyright Act; the rights to reproduce and to communicate the work to the 
public under the UK Copyright Act; as well as the rights to reproduce and 
to communicate the work to the public under the Australian Copyright 
Act. More than one right under the copyright laws of each jurisdiction is 
infringed by Jane’s use. Her use may be transformative enough to qualify 
as a fair use under the fair use doctrine in the US, particularly as the use 
is non- commercial and if there is no market for the photographs (ie, the 
photographs are not taken by professional photographers who licence 
their use in return for fees). Regardless of the commerciality of the use 
or existence of a market for the photographs, Jane’s use is still likely to 
qualify as a fair use, given that she has used the original photographs to 
comment on something else (ie, the ageing population),353 and that she 
has changed the composition, presentation and scale of the original pho-
tographs so as to have sufficiently transformed them354 in creating her 
collage. At the same time, the fair dealing exception for the purpose of 
caricature, parody or pastiche in the UK355 could exempt Jane’s use, as she 
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has created her collage – a pastiche – using selected photographs shared 
by other Pinterest users. However, no exceptions, including the fair deal-
ing exception for criticism or review,356 will likely apply to exempt Jane’s 
use in Australia. In any event, the condition of acknowledgement of the 
source of each photograph is not satisfied.
Based on the above, Jane has infringed the copyright laws in 
Australia, but not in the US and the UK.357
e. jane’s simultaneous sharing of the collage on facebook 
and Twitter
The discussion under sub- section (D)  can be referred to in respect of the 
rights to reproduce, to prepare derivative works, to distribute and to display 
under the US Copyright Act, as well as the equivalent rights under the UK 
Copyright Act and the Australian Copyright Act. The application of copyright 
exceptions such as fair use and fair dealing, as the case may be, is also similar.
For the same reasons as under sub- section (D), the above indicates 
that Jane has infringed the copyright laws in Australia, but not in the US 
and the UK.
f. jane’s sharing of the same collage in her blog post on wordPress
The discussion under sub- section (D) can be referred to in respect of the 
rights to reproduce, to prepare derivative works, to distribute and to dis-
play, as well as the equivalent rights under the UK Copyright Act and the 
Australian Copyright Act. The application of copyright exceptions such as 
fair use and fair dealing, as the case may be, is also similar.
For the same reasons as under sub- section (D), the above suggests 
that Jane has infringed the copyright laws in Australia, but not in the US 
and the UK.
g. Zee’s contribution to wikipedia on ‘income inequality’ using 
what jane has written
With reference to the discussion on copyright subsistence in Evangeline’s 
commentary under sub- section (C), the discussion in this sub- section is 
conducted on the assumption that Jane’s commentary enjoys copyright 
protection as a literary work in all three jurisdictions. I argue that Zee, in 
contributing Jane’s commentary to Wikipedia, infringes Jane’s rights to 
reproduce and to display the commentary under the US Copyright Act; 
to reproduce and to communicate her work to the public under the UK 
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Copyright Act; and to reproduce and to communicate her work to the public 
under the Australian Copyright Act.
Zee also infringes a moral right – the right of attribution – under the 
Australian Copyright Act. This is not the case under the US Copyright Act, 
as it applies very narrowly to works of visual art.358 Further, although Zee 
extracted Jane’s commentary from her Facebook ‘Timeline’ and is aware 
of her authorship, the assertion requirement under the UK Copyright 
Act is not satisfied, as Jane has not asserted her right to be identified. 
Therefore there is no infringement of this moral right in the UK.
In any case, more than one right under the copyright laws of each 
jurisdiction is infringed by Zee’s use. The fair use doctrine in the US will 
arguably exempt Zee’s use from infringement, as the purpose of Zee’s use 
is non- commercial and there is no existing market for Jane’s commen-
tary.359 Neither of the fair dealing exceptions for the purpose of review or 
criticism, whether in the UK or in Australia,360 will apply to exempt Zee’s 
use, given the lack of acknowledgement of Jane as the original author of 
the commentary. Finally, on the facts given, Zee’s infringement of Jane’s 
right of attribution under the Australian Copyright Act will not likely be 
seen as reasonable in the circumstances.361
Based on the above, Zee has infringed the copyright laws in the UK 
and Australia, but not in the US.362
h. jane’s creation and sharing of a new video clip by way 
of ‘vidding’ on youTube, and subsequently on facebook
Under the US Copyright Act, each of the random video clips from which 
scenes are extracted, as well as the new video clip Jane created, is an 
‘audiovisual work’. These video clips are ‘films’ under the UK Copyright 
Act and ‘cinematograph films’ under the Australian Copyright Act.
Copyright subsists in each video clip and in the new video clip cre-
ated by Jane, so long as the originality, authorship and fixation (or their 
equivalent) requirements are met. However, the new video clip is not a 
‘joint work’ in the US, as the mutual intention of the individual authors 
(ie, of each video clip) to merge their works into a joint piece is absent. 
Similarly the new video clip will not qualify as a ‘work of joint authorship’ 
in the UK and Australia, as there is no collaboration involved among the 
authors of the original video clips. As such, Jane is the sole author of the 
new video clip.
The discussion under sub- section (D) can be referred to in respect 
of the rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, perform 
and display in the US, as well as the equivalent rights, as applicable, in 
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the UK and in Australia. I  argue that Jane’s use infringes the rights of 
the copyright holder (ie, the producer of the television series) to repro-
duce, prepare derivative works, distribute, perform and display in the 
US; reproduce, show or play and communicate to the public in the UK; as 
well as reproduce, cause to be seen or heard and communicate to the public 
in Australia.
More than one right under the copyright laws of each jurisdiction is 
infringed by Jane’s use. Jane’s use will arguably not qualify as a fair use 
in the US. While her use is non- commercial, it may be argued to interfere 
with the existing market for the television series. On the other hand, the 
fair dealing exception for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche in 
the UK363 could exempt Jane’s use as she has created the new video clip – 
a pastiche – through drawing on other video clips shared on YouTube. No 
exceptions, however, including the fair dealing exception for criticism or 
review,364 will apply to exempt Jane’s use in Australia. In any event, the 
requirement for sufficient acknowledgement is not met.
The above indicates that Jane has infringed the copyright laws in 
the US and Australia, but not in the UK.365
i. Cheryl’s use of ‘stills’ from jane’s video clip as thumbnail 
images on her website
I discuss the extent to which each of the extracted ‘stills’, or individual 
images, is protected under the US Copyright Act, the UK Copyright Act and 
the Australian Copyright Act below.
As mentioned in sub- section (H), the individual images are 
extracted from ‘audiovisual works’ (being the random video clips, as well 
as Jane’s new video clip) as defined under the US Copyright Act. These 
images are extracted from ‘films’ under the UK Copyright Act and ‘cine-
matograph films’ under the Australian Copyright Act.
At first appearance Cheryl may have exercised more than one exclu-
sive right in the bundle of rights held by the producer of the television 
series in the audiovisual works from which these images are extracted – 
namely the rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works and display in the 
US. On further analysis, I argue that Cheryl does not infringe the right 
of reproduction. As she has only extracted a few images for her website, 
the amount she has copied from the original works is minimal and the 
standard of substantial similarity is not met. In addition, Cheryl does not 
infringe the right to prepare derivative works as there is no substantial 
similarity between her web page incorporating the images as thumbnails 
and the original audiovisual works. However, Cheryl’s use does infringe 
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the right to display the individual images from the original works. The 
term ‘display’ means, in the case of an audiovisual work, ‘to show indi-
vidual images nonsequentially’.366
I argue that in the UK Cheryl’s use of the individual images infringes 
the right to reproduce. This is because the definition of ‘copying’ in rela-
tion to a film ‘includes making a photograph of the whole or any sub-
stantial part of any image forming part of the film’.367 On the other hand, 
in Australia the position is less clear. Given the definition of ‘cinemato-
graph films’ to be the ‘aggregate of the visual images’,368 as well as the 
nature of copyright in these films,369 no copyright appears to be infringed 
in relation to Cheryl’s use. Notwithstanding this, the individual images 
are arguably protected as ‘artistic works’,370 and Cheryl’s use infringes the 
rights to reproduce and to communicate the works to the public.
Based on the above, at least one right under the copyright laws of 
each jurisdiction is prima facie infringed by Cheryl’s use. Her use is likely 
to qualify as a fair use in the US. Not only is her use non- commercial, such 
use is not one that can foreseeably interfere with the market for the televi-
sion series.371 Additionally, her use of only a few images as thumbnails on 
her website is likely to tip the balance in her favour.372 Cheryl’s use may 
also be transformative enough to qualify as a fair use under the fair use 
doctrine in the US. By using the ‘stills’ as thumbnail images on her web-
site, she has arguably re- contextualised the original video clips through 
changing their meaning (ie, using the ‘stills’ from them to decorate the 
website). Furthermore, in using the thumbnail images for aesthetic rea-
sons she has changed the purpose of these clips from the television series. 
In the UK and in Australia this is not the case, as Cheryl’s use is not for a 
specified purpose exempt under any fair dealing exception.
Therefore this suggests that Cheryl has infringed the copyright laws 
in the UK and Australia, but not in the US.373
j. other users’ partial use of jane’s collage to create their own, 
and sharing the same on Pinterest, facebook and Twitter
The discussion under sub- section (D) can be referred to in respect of 
the rights to reproduce, to prepare derivative works, to distribute and 
to display under the US Copyright Act, as well as the equivalent rights 
under the UK Copyright Act and the Australian Copyright Act. In par-
ticular, the rights (held by Jane in the collage and the author of each 
photo graph used in such collage)  to reproduce, to prepare derivative 
works, to distribute and to display in the US; as well as to reproduce 
and to communicate the work to the public in the UK and in Australia, 
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are arguably infringed by other users’ partial use of Jane’s collage. The 
application of copyright exceptions such as fair use and fair dealing, as 
the case may be, is largely similar. In relation to the application of the 
fair use doctrine in the US, the users’ transformation of Jane’s collage 
may additionally be their way of commenting on, criticising or parody-
ing Jane’s collage, depending on the collages resulting from their uses. 
At the same time, the fair dealing exception for the purpose of carica-
ture, parody or pastiche in the UK374 could exempt these uses, as the 
collages (or pastiches) are created using Jane’s collage, as well as other 
selected materials.
Based on the above, these users have infringed the copyright laws 
in Australia, but not in the US and the UK.375
K. editor jasper’s use of jane’s collage on the cover page 
of his magazine
As mentioned earlier, Jane’s collage is a ‘pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
work’ under the US Copyright Act, and an artistic work under the UK 
Copyright Act and the Australian Copyright Act. By his use, I argue that 
Jasper infringes Jane’s rights to reproduce and to distribute the collage in 
the US; to reproduce and to issue copies of the collage to the public in the 
UK; as well as to reproduce376 and to (first) publish the collage in Australia. 
Similar rights held by the author of each photograph used in such collage 
are also infringed by Jasper’s use.
Given that Jasper’s use of Jane’s collage is commercial in nature 
(ie, the magazine copies will be purchased by interested readers), his 
use is less likely to be exempt as a fair use in the US. Moreover, such use 
will have an adverse effect upon the potential market for Jane’s collage 
(and the photographs in the collage) if Jane (or the relevant author) 
decides to license the use of the collage (or each photograph in the col-
lage) in return for a fee. In addition, Jasper’s use is not exempt as a speci-
fied purpose under any fair dealing exception in the UK and in Australia.
This suggests that Jasper has infringed the copyright laws in all 
three jurisdictions.
III. Conclusion
In this chapter I have considered the application of copyright laws in the 
US, the UK and Australia to the content- generative activities of social 
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media users. This allows me to compare copyright laws with other regu-
latory factors on social media – namely the terms of service and the techno-
logical features  – in regulating the content- generative behaviours of 
users. In particular, I am concerned with the consistency of the copyright 
regimes with each of the private regimes explored in the subsequent 
chapters of this book.
I have demonstrated, through my discussion of the application of 
copyright subsistence and infringement issues and the challenges posed 
to the content- generative activities on social media, as well as through 
scenario one, the following:
 (i) Whether content used on social media is copyright protected 
requires one to address the multiple copyright subsistence issues 
set out;
 (ii) Any single content- generative activity can raise concerns of copy-
right infringement of more than one right;
 (iii) There is uncertainty as to whether any exceptions to copyright 
laws apply, although the fair use doctrine in the US is found to be 
more permissive than the fair dealing exceptions in the UK and 
Australia; and
 (iv) Conflict of laws issues will make it hard for users to ascertain the 
applicable law and the relevant jurisdiction in which a court can 
adjudicate a copyright- related dispute with respect to content on 
social media.
In this sense, it is not possible for any regular social media user to have 
the level of understanding of copyright laws required to assess the legit-
imacy of the content- generative activities he or she undertakes, through 
the application of copyright laws to these activities.
With scenario one, I have shown how the application of the copy-
right laws of the three jurisdictions to the same content- generative activi-
ties under the case study can result in varied positions being reached on 
the copyright liabilities of users based in each jurisdiction. In particular, 
the application of the copyright laws of the US, the UK and Australia in 
scenario one yields different outcomes under the US Copyright Act, as 
against the UK Copyright Act and the Australian Copyright Act. Out of a 
total of eleven content- generative activities extracted from the case study 
for scenario one, the application of copyright laws to as many as nine of 
these activities results in contrasting positions on the copyright liabilities 
of the respective users.
regulaTing ConTenT on soCial Media82
  
In the next chapter I  will survey the terms of service of the five 
selected social media platforms that purport to regulate the content- 
generative behaviours of users. I will also assess the interaction of these 
terms of service with the copyright regimes in each of the US, the UK and 
Australia for alignment and incompatibility. I then present the second of 
four scenarios in the book to demonstrate how the terms of service can 
apply to the content- generative activities of Jane and other users in the 
case study.
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IceTV the High Court held that although the plaintiff invested the required ‘skill and labour’ in 
the programming decisions and selection of programme information, the action for infringe-
ment failed as this ‘skill and labour’ was not directed to the expression of time and title infor-
mation in the programme guide that the defendant appropriated.
 41. See, for example, Feist, 499 US 340 (1991); Atari, 979 F 2d 242 (DC Cir, 1992); American 
Dental Association v Delta Dental Plans Association, 126 F 3d 977, 979 (7th Cir, 1997); Ladbroke 
[1964] 1 All ER 465; Data Access v Powerflex [1999] HCA 49. See also Goldstein, P.  and 
Hugenholtz, B.  2013, 194; Halpern, S.W., Nard, C.A.  and Port, K.L. 2012, 914; VerSteeg, 
R. 2007, 21.
 42. William Cornish, David Llewelyn and Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks and Allied Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed., 2010) [11– 05].
 43. Ricketson, S.  and Cresswell, C.  2015 [7.215]. Ricketson also suggests that an alternative 
explanation is that such works have no intelligible meaning on their own.
 44. Ricketson, S. and Cresswell, C. 2015 [7.215].
 45. See, for example, State of Victoria v Pacific Technologies (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2)  [2009] 
FCA 737 (Pacific Technologies); Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Reed International Books 
Australia Pty Ltd [2010] 88 IPR 11 (Federal Court of Australia) (Fairfax). Ricketson, S. and 
Cresswell, C. 2015 [7.220].
 46. Kirk v Fleming [1928– 35] Mac CC 44.
 47. Francis, Day & Hunter v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation [1940] AC 112 at 123 (Francis, 
Day & Hunter) (see Lord Wright).
 48. Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd [1982] Ch 119. See also Megan 
Richardson, ‘Copyright in Trademarks? On Understanding Trade Mark Dilution’ [2000] 
Intellectual Property Quarterly 66, 72– 4, where Richardson notes that the lack of originality is 
not the primary consideration for denying copyright protection to the word ‘Exxon’, and the 
reference Stephenson LJ made to the de minimis principle in the case (at 139).
 49. Pacific Technologies [2009] FCA 737.
 50. See, for example, Fairfax [2010] 88 IPR 11 (Federal Court of Australia). But see also Meltwater 
[2011] EWCA Civ 890, which suggests that news headlines can be copyright protected if they 
are worthy of being original literary works on their own.
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 51. Ricketson, S. and Cresswell, C. 2015 [7.215]. See also Pacific Technologies [2009] FCA 737; 
Fairfax [2010] 88 IPR 11 (Federal Court of Australia).
 52. See, for example, The Guardian 2015; D’Orazio, D. 2015.
 53. See Sam Ricketson, ‘Reflections on Authorship and the Meaning of a “Work” in Australian and 
Singapore Copyright Law’ (2012) 24 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 792, 831.
 54. In the US some courts have set a higher standard of originality for derivative works than that 
for non- derivative works. See, for example, Batlin, F 2d 486 (2nd Cir, 1976); Gracen v Bradford 
Exchange, 698 F 2d 300 (7th Cir, 1983). But see Schrock v Learning Curve International Inc, 586 
F 3d 513, 519– 20 (7th Cir, 2009) (where the court observed the historically lower standard in 
finding originality in the photographs, which were derivative works).
 55. Ricketson, S. 2012.
 56. See Valentine, C. 2015; Plaugic, L. 2015.
 57. See Ricketson, S. 2012.
 58. US Copyright Act, § 201(a). In addition, under the US Copyright Act, in the case of a work 
made for hire the employer is deemed to be the author of the work; see US Copyright Act, § 
201(b).
 59. US Copyright Act, § 101.
 60. Halpern, S.W., Nard, C.A. and Port, K.L. 2012, 46.
 61. UK Copyright Act, s 9(1).
 62. UK Copyright Act, s 10(1).
 63. Australian Copyright Act, s 10.
 64. Australian Copyright Act, s 10.
 65. See Peter Jaszi, ‘On the Author Effect:  Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity’ 
in Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi (eds), The Construction of Authorship:  Textual 
Appropriation in Law and Literature (Duke University Press, 1994) 35, 50.
 66. Jaszi, P.  1994, 50. See also Megan Richardson and Jake Goldenfein, ‘Competing Myths of 
Informal Economies’ in Dan Hunter et  al (eds), Amateur Media:  Social, Cultural and Legal 
Perspectives (Routledge, 2013) 18, 23. But see Ricketson, S. 2012. Where there is no human 
author identifiable for content, the question to ask could be whether the time, effort and 
investment of resources to create such content, if unprotected by copyright’s author- centric 
framework, should be protected under a neighbouring rights regime instead. It appears that 
there is no current protection for such content under present laws, except, perhaps, under the 
UK Copyright Act, s 9(3).
 67. As indicated on the history of the relevant page. See also Fairfax [2010] 88 IPR 11 (Federal 
Court of Australia), which highlights the growing problem of identifying authorship in a work. 
In Fairfax, the plaintiff chose to rely on s 129(2) of the Australian Copyright Act that presumes 
the originality of published works where it is not established that ‘the identity of the author is 
generally known or can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry’, instead of adducing evidence 
regarding the authorship of the works in question. Bennett J noted that the plaintiff did not 
attempt to ascertain the identity of the authors from its own employment and attendance; as 
such, she found that the presumption under s 129(2) was not available to the plaintiff in prov-
ing the originality of the headlines. This presumption of originality under s 129(2) (including 
that the publication is alleged to be pseudonymous) may, however, be useful in relation to 
articles shared on Wikipedia.
 68. See, for example, Jessica Litman, ‘Lawful Personal Use’ (2007) 85 Texas Law Review 1871; 
Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’ in Stephen Heath (trans.), Image, Music, Text (Hill 
and Wang, 1977) 142; Michel Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’ in James D. Faubion (ed., trans-
lated by Josue V. Harari) in Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology (The New Press, 1994) 205.
 69. Jane C. Ginsburg, ‘The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright’ (2009) 153(2) Proceedings 
of the American Philosophical Society 147, 152– 3. Ginsburg argues that the concept of profes-
sional authorship will persist, notwithstanding that professional authors will be joined by a 
host of newcomers.
 70. Ginsburg, J.C. 2009, 151.
 71. See Erez Reuveni, ‘Authorship in the Age of the Conducer’ (2007) 54 Journal of the Copyright 
Society of the U.S.A. 1801, 1802.
 72. Lionel Bently, ‘Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature and Law’ (1994) 5 The 
Modern Law Review 973, 981.
 73. Ginsburg, J.C. 2009, 151.
 74. See Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd (2010) 194 FCR 142, where 
individual human contributions to telephone directories produced by Telstra could not be 
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  discerned clearly, in part because the ultimate work was produced by technology. As such, 
it was held that copyright did not subsist in Telstra’s phone directories. It was also decided 
that the collaboration between staff members did not warrant the deployment of the concept 
of joint authorship, and that the intellectual effort to organise the listings did not represent 
sufficient literary effort warranting protection.
 75. But see Melissa Dolin, ‘Note: Joint Authorship and Collaborative Artwork Created through 
Social Media’ (2011) 39(4) American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal 
535, 561, where she suggests that in order to encourage artists to continue creating works 
and to further the goals of copyright, collaborative content created on social media platforms 
should generally be found to satisfy the requirements for copyright protection. Users who 
have jointly collaborated to create such works should be considered joint authors, unless 
there are contractual stipulations to the contrary or a person is contributing anonymously.
 76. Elizabeth White, ‘The Berne Convention’s Flexible Fixation Requirement:  A Problematic 
Provision for User- Generated Content’ (2012– 2013) 13(2) Chicago Journal of International 
Law 685, 689– 99.
 77. White, E. 2012– 2013, 689– 99.
 78. Twitter, Help Center: I’m missing Tweets <https:// support.twitter.com/ articles/ 277671#>.
 79. See, for example, Elisa Gabbert, Find Your Old Tweets: How to See Your First (Worst?) Tweet 
(10 October 2013)  <http:// www.wordstream.com/ blog/ ws/ 2013/ 10/ 10/ how- to- find- 
your- old- tweets>. This guide provides users with steps to take to locate their old ‘tweets’.
 80. This challenge persists although US courts are observed to be generous in their interpretation 
of the fixation requirement, so long as the expressions of ideas in content on social media are 
tangible. See Dolin, M. 2011, 553.
 81. US Copyright Act, § 102.
 82. US Copyright Act, § 101. In particular, see the definition of a work that is ‘fixed’.
 83. UK Copyright Act, s 3(2).
 84. UK Copyright Act, s 4.
 85. UK Copyright Act, ss 5A and 5B.
 86. Australian Copyright Act, s 22(1).
 87. Australian Copyright Act, s 10.
 88. Australian Copyright Act, s 10. See particularly the definitions for ‘sound recording’, ‘record’ 
(which includes an electronic file), ‘cinematograph film’ and ‘sound- track’.
 89. US Copyright Act, §§ 102 and 103.
 90. This includes that one or more of the authors of the works (wherever published) is a national 
or domiciliary of the US on the date of first publication; see US Copyright Act, § 104(b)(1).
 91. US Copyright Act, § 104(b)(2). A treaty party is a country or intergovernmental organisation 
that is a party to an international agreement; see US Copyright Act, § 101.
 92. US Copyright Act, § 104(b)(3).
 93. US Copyright Act, § 104(a).
 94. US Copyright Act, § 101. In spite of this definition of the term ‘publication’, which mirrors the 
reference to the exclusive right of distribution under § 106(3), publication has been found to 
be ‘an important subsidiary right’ subsumed within the right of distribution; see Harper, 471 
US 539, 549 (1985). It is a narrower right than the right of distribution.
 95. In spite of the US Copyright Act, § 104(b)(1).
 96. This difficulty arises from the fact that the fixation of content on social media occurs online. 
Regardless of where the user creating the content is situated, the content is ultimately access-
ible from all over the world.
 97. UK Copyright Act, ss 153– 5.
 98. UK Copyright Act, s 175(1).
 99. UK Copyright Act, s 17.
 100. Australian Copyright Act, s 32(2).
 101. Australian Copyright Act, s 29. The term ‘copy’ is defined to relate narrowly to a cinemato-
graph film; see Australian Copyright Act, s 10.
 102. See UK Copyright Act, ss 153– 5; Australian Copyright Act, s 32(2).
 103. This principle of national treatment is established in other international instruments includ-
ing but not limited to the TRIPS Agreement (art 3(1)), as well as the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(through incorporating arts 2 to 6 of the Berne Convention under art 3)  and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (art 4), signed 20 December 1996 (entered into force 
20 May 2002) (together, the WIPO Internet Treaties).
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 104. To date the Berne Convention has 172 contracting parties. See World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), WIPO- Administered Treaties:  Contracting Parties  – Berne Convention 
<http:// www.wipo.int/ treaties/ en/ ShowResults.jsp?treaty_ id=15>.
 105. The US acceded the instrument on 16 November 1988, which came into force on 1 March 
1989; and the UK ratified the instrument on 5 September 1887, which came into force on 
5 December 1887. The instrument came into force in Australia on 14 April 1928. See WIPO.
 106. See UK Copyright Act, s 159 and The Copyright (Application to Other Countries) Order 1993 
(UK) SI 1993/ 942, Schedule One.
 107. Copyright (International Protection) Regulations 1969 (Cth) reg 4.
 108. US Copyright Act, § 106.
 109. US Copyright Act, § 102.
 110. US Copyright Act, § 106(1).
 111. US Copyright Act, § 101.
 112. UK Copyright Act, s 16(1).
 113. UK Copyright Act, s 17.
 114. UK Copyright Act, s 17(2).
 115. UK Copyright Act, s 17(3).
 116. UK Copyright Act, s 17(4).
 117. UK Copyright Act, s 17(6).
 118. Australian Copyright Act, ss 31(1)(a)(i) and 31(1)(b)(i).
 119. Australian Copyright Act, ss 85(1)(a) and 86(a).
 120. Australian Copyright Act, s 10.
 121. Australian Copyright Act, ss 21(1A) and 21(6).
 122. Australian Copyright Act, s 21(3)(b).
 123. Australian Copyright Act, s 65(2). See also Australian Copyright Act, ss 66 and 67.
 124. See, for example, Sandoval v New Line Cinema Corp, 147 F 3d 215 (2nd Cir, 1998) (Sandoval); 
Ringgold v Black Entertainment Television Inc, 1996 WL 535547 (USDC SDNY, 19 September 
1996)  (Ringgold). See also Paul C.  Weiler and Gary Myers, Entertainment, Media, and the 
Law: Text, Cases and Problems (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed., 2011) 347.
 125. In relation to the application of this principle in the UK see UK Copyright Act, s 16(3). See, 
for example, Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2000] UKHL 58 (Designers 
Guild); Ladbroke [1964] 1 All ER 465; Francis, Day & Hunter [1940] AC 112. See also 
William Cornish, David Llewelyn and Tanya Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks and Allied Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed., 2010)  [12– 06]. In the case of 
Australia, see Australian Copyright Act, s 14(1). See, for example, EMI Songs Australia Pty 
Ltd v Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 47 (EMI Songs); IceTV [2009] HCA 14; 
Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 197 (Elwood Clothing). 
See also Ricketson, S.  and Cresswell, C.  2015 [9.80]; Sam Ricketson, Megan Richardson 
and Mark Davison, Intellectual Property:  Cases, Materials and Commentary (Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths, 5th ed., 2013) 247– 71. Whether an author has copied a substantial part may 
depend more on quality (ie, whether an important part of the subject matter is taken) than 
on the quantity of what he has taken. This could make the assessment a difficult one to make.
 126. See, for example, Designers Guild [2000] UKHL 58; EMI Songs [2011] FCAFC 47; Elwood 
Clothing [2008] FCAFC 197.
 127. US Copyright Act, § 106(2).
 128. US Copyright Act, § 101. The definition of ‘derivative work’ also means that, to be copyright 
protected, such work must pass the threshold for originality and be fixed as tangible expres-
sion. The implications of the concept of originality on content on social media have been 
highlighted earlier.
 129. Even where there is incorporation of the original work in the secondary work, the second-
ary work is not infringing if the final product is not substantially similar to the original 
work. See Castle Rock Entertainment Inc v Carol Publishing Group Inc, 150 F 3d 132 (2nd Cir, 
1998) (Castle Rock), for the proposition that if the secondary work sufficiently transforms 
the expression of the original work such that the two works are not substantially similar, 
then the secondary work is not a derivative work and, as such, does not infringe the copy-
right of the original work. It is noted that no distinction was made between the two forms 
of infringement (ie, of the rights of reproduction and to produce derivative works) in Castle 
Rock. See also Well- Made Toy Manufacturing Corp v Goffa International Corp, 354 F 3d 112 
(2nd Cir, 2003).
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 130. See, for example, Batlin, F 2d 486 (2nd Cir, 1976) for the view that a derivative work must 
qualify for copyright protection on its own in order to infringe the derivative works right. But 
see Lone Ranger Television Inc v Program Radio Corp, 740 F 2d 718, 722 (9th Cir, 1984) for the 
alternative view that a derivative work (of which derivative rights can be infringed) may not 
qualify for copyright protection. See also Lee v A.R.T. Co, 125 F 3d 580 (7th Cir, 1997). In this 
case the district court initially concluded that as the tile art created by the defendants with 
the plaintiff’s copyrighted note cards was not original enough to be copyright protected, it 
was not an infringing derivative work. Subsequently the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judge-
ment on slightly different grounds. Although the tile art was seen by itself to be a derivative 
work, it was not considered an infringement as ‘an alteration that includes (or consumes) the 
original lacks economic significance’. In addition, a split in case law and in scholarly com-
mentary was noted by Judge Easterbook, who then concluded that in the case it was not 
necessary to choose either view (at 582). The first view results in the paradoxical result that 
a defendant could gain more protection against liability for not being creative than if he or 
she had been; see Amy B. Cohen, ‘When does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works Right of 
a Copyright Owner?’ (1999) 17 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 623, 639.
 131. See, for example, Eden Toys v Florelee Undergarment Co, 697 F 2d 27 (2nd Cir, 1982). In this 
case Judge Mansfield noted that a work may make non- trivial contributions to an existing 
one, and hence be copyright protected as a derivative work. The author of the work may be 
liable for copyright infringement if permission from the owner holding the copyright to the 
original work is not sought, and if the secondary work retains the same aesthetic appeal as 
the original work. He gave the example of a second edition of a textbook that is copyright 
protected as a derivative work. This second edition can infringe the original copyright work 
if it is created without permission.
 132. If this case goes to trial its outcome would, however, likely depend on whether Prince’s use 
qualified for the fair use defence in the US; see US Copyright Act, § 107.
 133. See Cariou v Prince, 714 F 3d 694 (2nd Cir, 2013) (Cariou). In this case Prince was noted 
to have created the collages on canvases which incorporate colour, feature distorted forms 
and settings, and measure between 10 and nearly 100 times the size of the original photo-
graphs. Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, colour palette and media, as is the expres-
sive nature of his works, were observed to be fundamentally different from the original 
photographs.
 134. See Sandoval, 147 F 3d 215 (2nd Cir, 1998) citing Ringgold, 1996 WL 535547 (USDC SDNY, 
19 September 1996).
 135. Although this relates to content on social media, it should be noted that Prince’s use occurred, 
in part, off site. See Valentine, C. 2015; Plaugic, L. 2015. See also sub- section (B).
 136. UK Copyright Act, s 16(1).
 137. UK Copyright Act, s 21.
 138. UK Copyright Act, s 21(3).
 139. Australian Copyright Act, s 31(1)(a)(vi).
 140. Australian Copyright Act, s 10.
 141. See UK Copyright Act, s 21(2); Australian Copyright Act, s 31(1)(a)(vii).
 142. US Copyright Act, § 106 (3).
 143. US Copyright Act, § 106 (3). This description overlaps with the given definition of the term 
‘publication’ in § 101.
 144. US Copyright Act, § 101.
 145. See A&M Records v Napster, 239 F 3d 1004 (9th Cir, 2001), where the court held that the 
internet transmission of a sound recording is an infringing ‘distribution’ of the sound record-
ing and of the copyright- protected music contained therein.
 146. This is consistent with the obligations of the US under the WIPO Internet Treaties. See also 
United States Copyright Office, The Making Available Right in the United States (February 
2016)  <http:// copyright.gov/ docs/ making_ available/ making- available- right.pdf>; Jane 
C. Ginsburg, Comments in response to the US Copyright Office’s Notice soliciting further com-
ments on the ‘Right of Making Available’ dated 15 July 2014 (3 September 2014)  <http:// 
copyright.gov/ docs/ making_ available/ comments/ docket2014_ 2/ reply/ Ginsburg_ Jane.
pdf>. See, for example, BMG Rights Management (US) LLC v Cox Communications Inc et al, 
2015 WL 7756130 (ED Va, 1 December 2015) [transferring electronic files (also ‘material 
objects’) using the BitTorrent protocol satisfies the transactional element of distribution].
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 147. The making available right, although not expressly provided for, is said to be implemented 
through the US Copyright Act’s rights of distribution, public performance and display. The 
making available right is noted to be narrower than the rights to communicate a work to the 
public under the UK Copyright Act (ss 16(1) and 20(2)) and the Australian Copyright Act (ss 
31(1)(a)(iv), 31(1)(b)(iii) and 10). See United States Copyright Office 2016.
 148. UK Copyright Act, s 16(1).
 149. UK Copyright Act, s 18(3).
 150. Australian Copyright Act, ss 31(1)(a)(ii) and 31(1)(b)(ii).
 151. The right to publish under Section 31(1) is confined to ‘first publication’ (ie, as a right which 
can be violated under an infringement action), unlike publication for the subsistence of copy-
right under Section 32. See Avel Pty Ltd v Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 88. 
In this case it was established that the right to publish a work extends only to the right of first 
publication (ie, supplying copies of a work not previously made public in the relevant terri-
tory to the public). See also Ricketson, S. and Cresswell, C. 2015 [16.280]; Ricketson, S., 
Richardson, M. and Davison, M. 2013, 353– 4.
 152. Australian Copyright Act, s 29. When a work ‘deemed to have been published’ is further 
defined, and references are made, among others: to reproductions of a work being supplied 
to the public, by sale or otherwise; copies of films being sold or let on hire to the public; and 
records of sound recordings being supplied by sale or otherwise to the public.
 153. US Copyright Act, § 106(4).
 154. US Copyright Act, § 101. The same applies to displaying a work publicly.
 155. US Copyright Act, § 106(5).
 156. In the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images non- 
sequentially; see US Copyright Act, § 101.
 157. US Copyright Act, § 101.
 158. Columbia Pictures Industries Inc v Redd Horne Inc, 749 F 2d 154 (3rd Cir, 1984).
 159. US Copyright Act, § 106(6).
 160. UK Copyright Act, s 16(1).
 161. UK Copyright Act, s 19(2).
 162. UK Copyright Act, s 19(4).
 163. UK Copyright Act, s 20(2).
 164. UK Copyright Act, s 16(1).
 165. Reference can be made to the decisions made at the European Union (EU) level. See 
Information Society Directive, art 3(1). See also ITV Broadcasting Ltd And Others (Court of 
Justice of the European Union, C- 607/ 11, 7 March 2013) (ITV Broadcasting Ltd) [32].
 166. See, for example, Jennings v Stephens [1936] Ch 469 (Jennings); Ernest Turner Electrical 
Instruments Ltd v Performing Right Society Ltd [1943] Ch 167; Performing Right Society Ltd 
v Harlequin Record Shops Ltd [1979] 2 All ER 828 at 833 (where Browne- Wilkinson J, as he 
then was, adopted the view of Greene LJ in the earlier cases, and said that it is important to 
see whether the composer would expect to receive a fee for the performance given to the 
audience).
 167. Jennings [1936] Ch 469.
 168. See, for example, Nils Svensson et al v Retriever Sverige AB (Court of Justice of the European 
Union, C- 466/ 12, 13 February 2014) (Svensson) [24]– [30], which introduced the concept of 
the ‘new public’. It was held that as making available the relevant works through hyperlinks 
did not lead the works in question to be communicated to a new public, the authorisation of 
the copyright holders is not required.
 169. Svensson (Court of Justice of the European Union, C- 466/ 12, 13 February 2014).
 170. Svensson (Court of Justice of the European Union, C- 466/ 12, 13 February 2014). It should 
be noted that this is a contentious decision which may not be relevant to the UK in future, in 
any case, owing to the country’s forthcoming exit from the EU (or ‘Brexit’).
 171. Australian Copyright Act, s 31(1)(a)(vi).
 172. Australian Copyright Act, ss 31(1)(a)(iv) and 31(1)(b)(iii).
 173. Australian Copyright Act, s 27(1)(a).
 174. Australian Copyright Act, s 10.
 175. Australian Copyright Act, ss 85(1)(c) and 86(c).
 176. See, for example, Rank Film Production Ltd v Colin S Dodds (1983) 2 IPE 113 (Rank Film 
Production); Telstra Corporation v Australasian Performing Right Association (1997) 38 
IPR 294.
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 177. Telstra Corporation v Australasian Performing Right Association (1997) 38 IPR 294 at 295.
 178. Australia Copyright Act, s 10.
 179. See US Copyright Act, § 106(1); UK Copyright Act, ss 16(1) and 17; Australian Copyright Act, 
ss 31(1)(a)(i), 31(1)(b)(i), 85(1)(a) and 86(a).
 180. US Copyright Act, §§ 106(3)– (6).
 181. UK Copyright Act, ss 16(1) and 20.
 182. Australian Copyright Act, ss 31(1)(a)(iv), 31(1)(b)(iii), 85(1)(c) and 86(c).
 183. Elizabeth Adeney, The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers:  An International and 
Comparative Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2006)  1. See also art 6bis of the Berne 
Convention, which provides that an author is entitled to moral rights (ie, the rights of attribu-
tion and integrity) that exist independently of economic rights.
 184. Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), 17 USC § 106A (1990).
 185. Prior to the enactment of VARA, some state legislatures have enacted moral rights laws. 
These states include California, New York and Maine. Not all state moral rights protection has 
been pre- empted by VARA, although the Artists Authorship Rights Act in New York has been 
held to be so (pre- empted); see Board of Managers of Soho International Arts Condominimum 
v City of New York, US Dist LEXIS 10221 (SDNY, 2003).
 186. In the case of limited editions of 200 copies or fewer, these are signed and consecutively 
numbered by the author; see US Copyright Act, § 101.
 187. In general there is the question as to whether digital works of visual art can be protected 
under the VARA. It has been suggested that artists who seek VARA’s protection will need to fix 
their art works in a physical medium and arrange for subsequent dealings in a manner that is 
consistent with the VARA paradigm. An example is given of a photographer who never prints 
his digital photograph; instead, he sells the photograph in a digital format (for instance, by 
placing it in a thumb drive or by permitting the collector to download the digital work). See 
Joseph Gibbons Llewellyn, ‘Visual Artists Rights Act and the Protection of Digital Works of 
Photographic Art’ (2010) 11(3) North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology 531, 552.
 188. VARA, § 106A(a)(1)(A).
 189. VARA, § 106A(a)(1)(B).
 190. VARA, § 106A(a)(2).
 191. VARA, § 106A(a)(3)(A). The formulation for determining whether harm to honour or reputa-
tion exists is flexible – the reputation need not be derived independently of the art work that 
is the subject of the dispute (ie, author need not prove a pre- existing standing in the artistic 
community). See Carter v Helmsley- Spear 71 F 3d 77 (2nd Cir, 1995).
 192. VARA, § 106A(a)(3)(B). The rights under § 106A(a)(2) and § 106A(a)(3) are noted to be 
rights of integrity.
 193. See, for example, Adeney, E. 2006, 487.
 194. VARA, §§ 106A(a)(2) and 106A(a)(3)(A). It is noted that the requirements for prejudice are 
conjunctive as the provision reads ‘which would be prejudicial to his or her honour or reputa-
tion’, therefore suggesting the non- inevitability of the harm. This can be contrasted with the 
equivalent provisions in the UK and in Australia. See also Adeney, E. 2006, 494.
 195. Dramatic works are again omitted from the discussion, as they are not relevant to this book.
 196. UK Copyright Act, s 77.
 197. See, for example, Adeney, E. 2006, 395.
 198. UK Copyright Act, ss 77(2)– (6).
 199. Specific assertion can be made by a statement included in an assignment of copyright in the 
work, where the author or director asserts his or her right to be identified, or by an instru-
ment in writing signed by the author or director; see UK Copyright Act, ss 77(1) and 78(2).
 200. The right of a person not to have a work or film falsely attributed to him or her if the person 
is not the author or director; see UK Copyright Act, s 84(1).
 201. See, for example, Pasterfield v Denham [1999] FSR 168 (Pasterfield), 182, where it was held 
that the colour variations and minor variations of detail between the two works are not con-
sidered to be ‘derogatory treatment’ and that ‘gross differences’ would be required.
 202. See Pasterfield [1999] FSR 168, 181– 2, where it was considered that the honour or reputa-
tion test applied to mutilations and distortions. See also Confetti Records [a firm] v Warner 
Music UK Ltd (trading as East West Records) [2003] EWJC 1274, [149]– [150]; Adeney, 
E. 2006, 407– 9. Like in the US, the honour or reputation test applies conjunctively.
 203. UK Copyright Act, ss 80(1) and 80(2).
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 204. See UK Copyright Act, s 77(2)(a), in respect of the right to attribution where a literary work 
is communicated to the public.
 205. See UK Copyright Act, s 80(4), in respect of the respect of the right to integrity where a visual 
image of a derogatorily treated artistic work is communicated to the public.
 206. Australian Copyright Act, Part IX.
 207. Australian Copyright Act, Part IX, Divisions 2– 4.
 208. Australian Copyright Act, ss 195AC– AF.
 209. Australian Copyright Act, ss 195AG and 195AH.
 210. Australian Copyright Act, s 195AI.
 211. Australian Copyright Act, ss 195AJ– AL. It has been suggested that proving the propensity to 
produce harm to honour or reputation through present action is sufficient to establish preju-
dice. See Adeney, E. 2006, 583.
 212. Such content will not fall under the definition of a work of visual art, being a painting, draw-
ing, print, sculpture or a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only; see 
US Copyright Act, § 101.
 213. Doubt has been expressed as to whether this requirement is compliant with the 
Berne Convention. See, for example, Garnett, K., Davies, G.  and Harbottle, G.  2011 
 [111.18].
 214. This is because the right is not likely to have been asserted generally or specifically (ie, in an 
assignment through a statement of the author or director, or by an instrument in writing); 
see UK Copyright Act, ss 78(1) and 78(2).
 215. For instance, the right of attribution of an author is only protected under rights management 
provisions if his or her name is included as part of the information accompanying the copy-
right work. There is no obligation imposed on the owner of the work to do so.
 216. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 USC § 1202(b)(1) (1998) (DMCA).
 217. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, § 1202(c).
 218. Murphy v Millennium Radio Group LLC, 650 F 3d 295 (3rd Cir, 2011).
 219. VARA, § 106A(a)(1)(A).
 220. This will include literary, musical, dramatic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural and audiovisual 
works, as well as sound recordings, architectural works, compilations and derivative works. 
See US Copyright Act, §§ 102 and 103.
 221. See Jane Ginsburg, ‘Moral Rights in the U.S.: Still in Need of a Guardian Ad Litem’ (2012) 30 
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 73, 78.
 222. DMCA, § 1202(b)(1).
 223. UK Copyright Act, s 296ZG(1).
 224. UK Copyright Act, s 296ZG(1).
 225. UK Copyright Act, s 296ZG(2).
 226. UK Copyright Act, s 296ZG(7)(b).
 227. UK Copyright Act, s 77.
 228. UK Copyright Act, ss 296ZG(1)– (2).
 229. Australian Copyright Act, s 116B.
 230. Australian Copyright Act, s 116B.
 231. Australian Copyright Act, s 116C.
 232. Australian Copyright Act, s 10.
 233. Australian Copyright Act, ss 195AC– AF.
 234. Australian Copyright Act, s 116B(1)(c).
 235. See US Copyright Act, §§ 411 and 101. See Goldstein, P. and Hugenholtz, B. 2013, 227.
 236. US Copyright Act, § 412.
 237. US Copyright Act, §§ 502–504.
 238. US Copyright Act, § 504(c)(1).
 239. US Copyright Act, § 504(c)(2).
 240. Agence France Presse v Morel, 10 Civ 02730 (USDC SDNY, 14 January 2013) (Morel); Morel, 
10 Civ 02730 (USDC SDNY, 21 May 2013); Morel, 10 Civ 02730 (USDC SDNY, 22 November 
2013); Morel, 10 Civ 02730 (USDC SDNY, 13 August 2014).
 241. Morel (USDC SDNY, 14 January 2013); Morel (USDC SDNY, 21 May 2013); Morel (USDC 
SDNY, 22 November 2013); Morel (USDC SDNY, 13 August 2014).
 242. See, for example, Eugene Reznik, How the photo community would reimagine copyright 
(16 July 2015) <http:// www.americanphotomag.com/ how- photo- community- reimagines- 
copyright>. A photojournalist named Yunghi Kim commented that there is a burden both 
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in terms of time and money for photographers to protect their works through registration. 
In addition, he recommended giving photographers up to a year to register their works. See 
also United States Copyright Office, eCO Registration System <http:// copyright.gov/ eco/ >, 
where the current processing time for the electronic filing of a copyright (registration) appli-
cation is stated to take up to 8 months and that for the filing of such an application through 
paper forms is 13 months.
 243. UK Copyright Act, s 96.
 244. UK Copyright Act, s 97(1).
 245. UK Copyright Act, s 97(2).
 246. UK Copyright Act, s 97(2).
 247. Australian Copyright Act, s 115(2).
 248. Australian Copyright Act, s 115(3).
 249. Australian Copyright Act, s 115(4).
 250. Australian Copyright Act, s 115(4).
 251. This content is likely to be considered as unpublished. Reference is made to the limited defini-
tions of the terms ‘publication’ and ‘copies’ discussed earlier; see sub- section (D).
 252. The awards of additional damages can, however, be high in Australia. See, for example, Aristocrat 
Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (in liq) (2007) 71 IPR 437.
 253. UK Copyright Act, s 97(1).
 254. Australian Copyright Act, s 115(3).
 255. The fair use doctrine exempts a fair use from copyright infringement in the US, while the fair 
dealing exceptions exempt specified categories of purposes from copyright infringement in 
the UK and in Australia.
 256. See Matthew Sag, ‘Predicting Fair Use’ (2012) 73(1) Ohio State Law Journal 47, 85, where 
Sag makes this comment of fair use.
 257. The right of reproduction (of the photographs), the right to prepare derivative works (also of 
the photographs), as well as the right to display publicly (in respect of the sculptures that are 
private); see US Copyright Act, §§ 106(1), 106(2) and 106(5).
 258. US Copyright Act, § 106(1); UK Copyright Act, ss 16(1) and 17; Australian Copyright Act, ss 
31(1)(a)(i), 31(1)(b)(i), 85(1)(a) and 86(a).
 259. US Copyright Act, §§ 106(3)– (6).
 260. UK Copyright Act, ss 16(1) and 20.
 261. Australian Copyright Act, ss 31(1)(a)(iv), 31(1)(b)(iii), 85(1)(c) and 86(c). See also 
sub- section (E).
 262. See, for example, Harper, 471 US 539 (1985); Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003).
 263. US Copyright Act, § 107.
 264. US Copyright Act, § 107.
 265. Campbell v Acuff- Rose Music Inc, 510 US 569 (1994) (Campbell).
 266. See, for example, Campbell, 510 US 569 (1994); Suntrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co, 
268 F 3d 1257 (11th Cir, 2001)  (Suntrust Bank); Blanch v Koons, 467 F 3d 244 (2nd 
Cir, 2006)  (Koons II); Mattel Inc v Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F 3d 792 (9th Cir, 
2003) (Mattel Inc); Bill Graham Archives v Dorling Kindersley Ltd, 448 F 3d 605 (2nd Cir, 
2006) (Bill Graham); Kelly v Arriba Soft Corporation, 336 F 3d 811 (9th Cir, 2003) (Kelly); 
Perfect 10 Inc v Amazon.com Inc, 508 F 3d 1146 (9th Cir, 2007) (Perfect 10). See also Tan, 
D. 2016, 321; Barton Beebe, ‘An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978– 
2005’ (2008) 156 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 549; Sag, M. 2012, 369. Tan high-
lighted that both Beebe’s empirical study of fair use decisions in the US and Sag’s statistical 
analysis – which focused on the ex- ante predictability of fair use based on fair use cases in 
the US – affirmed the salient role that transformative use (as part of the fair use inquiry for 
the first statutory factor, being the purpose and the character of the use) plays in the evalu-
ation of fair use.
 267. US Copyright Act, § 107(1).
 268. Tan, D. 2016.
 269. See, for example, Campbell, 510 US 569 (1994); Suntrust Bank, 268 F 3d 1257 (11th 
Cir, 2001).
 270. See, for example, Koons II, 467 F 3d 244 (2nd Cir, 2006); Mattel Inc, 353 F 3d 792 (9th 
Cir, 2003).
 271. See, for example, Bill Graham, 448 F 3d 605 (2nd Cir, 2006).
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 272. See, for example, Kelly, 336 F 3d 811 (9th Cir, 2003); Perfect 10, 508 F 3d 1146 (9th 
Cir, 2007).
 273. See, for example, Pierre Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 
1111, 1105– 7.
 274. UK Copyright Act, s 29.
 275. UK Copyright Act, s 30.
 276. UK Copyright Act, s 29(1C).
 277. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotation and Parody) Regulations 2014 (UK) SI 
2014/ 2356 (UK Copyright Regulations 2014), reg 5. The regulation introduced, among other 
things, the new sections 30(1ZA), 30A and a new paragraph 2A (to Schedule 2) to the UK 
Copyright Act.
 278. This is practical given that the subtle humour of a parody can be diminished by such a 
requirement.
 279. Australian Copyright Act, ss 41 and 103A.
 280. Australian Copyright Act, ss 42 and 103B.
 281. Australian Copyright Act, ss 40 and 103C.
 282. Australian Copyright Act, ss 41A and 103AA.
 283. The Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). Part 3 introduced the new sections 41A and 103AA.
 284. Australian Copyright Act, ss 41, 41A, 42, 103A, 103AA and 103B.
 285. ALRC, Copyright and the Digital Economy (November 2013) <http:// www.alrc.gov.au/ sites/ 
default/ files/ pdfs/ publications/ final_ report_ alrc_ 122_ 2nd_ december_ 2013_ .pdf>. The 
ALRC recommended that a fair use exception should be applied when determining whether 
quotation infringes copyright, and that ‘quotation’ should be one of the illustrative purposes 
in the fair use analysis. Alternatively, if fair use is not enacted, the ALRC recommended con-
solidating the existing fair dealing exceptions and to provide for certain new purposes in a 
closed list (including for the purpose of quotation) which do not infringe copyright. In this 
instance, fairness factors will have to be considered in determining if a dealing is fair.
 286. Productivity Commission, Australian Government, Productivity Commission Draft Report on 
Intellectual Property Arrangements (April 2016).
 287. UK Copyright Act, s 30A.
 288. Australian Copyright Act, 41A and 103AA.
 289. Australian Copyright Act, ss 41 and 103A.
 290. See, for example, Network Ten Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 14. In this 
case, Network Ten’s show ‘The Panel’ played short clips from the recorded broadcasts made 
by Channel Nine (and other networks) – its hosts discussed these short clips. Channel Nine 
brought suit for Network Ten’s copyright infringement of its broadcasts. The finding that 
some of The Panel’s uses infringed copyright provides little certainty for users of copyright- 
protected material that their parodic or satirical commentaries are exempt. See also Nicolas 
Suzor, ‘Where the Bloody Hell Does Parody Fit in Australian Copyright Law?’ (2008) 13 
Media and Arts Law Review 218, 224. Suzor noted that the definitions of ‘criticism’, ‘review’ 
and ‘news’ are drawn restrictively in De Garis v Neville Jefress Pidler (1990) 37 FCR 99 at 107, 
and that there is little room for unlicensed use of copyright- protected material to make a 
general comment on society or unrelated works.
 291. Although a recent European Court of Justice’s decision suggests a sophisticated interpret-
ation of the expression ‘parody’, which takes into account the striking of a ‘fair balance’ 
between the interests and rights of copyright holders and the freedom of expression of users. 
Furthermore, whether a defendant has used the original copyright work to convey a dis-
criminatory message is potentially relevant to the assessment of this ‘fair balance’; see Johan 
Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Helena Vandersteen and Others (Court of Justice of the 
European Union, C- 201/ 13, 3 September 2014) [26]. The relevance of this decision to the UK 
(owing to Brexit) is uncertain. See also Jonathan Griffiths, ‘Fair Dealing after Deckmyn: The 
United Kingdom’s Defence for Caricature, Parody or Pastiche’ in Megan Richardson and 
Sam Ricketson (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property in Media and Entertainment 
(Edward Elgar, 2017) 64.
 292. For example, pastiche is listed in Lesley Brown (ed.), The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
(Clarendon Press, 1993); Macquarie Dictionary, Pastiche <https:// www.macquariediction-
ary.com.au/ features/ word/ search/ ?word=pastiche&search_ word_ type=Dictionary>.
 293. UK Copyright Act, s 30(1ZA).
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 294. In respect of the second condition, the UK Intellectual Office’s guidelines suggest that it 
would be a matter of fact, degree and impression in each case, and of asking how a fair- 
minded and honest person would have dealt with the work. Relevant factors considered 
include the amount of the work quoted and if the use would affect the market for the origi-
nal work. For the third condition, the use has to be fair and reasonable (ie, a shorter quota-
tion is likely to be more permissible than a longer extract). In respect of the last condition, 
I  see few instances on social media where sufficient acknowledgement could be impos-
sible for reasons of practicality or otherwise. See Intellectual Property Office, Exceptions to 
Copyright: Guidance for Creators and Copyright Owners (October 2014) <https:// www.gov.
uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment_ data/ file/ 448274/ Exceptions_ to_ 
copyright_ - _ Guidance_ for_ creators_ and_ copyright_ owners.pdf>.
 295. See, for example, TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 112 (Full 
Federal Court, see particularly Sundberg J’s judgement at [2] ); Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 
QB 84 at 94.
 296. See, for example, Kevin Taylor, ‘Copyright in Practice: The Publisher Perspective’ in Trevor 
Fenwick and Ian Locks (eds), Copyright in the Digital Age: Industry Issues and Impacts (Wildy, 
Simmons & Hill Publishing on behalf of The Stationers Company and individual contributors, 
2010) 159, 162.
 297. See, for example, American Law Institute, Intellectual Property:  Principles Governing 
Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes (2007) (ALI Principles) § 
101(6). A ‘transnational civil dispute’ is defined to mean a civil action in a court of the forum 
state in which there is a claim or defence under the intellectual property rights of another 
state (ie, non- forum state), or a claim arising out of activities that implicate intellectual prop-
erty rights where the activities occur, at least in part, outside the forum state.
 298. This uncertainty can be caused as much by conflicting demands imposed under varied 
copyright provisions from different jurisdictions, as well as by overlapping rights under the 
same. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Rochelle Dreyfuss and Annette Kur, ‘The Law Applicable to 
Secondary Liability in Intellectual Property Cases’ (2010) 42 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 201, 206.
 299. See, for example, Graeme Dinwoodie, ‘Developing a Private International Intellectual 
Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality’ (2009) 51 William & Mary Law Review 711, 716.
 300. See Dinwoodie, G. 2009, 716. See also Tod’s SpA v. Heyraud SA, Case C- 28/ 04, 2005 ECR 
I- 05781; Sam Ricketson and Jane C.  Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2005) [20.08].
 301. See, for example, Dinwoodie, G. 2009, 718.
 302. See Dinwoodie, G. 2009, 718. Dinwoodie has also argued that the unexamined invocation of 
the principle of territoriality has undermined the maturing of a properly developed private 
international law of intellectual property, as the principle has led erroneously to the vesting 
of exclusive jurisdiction over intellectual property litigation in the courts of the country for 
which protection is sought (788– 9). He noted further that article 5(2) has been alternatively 
read to institute a rule of lex fori, as the forum is ‘the country where protection is claimed’, 
although the accepted reading is that the article refers to the country where the infringement 
is alleged to have occurred (ie, the country in which protection is claimed). See also Graeme 
W.  Austin, ‘Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights:  Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright 
Infringement Litigation’ (1999) 23 Columbia- VLA Journal of Law & Arts 1, 24– 5.
 303. See Dinwoodie, G. 2009, 730. In this respect Dinwoodie noted that the US courts have articu-
lated choice of law rules that admit greater flexibility on the question of infringement, with-
out jettisoning respect for the claims of the lex loci protectionis. Instead the lex loci delicti (ie, 
the law of the place where the wrong was committed) is identified as the applicable choice of 
law rule in the infringement context.
 304. ALI Principles.
 305. European Max Planck Group, Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (1 
December 2011)  <http:// www.ip.mpg.de/ fileadmin/ ipmpg/ content/ clip/ Final_ Text_ 1_ 
December_ 2011.pdf> (CLIP Principles).
 306. ALI Principles, § 201(1).
 307. CLIP Principles, art 2.101.
 308. ALI Principles, § 204(1) – (2) (the person must have substantially acted, or taken substantial 
preparatory acts, to initiate or further the infringement); CLIP Principles, art 2.202.
 309. ALI Principles, § 321(1); CLIP Principles, art 3.603(1).
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 310. ALI Principles, § 321(1).
 311. CLIP Principles, art 3.603(2).
 312. ALI Principles, § 321(1)(a).
 313. CLIP Principles, art 3.603(2)(a).
 314. ALI Principles, § 321 (1)(d).
 315. CLIP Principles, art 3.603(2)(d). See also Rita Matulionyte, ‘IP and Applicable Law in Recent 
International Proposals: Report for the International Law Association’ (2012) 3(2) Journal 
of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Electronic Commerce Law 263, 289, where 
it is noted that the ubiquitous infringement rules provide little legal certainty and foresee-
ability; Andrew F.  Christie, Private International Law Issues in Online Intellectual Property 
Infringement Disputes with Cross- Border Elements: An Analysis of National Approaches (2015) 
<http:// www.wipo.int/ edocs/ pubdocs/ en/ wipo_ rep_ rfip_ 2015_ 1.pdf>.
 316. See UK Copyright Act, ss 153– 5; Australian Copyright Act, s 32(2). These factors are less rele-
vant when we consider if the same content is copyright protected in the US, as such con-
tent (likely considered to be unpublished instead) is copyright protected irrespective of the 
nationality or domicile of the relevant author. See US Copyright Act, § 104(a). See also the 
discussion in Part I, sub- section (D).
 317. See US Copyright Act, § 106(1); UK Copyright Act, ss 16(1) and 17; Australian Copyright Act, 
ss 31(1)(a)(i), 31(1)(b)(i), 85(1)(a) and 86(a).
 318. US Copyright Act, §§ 107(1) and (4). The second fair use factor (ie, the nature of the copy-
right- protected work) is likely to be neutral to both the copyright holder and Jane; see § 
107(2).
 319. See US Copyright Act, § 107(3).
 320. UK Copyright Act, s 30.
 321. UK Copyright Act, s 30A.
 322. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Personal Copies for Private Use) Regulations 2014 
(UK) SI 2014/ 2361 (UK Copyright Regulations 2014), reg 3.
 323. Australian Copyright Act, ss 41 and 103A.
 324. Australian Copyright Act, ss 41A and 103AA.
 325. Australian Copyright Act, ss 42 and 103B.
 326. See Australian Copyright Act, ss 43C, 47J, 109A, 110AA and 111.
 327. Australian Copyright Act, ss 43C, 47J, 109A and 110AA.
 328. Jane’s use is likely exempt as a fair use in the US.
 329. US Copyright Act, § 106(3).
 330. UK Copyright Act, s 16(1).
 331. Australian Copyright Act, s 31(1).
 332. US Copyright Act, §§ 106(4) and 106(5).
 333. UK Copyright Act, s 16(1).
 334. Australian Copyright Act, ss 31(1)(a)(vi), 31(1)(a)(iv), 31(1)(b)(iii), 85(1)(c) and 86(c).
 335. US Copyright Act, § 101.
 336. UK Copyright Act, s 20(2).
 337. See Information Society Directive, art 3(1); ITV Broadcasting Ltd (Court of Justice of the 
European Union, C- 607/ 11, 7 March 2013) [32].
 338. The expression ‘in public’ is considered in relation to the owner of the copyright (ie, the 
copyright holder’s public). The question is whether the audience is one which the copyright 
holder would fairly consider to be a part of his or her public (ie, whom the copyright holder 
would expect to receive remuneration from). This can refer to a small portion of the public 
and neither the size of the audience nor the privacy of the surroundings is decisive. See, 
for example, Rank Film Production Ltd (1983) 2 IPE 113 (Rank Film); Telstra Corporation v 
Australasian Performing Right Association (1997) 191 CLR 140.
 339. ‘To the public’ (in relation to the right to communicate) conveys a broader concept than ‘in 
public’ (in relation to the right to perform, show or play). A communication to the public 
includes a communication to individual members of the public in a private setting. See, for 
example, Rank Film (1983) 2 IPE 113; Telstra Corporation v Australasian Performing Right 
Association (1997) 191 CLR 140. Apart from defining ‘to the public’ to refer to the public 
within or outside Australia, see Australian Copyright Act, s 10, ‘in public’ and ‘to the public’ 
is left largely to judicial determination. See also Ricketson, S., Richardson, M. and Davison, 
M. 2013, 358– 61.
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 340. These countries are contracting parties to the Berne Convention. Copyright protection will be 
conferred even if the venue of first publication (if published) cannot be ascertained. See the 
discussion in Part I, sub- section (D).
 341. US Copyright Act, § 106(2).
 342. I note that substantial similarity appears to be an elusive concept, not subject to precise defin-
ition. See, for example, Concrete Machinery Co Inc v Classic Lawn Ornaments Inc, 843 F 2d 
600 (1st Cir, 1988); Atari Inc v North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp, 672 F 2d 
607 (7th Cir, 1982). Under the ‘ordinary observer’ test, as the original commentary is not 
identifiable in Jane’s new commentary, an ordinary, reasonable person is not likely to con-
clude that the two commentaries are substantially similar, and that Jane has appropriated 
Evangeline’s expression.
 343. This is regardless of whether the allegedly infringing work is original enough to constitute a 
separate, copyright- protected, derivative work.
 344. See UK Copyright Act, ss 16(1) and 21(3); Australian Copyright Act, ss 31(1)(a)(vi) 
and 10.
 345. See UK Copyright Act, ss 16(1) and 17; Australian Copyright Act, ss 31(1)(a)(i), 31(1)(b)(i), 
85(1)(a) and 86(a).
 346. Although Evangeline’s commentary is not reproduced substantially so as to be recognisable 
by any person, the quality of what is copied (linked to the factor of originality of the part cop-
ied) is critical to the assessment as to whether a substantial part is copied. See UK Copyright 
Act, s 16(3); Australian Copyright Act, s 14. See also Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd v Paramount 
Films Service Ltd [1934] 1 Ch 593; Ice TV [2009] HCA 14.
 347. In particular, the right against false attribution; see Australian Copyright Act, ss 195AC– AH.
 348. See US Copyright Act, § 101. There is also no breach of the right to prohibit the removal 
or alteration of copyright management information under the DMCA, § 1202(b), given 
that there are no facts in the case study which establish that Jane knows, or has reasonable 
grounds to know, that she is assisting or hiding an infringement of Evangeline’s copyright.
 349. UK Copyright Act, ss 77(1) and 78(2).
 350. UK Copyright Act, s 30. I  add that Jane will not likely be able to satisfy all the conditions 
to avail herself of the newly extended fair dealing exception for the purpose of quotation 
under s 30(1ZA) [in particular, that sufficient acknowledgement is impossible for reasons of 
practicality or otherwise under s30(1ZA)(d)]. On the facts, it cannot be ascertained if Jane’s 
use is a fair dealing and if the amount of material quoted from Evangeline’s commentary is 
required for the specific purpose. These will be matters of fact, degree and impression.
 351. Australian Copyright Act, ss 41 and 103A.
 352. Circumstances such as the purpose for which the work is used, the context, any practice and 
so on will be taken into account; see Australian Copyright Act, s 195AR.
 353. See, for example, Koons II, 467 F 3d 244 (2nd Cir, 2006).
 354. See Cariou v Prince, 714 F 3d 694 (2nd Cir, 2013), 714 F 3d 694 (2nd Cir, 2013).
 355. UK Copyright Act, s 30A.
 356. Australian Copyright Act, ss 41 and 103A. This exception has been restrictively interpreted. 
This is also the case under the UK Copyright Act, s 30.
 357. Jane’s use is likely exempt as a fair use in the US and a fair dealing in the UK.
 358. There are no facts in the case study which establish that Zee knows, or has reasonable 
grounds to know, that he is assisting or hiding an infringement of Jane’s copyright. As such, 
there is no breach of the right to prohibit the removal or alteration of copyright management 
information under the DMCA, § 1202(b).
 359. This is although Zee has copied Jane’s commentary substantially onto the relevant 
Wikipedia page.
 360. UK Copyright Act, s 30; Australian Copyright Act, ss 41 and 103A. I also add that Zee will not 
likely be able to satisfy all the conditions to avail himself of the newly extended fair deal-
ing exception for the purpose of quotation under s 30(1ZA) [in particular, that sufficient 
acknowledgement is impossible for reasons of practicality or otherwise under s30(1ZA)(d)].
 361. Again circumstances such as the purpose for which the work is used, the context, any practice 
and so on will be taken into account; see Australian Copyright Act, s 195AR.
 362. Zee’s use is likely exempt as a fair use in the US.
 363. UK Copyright Act, s 30A.
 364. Australian Copyright Act, ss 41 and 103A. This exception has been restrictively interpreted. 
This is also the case under the UK Copyright Act, s 30.
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 365. Jane’s use is likely exempt as a fair dealing in the UK.
 366. US Copyright Act, § 101.
 367. UK Copyright Act, s 17(4).
 368. Australian Copyright Act, s 10.
 369. Australian Copyright Act, s 86. This includes the exclusive right to make a copy of the film, 
cause the film to be seen or heard in public and to communicate the film to the public.
 370. Australian Copyright Act, s 10. See also Australian Olympic Committee Inc v The Big Fights Inc 
(1999) 46 IPR 53; Ricketson, S. and Cresswell, C. 2015 [7.290].
 371. US Copyright Act, §§ 107(1) and (4).
 372. US Copyright Act, § 107(3). The third factor refers to the ‘amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole’.
 373. Cheryl’s use is likely exempt as a fair use in the US.
 374. UK Copyright Act, s 30A.
 375. These uses are likely exempt as fair uses in the US and fair dealings in the UK.
 376. The reproduction occurs through the conversion of the collage from a digital form. Each 
magazine embodying the collage is taken to be a single reproduction. See Australian 
Copyright Act, s 21(1A).
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Chapter Three
Application of the terms of service
In this chapter I examine the standard terms of service (TOS) that users 
agree to when they use the services offered on the five selected social 
media platforms, namely Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube, Twitter and 
Wikipedia. I begin by identifying the key TOS that govern or have impli-
cations on the content- generative activities undertaken by users on these 
platforms. These TOS address the following: the ownership and licens-
ing of the content generated; the copyright policies adopted by the plat-
forms; the indemnification and limitation of liability of such platforms; 
and the choice of a governing law and jurisdiction. I then apply the rel-
evant terms to the content- generative activities undertaken by Jane and 
other users in the case study, under the second of four scenarios in this 
book. My application of the TOS to each content- generative activity will 
not be conducted on a comprehensive basis as there is a dearth of case 
law in this area, particularly in the UK and in Australia.
I then examine the extent of alignment and incompatibility the TOS 
have with the copyright regimes in the US, the UK and Australia. The 
clauses that deal with the ownership and licensing of the content, as well 
as the copyright policies that expressly incorporate the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA)’s notice and takedown mechanism, are the most 
relevant with regard to the content- generative behaviours of users. While 
the incorporation of the DMCA reflects the way in which social media plat-
forms align themselves with copyright laws (particularly those of the US, 
where these platforms are registered), there are three areas that give rise 
to potential incompatibilities between the TOS and the copyright regimes.
The other clauses identified, such as those providing for the indem-
nification and limitation of liability of the platforms, have implications 
for the content- generative activities of users. In particular, these clauses 
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underscore the vulnerability of users who are exposed to the risks of copy-
right infringement through the generation of content on such platforms.
This chapter provides further support for the book’s argument 
that current inconsistencies existing between the TOS and the copyright 
regimes compromise the effectiveness of those laws in regulating the 
content- generative behaviours of social media users. The TOS are also 
found to reflect the unilateral interests of the social media platforms sur-
veyed, at the expense of their users. Finally, the application of the TOS in 
the chapter to the case study constitutes scenario two in the book. This 
allows – through a juxtaposition of the outcomes reached under scenarios 
one (from Chapter Two) and two (from this chapter) – for a specific evalu-
ation of the consistency between the copyright regimes and the TOS.
I. Terms of service
Users have to tread through a labyrinth of terms and policies set out in sep-
arate documents across multiple web pages to ascertain their rights and 
obligations on social media platforms, including those pertaining to their 
content- generative activities on such platforms. For instance, the main 
TOS for Facebook that outline its users’ rights and responsibilities are 
comprised within Facebook’s ‘Statement of Rights and Responsibilities’ 
(Facebook Statement).1 In addition, many links to separate documents2 
are provided under the Facebook Statement, and these have a bearing on 
the overall position of a user when it comes to issues relating to his or her 
content- generative activities. The TOS for Pinterest (Pinterest Terms),3 
YouTube (YouTube Terms),4 Twitter (Twitter Terms)5 and Wikipedia 
(Wikipedia Terms)6 are similarly presented across multiple documents. 
In the following sub- sections I will look at the primary types of provisions 
under the TOS that seek to regulate the content- generative behaviours of 
users on the five social media platforms surveyed. The types of provisions 
which otherwise have implications on these activities are also studied.
a. ownership and licensing
The ownership and licensing clauses under the TOS of social media 
platforms govern the content- generative activities undertaken by social 
media users. They identify users who hold the copyrights to the content 
created, modified and disseminated on these platforms, as well as pro-
vide for the rights of users to use copyright- protected content generated 
by others on such platforms.
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1. Facebook
Pursuant to the Facebook Statement, a user grants to Facebook, in respect 
of content ‘covered by intellectual property rights’, a ‘non- exclusive, trans-
ferable, sub- licensable, royalty- free, worldwide license’ to use any con-
tent covered by intellectual property rights that he or she posts on the 
Facebook platform.7 This licence is effectively unencumbered (ie, unre-
stricted by copyright), although a user owns all the content that he or 
she posts.8 The licence ends when the user deletes the relevant content, 
or closes his or her account, unless such ‘content has been shared with 
others, and they have not deleted it’.9 The Facebook Statement further 
clarifies that where a user publishes content and chooses the ‘Public 
setting’, the user is in effect allowing everyone, including non- Facebook 
users, ‘to access and use that information’.10 At the same time the term 
‘use’ is broadly defined and includes the acts of running, copying, public 
performance or display, distribution, modification, translation and the 
creation of derivative works.11
2. Pinterest
Under the Pinterest Terms, a user retains all rights in the content he or 
she has posted on the Pinterest platform.12 Further, each of Pinterest 
and other users acquire a ‘non- exclusive, royalty- free, transferable, sub- 
licensable, worldwide’ licence to, among other things, use, display, 
reproduce, ‘re- pin’, modify, create derivative works from, perform and 
distribute a user’s content solely for ‘the purposes of operating, develop-
ing, providing and using’ the Pinterest products.13 This qualifier limits 
the scope of the licences granted – the broad range of acts is permissible 
only to the extent that these are carried out on the Pinterest platform 
and for the purposes of developing and using the services and products 
on Pinterest. After a user has deactivated his or her account, Pinterest 
and other users can continue, in relation to the user’s content, to engage 
in acts consistent with the rights granted under the licence when the 
Pinterest account was active, if such content has already been stored or 
shared by other users.14
3. YouTube
The YouTube Terms provide that a user retains all ownership rights, 
although the user, through submitting his or her content to YouTube, 
grants to the latter a similarly unencumbered ‘worldwide, non- exclusive, 
royalty- free, sub- licensable and transferable’ licence to, inter alia, use, 
reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, adapt, elec-
tronically transmit and perform his or her content15 in connection with 
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the service, as well as YouTube’s, and its successors’ and affiliates’ busi-
ness.16 While content on the YouTube platform is ‘owned by or licensed to 
YouTube’, it is subject to ‘copyright and other intellectual property rights 
under the law’.17 In relation to the sharing of content by a user, other users 
of YouTube are also expressly granted a licence with similar rights as can 
be exercised through the functionality of the YouTube service, except that 
the rights of adaptation, and to prepare derivative works, are specifically 
omitted.18 Further, notwithstanding the termination of licences granted 
to YouTube within a ‘commercially reasonable time’ after a user removes 
the relevant video clips from his or her YouTube account, YouTube may 
retain the deleted video clips that are not displayed.19 In addition, the 
licences in respect of comments a user submits (ie, to video clips shared 
on YouTube) are irrevocable and perpetual.20
4. Twitter
Under the Twitter Terms, while a user retains the rights to his or her con-
tent,21 a ‘worldwide, non- exclusive, royalty- free license (with the right 
to sublicense)’ is granted to Twitter to, inter alia, use, copy, reproduce, 
adapt, modify, publish, display and distribute such content in ‘any and all 
media or distribution methods’.22 The provision further clarifies that the 
licence authorises Twitter to make a user’s ‘tweets’ available to the public 
and to let others do the same.23
5. Wikipedia
The Wikipedia Terms are the TOS that apply to all of the collaborative pro-
jects started by the Wikimedia Foundation. Its summary states that while 
a user can share and re- use articles and other media on the Wikipedia 
platform under free and open licences, such users also license his or 
her individual contributions to Wikipedia under free and open licences, 
except where these contributions fall within the public domain.24 It is 
emphasised under the Wikipedia Terms that the Wikimedia Foundation 
merely hosts the content, which is created and managed by users.25 In 
general, all content submitted to Wikipedia has to be licensed so that it 
is freely re- usable by anyone who is interested in accessing it.26 In par-
ticular, users contributing content to Wikipedia are required to ‘grant 
broad permissions to the general public to re- distribute and re- use’ their 
content freely, so long as there is proper attribution of the use and the 
same freedom to re- use and re- distribute is granted to resulting derivative 
works.27 The licensing requirements for text in respect of which a user 
holds the copyright are set out under the ‘Creative Commons Attribution- 
Share Alike 3.0 Unported License’28 and the ‘GNU Free Documentation 
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License’.29 These licences allow for commercial uses of the content, so long 
as users are compliant with the licensing terms.30 Furthermore, under 
the Wikipedia Terms, the licences granted by a user in relation to his or 
her contributed content are irrevocable, even after a user terminates his 
or her use of the services.31 Overall, the clauses relating to the ownership 
and licensing of the content are presented differently from the equiva-
lent clauses under the TOS of the other four social media platforms. For 
instance, the Wikipedia Terms make a point of specifying that the re- use 
of content on the Wikipedia platform is acceptable.32
6. Observations
Under the TOS surveyed, a user not only grants the relevant social media 
platform an unencumbered licence to use his or her content under the 
respective TOS; he or she also grants other users the licence to use his or 
her content. The rights of other users in relation to a user’s content are 
more equivocal and vague under the Facebook Statement and the Twitter 
Terms as compared to the Pinterest Terms, the YouTube Terms and the 
Wikipedia Terms.
In respect of the Pinterest platform, the scope of the licence granted 
by a user to other users is fairly limited  – such licence covers mainly 
the activities occurring on the Pinterest platform. With regard to the 
Wikipedia platform, on the other hand, the expansive grant of rights 
from a user to other users, in relation to his or her content, could be 
explained by the purpose of a collaborative project such as Wikipedia. Its 
main purpose is to expand the commons of free culture and knowledge,33 
so hosting freely accessible and re- usable content is consistent with the 
project’s overall ethos. Finally, it is noted that YouTube users are granted 
limited rights (in comparison to those granted to YouTube) to re- use a 
user’s content, which do not include the rights of adaptation and to pre-
pare derivative works.34
b. Copyright policy
Under the DMCA,35 there is a safe harbour provision that can, subject to 
the meeting of other conditions,36 exempt social media platforms (being 
service providers)37 from liability for monetary relief, in relation to sec-
ondary liability for copyright infringement38 by their users. The condi-
tions that have to be met by a social media platform are as follows:
 (i) the platform does not have either actual or constructive knowledge 
of the infringing activity;39
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 (ii) the platform does not receive any direct financial benefit from the 
infringing activity, where such platform has the right and ability to 
control such activity;40 and
 (iii) where notified of infringement, the platform responds exped-
itiously to remove infringing material.41
Another condition to be met is that the relevant social media platform 
has a termination policy in respect of the accounts of users who are 
repeat copyright infringers.42 Moreover, the platform is also protected 
from liability to users if the removals of content were done in good faith, 
even if the content is later found to be non- copyright infringing and erro-
neously removed.43
At the same time there are safeguards built into the DMCA to pre-
vent abuse by copyright holders of the notice and takedown process 
available to them. These include the user’s option to issue a counter- 
notice where his or her content has been erroneously removed44 and the 
award of damages where a copyright holder knowingly and materially 
misrepresents that content is infringing.45 Separately, the DMCA also lists 
the requisite elements for a notice alleging copyright infringement46 and 
a counter- notice disputing the same.47
In this sub- section, the copyright policies of the social media plat-
forms are examined. These policies set out the recourses (legal or other-
wise) available to copyright holders, in relation to the infringing content 
and the relevant users, as well as the positions taken by such platforms 
against users who repeatedly infringe the copyrights of others. In either 
respect, it is noted that the DMCA mechanism is incorporated into the 
TOS of the five platforms.
1. Facebook
The Facebook Statement prohibits a user from sharing content that 
infringes another user’s rights.48 Facebook can remove content that vio-
lates the rights of a copyright holder, and also disable a user’s account for 
repeated infringements.49 In this respect Facebook has created a page, 
accessible via a link,50 which specifically advises users on copyright and 
trademark infringements. A user is warned against misrepresenting that 
an activity is infringing,51 as he or she may be liable for damages under 
the DMCA,52 including costs and fees incurred by Facebook or other 
users. Other alternatives are proposed to a copyright holder (often also 
a user) – namely, resolving the issue directly with another user whom he 
or she believes is infringing his or her copyright or seeking legal advice 
before reporting the infringement under the DMCA.53 A copyright holder 
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who nonetheless wishes to notify Facebook of copyright infringement 
has to fill in a DMCA compliant form made available online.54 He or she 
can alternatively submit a report to Facebook’s designated agent, which 
includes all elements of a copyright notice under the DMCA.55 If there is a 
wrongful removal of content by Facebook, a user can appeal against such 
removal.56
2. Pinterest
Under Pinterest’s acceptable use policy, a user agrees that he or she 
will not post content that is infringing of, among other things, another 
user’s intellectual property rights.57 On the other hand, pursuant to its 
copyright policy, Pinterest has the discretion to terminate the account 
of a user who repeatedly infringes, or is repeatedly charged, with 
infringing the intellectual property rights, including copyrights, of 
others.58 A copyright holder, or a person acting on his or her behalf, is 
asked to report copyright infringements, either by completing a DMCA 
compliant form of notice and delivering it to Pinterest’s designated 
agent or by taking the more convenient option and submitting a DMCA 
compliant form made available online.59 A user who believes that his 
or her content was mistakenly removed is entitled to file a counter- 
notice by sending an email to Pinterest, in the format suggested under 
Pinterest’s copyright policy.60
3. YouTube
Under the YouTube Terms, YouTube can terminate the account of a 
repeat infringer who has been notified of infringing activity for the third 
time.61 In addition, under its community guidelines, YouTube users are 
reminded not to upload video clips they did not make, or to use content 
within their video clips that someone else owns the copyright to.62 The 
mechanism under the DMCA is similarly available to a copyright holder – 
the copyright holder can notify YouTube of copyright infringement using 
a DMCA compliant online form,63 while a counter- notice using another 
online form can be submitted to YouTube if the latter has removed con-
tent erroneously.64
4. Twitter
The Twitter Terms provide that Twitter respects the intellectual property 
rights of others and expects its users to do the same.65 As with the other 
social media platforms discussed, Twitter can terminate the account of 
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a repeat infringer.66 A copyright holder can avail him- or herself of the 
DMCA notice and takedown procedure and submit an online form for this 
purpose;67 a user can submit a counter- notice to Twitter, in response to a 
wrongful removal of content.68
5. Wikipedia
Users are prohibited under the Wikipedia Terms from infringing intellec-
tual property rights;69 further, the Wikimedia Foundation can terminate 
the account of a repeat infringer.70 In addition to the notice and takedown 
mechanism under the DMCA,71 the Wikimedia Foundation offers two 
alternative mechanisms to a copyright holder.72 The first alternative is to 
submit a request to the Wikimedia community, which, in the Wikimedia 
Foundation’s own words, ‘handles copyright issues faster and more effec-
tively than prescribed under the DMCA’.73 The copyright holder can post 
a notice stating his or her copyright concerns on a relevant page created 
for this purpose.74 The second alternative is for the copyright holder to 
send an email to the community, at the email address provided.75
6. Observations
The DMCA mechanism is available to copyright holders (often also 
users) under all of the TOS examined. Beyond the DMCA, Facebook, 
YouTube and the Wikimedia Foundation have flagged out other self- 
help alternatives to copyright holders. Indeed, Facebook appears to 
encourage copyright holders to seek self- help firsthand when they 
have copyright concerns. YouTube offers, under its ‘Copyright Center’, 
a vast source of self- help options76 for copyright holders of content, 
as well as users.77 Finally, the Wikimedia Foundation, in respect of 
its projects including Wikipedia, also directs copyright holders to 
take up community self- help options, instead of the legal route under 
the DMCA.
C. indemnification and limitation of liability
The indemnification and limitation of liability clauses under the TOS of 
social media platforms provide for the position taken by these platforms 
if the content- generative activities undertaken by social media users 
are found to be copyright infringing, as well as such platforms’ right to 
indemnity in these circumstances. The clauses further limit the liability 
of the platforms.
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1. Facebook
Facebook disclaims all responsibility for the acts of a user on Facebook, 
including his or her sharing of content.78 If there is any claim brought 
against Facebook in relation to a user’s actions or content, such user is 
required to indemnify Facebook against all damages, losses and expenses 
related to the claim.79 Facebook further excludes or limits, to the fullest 
extent permissible under applicable law, its liability to a user.80
2. Pinterest
Pinterest similarly disclaims any responsibility for content shared on the 
Pinterest platform.81 The Pinterest Terms contain an indemnity clause, 
albeit a narrower one, since it applies only if there are damages, losses, 
expenses, and so on, arising from a use of Pinterest for commercial pur-
poses.82 Pinterest also excludes or limits – to the maximum extent per-
mitted by law – its liability to a user for, among other things, damages or 
losses arising from his or her use of the Pinterest platform or the content 
shared on Pinterest.83
3. YouTube
YouTube too disclaims all responsibility relating to content shared on 
its platform.84 The YouTube Terms further provide that a user agrees to 
indemnify YouTube and its affiliates, and so on, to the fullest extent per-
mitted by law, for matters relating to his or her use of YouTube,85 includ-
ing a violation of the copyright of a third party86 (often also a user). 
Additionally, YouTube’s liability to a user for, among other things, losses, 
expenses or damages resulting from his or her use of its service or the 
content on the YouTube platform is excluded or limited, to the fullest 
extent permitted by law. 87
4. Twitter
Twitter also disclaims responsibility for any content posted on Twitter.88 
Furthermore, pursuant to the Twitter Terms, Twitter’s liability to a user is 
excluded or limited – to the maximum extent permissible under applica-
ble law – for matters resulting from the use of Twitter or the content on 
Twitter.89
5. Wikipedia
Under the Wikipedia Terms, the Wikimedia Foundation disclaims, among 
other things, responsibility for the content or acts of third parties.90 The 
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Wikipedia Foundation also limits or excludes its liability to a user, to the 
fullest extent permitted by law.91
6. Observations
As can be seen, all the social media platforms examined disclaim liability for 
the content available and for the use of such content. In any case, if these 
platforms are found liable and the disclaimers are ineffective, the liability 
clauses under the TOS will apply, to the maximum extent legally permis-
sible, to limit or exclude their liabilities. In addition, a user has the contrac-
tual obligation to indemnify Facebook, Pinterest and YouTube under their 
respective TOS, if the platforms incur losses as a result of his or her use. 
Notably, the indemnity and liability clauses have been drafted to be inclu-
sive – in respect of the scope of circumstances they can apply to as well as 
the parties involved (ie, users of such platforms or other third parties).
d. governing law and jurisdiction
When there is a copyright- related dispute relating to content, the gov-
erning law and jurisdiction clauses under the TOS of social media plat-
forms will naturally be the first point of reference as to the law that 
governs such dispute, and the jurisdiction in which a court can adjudi-
cate the dispute.
1. Facebook
The laws of the state of California govern the Facebook Statement and 
any dispute arising between Facebook and a user, ‘without regard to 
conflict of law provisions’.92 The user further agrees to have any dispute 
resolved exclusively in the US District Court for the Northern District of 
California or a state court located in San Mateo County, and to submit to 
the personal jurisdiction of these courts for the purpose of all litigation 
claims.93
2. Pinterest
Under the Pinterest Terms a user agrees to contact Pinterest first to 
resolve a dispute informally. If the dispute remains unresolved, it will be 
subject to binding arbitration by the American Arbitration Association, 
with reference to the applicable arbitration rules.94
The laws of the state of California similarly govern the Pinterest 
Terms, ‘without respect to its conflict of laws principles’.95 The user also 
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consents to submit to the personal jurisdiction of a state court located in 
San Francisco County, California, or the US District Court for the Northern 
District of California, for actions not subject to arbitration.96 
3. YouTube
The YouTube Terms are governed by the laws of California, ‘excluding 
California’s choice of law rules’, and a user consents to submit to the 
personal jurisdiction of the courts in Santa Clara County, California.97 
The user further agrees that the YouTube service is deemed ‘solely based 
in California’ and that YouTube is ‘a passive website that does not give 
rise to personal jurisdiction over YouTube’, in jurisdictions other than 
California.98
4. Twitter
Under the Twitter Terms, the governing law is that of the state of 
California, ‘excluding its choice of law provisions’.99 Further, the user 
agrees that the federal or state courts located in San Francisco County, 
California will have jurisdiction over the litigation claims arising from his 
or her use of the Twitter service.100
5. Wikipedia
Where there is a dispute, a user is encouraged to seek resolution through 
the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms provided by the project.101 
Similar to the Pinterest Terms and the Twitter Terms, the Wikipedia 
Terms provide that the laws of the state of California, without reference 
to conflict of laws principles, constitute the governing law. The user also 
submits to the personal jurisdiction of the federal or state courts in San 
Francisco County, California.102
6. Observations
The social media platforms studied have chosen as the governing law of 
their TOS the laws of the state in which their headquarters are based.103 
A user also agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of various federal, state 
or district courts in the US, as the case may be, in the event of a dispute.
e. summary
Table 3.1 below serves as a summary of the above discussion on the 
key terms that govern or have implications on the content- generative 
activities of users on Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube, Twitter and 
Wikipedia.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3.1 Summary of the key terms applicable to the content- generative activities of users across the five selected social media platforms
Social media platform & 
terms of service
Ownership and licensing Copyright policy Indemnification and 
limitation of liability
Governing law and 
jurisdiction
Facebook
1. Facebook Statement
2. Facebook Principles
3. Data Policy
4.  Facebook 
Copyright Policy
5. Community Standards
In general, a user owns the con-
tent he or she shares
Unencumbered licence granted 
to Facebook
It is implied that other users  
can use the content made avail-
able to them by a user, although 
this is equivocal
Note: Broad definition of the term 
‘use’
Notice and takedown, as well  
as counter- notice procedures 
under the DMCA
Facebook will disable a 
user’s account for repeated 
infringements
Online form to notify 
Facebook of copyright 
infringement available
Encourages self- help by 
a copyright holder before 
reporting copyright infringe-
ment under the DMCA
User indemnification of 
Facebook against all  
damages, losses and  
expenses incurred, in  
relation to a user’s actions 
or content
Broad exclusion and  
limitation of liability
Laws of the state of 
California
US District Court for the 
Northern District of California 
or a state court located in San 
Mateo County
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Social media platform & 
terms of service
Ownership and licensing Copyright policy Indemnification and 
limitation of liability
Governing law and 
jurisdiction
Pinterest
1. Pinterest Terms
2.  Pinterest Acceptable  
Use Policy
3. Privacy Policy
4. Pinterest Copyright Policy
In general, a user owns the con-
tent he or she shares
Licence granted to Pinterest
Licence granted to other users
However, the broad range of 
acts licensed must be solely for 
the purposes of developing and 
using the services and products 
on Pinterest
Notice and takedown, as well  
as counter- notice procedures 
under the DMCA
Pinterest will disable a 
user’s account for repeated 
infringements
Online form to notify 
Pinterest of copyright 
infringement available
User indemnification of 
Pinterest where there are 
damages, losses, expenses  
and so on arising from his 
or her use of Pinterest for  
commercial purposes
Broad exclusion and  
limitation of liability
Laws of the state of 
California
US District Court for the 
Northern District of California 
or a state court located in San 
Francisco County
Note: In general, an attempt 
must be made to resolve the 
dispute informally, before 
submitting it for binding 
arbitration
YouTube
1. YouTube Terms
2. Privacy Guidelines
3. YouTube Copyright Policy
4. Community Guidelines
In general, a user owns the con-
tent he or she shares
Unencumbered licence granted 
to YouTube
More limited licence granted to 
other users – this does not include 
the rights to adapt and prepare 
derivative works
Notice and takedown, as well  
as counter- notice procedures 
under the DMCA
YouTube will disable a 
user’s account for repeated 
infringements
Online forms to notify 
YouTube of copyright 
infringement, as well as to 
lodge a counter- notice for 
content mistakenly removed, 
are available
User indemnification of 
YouTube in matters relating  
to his or her use of 
YouTube
Broad exclusion and limi-
tation of liability
Laws of the state of 
California
Courts of Santa Clara 
County, California
Table 3.1 (Cont.)
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Social media platform & 
terms of service
Ownership and licensing Copyright policy Indemnification and 
limitation of liability
Governing law and 
jurisdiction
Twitter
1. Twitter Terms
2. Privacy Policy
3. Twitter Copyright Policy
4. Twitter Rules
In general, a user owns the con-
tent he or she shares
Unencumbered licence granted 
to Twitter
Notice and takedown, as well 
as counter- notice procedures 
under the DMCA
Twitter will disable a 
user’s account for repeated 
infringements
Online form to notify Twitter 
of copyright infringement 
available
Broad limitation and 
exclusion of liability
Laws of the state of 
California
Federal or state courts of San 
Francisco County
Wikipedia
1. Wikipedia Terms
2. Privacy Policy
3.  Creative Commons 
Attribution- ShareAlike 3.0
4. GNU Licence
5.  Wikipedia Copyright 
Policy
No express reference to the 
ownership of content on 
Wikipedia
Content on Wikipedia can be 
shared and re- used under free 
and open licences
Free and open licences also 
granted by a user over his or her 
contributions to the project
Note: Commercial uses of con-
tent are permitted, so long as 
the user is compliant with the 
licensing terms
Notice and takedown, as well 
as counter- notice procedures 
under the DMCA
Wikimedia Foundation will 
disable a user’s account for 
repeated infringements
Encourages community 
self- help as alternatives (ie, 
submit a request by posting 
a notice on a relevant page 
or by sending an email to the 
Wikimedia community)
Broad limitation and 
exclusion of liability
Laws of the state of 
California
Federal or state courts of San 
Francisco County
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II. Scenario two: the application of the terms of service
The case study on Jane in Chapter One serves as the basis on which the 
TOS discussed in this chapter can be applied to the content- generative 
activities undertaken by Jane and other users. I consider these activities 
in the same order as in Chapter Two, where the copyright laws discussed 
were applied to such activities.
a. jane’s use of the music video clip on youTube as 
her morning alarm
As the singer’s managers have uploaded the video clip to YouTube they 
are bound by the YouTube Terms, which provides that they grant a 
licence to other users, including Jane, to use the video clip in the way 
Jane has. In this instance, Jane is acting within the scope of the limited 
licence granted from one YouTube user to another, as there is no prep-
aration of derivative works from, or adaptation of, the said video clip.104
This suggests that Jane has not acted in breach of the YouTube Terms.
b. jane’s ‘pinning’ of the youTube music video clip on her pin- 
board titled ‘My favourite Things’ on Pinterest
Jane can directly ‘pin’ the video clip on her Pinterest pin- board by utilis-
ing the ‘share’ function available on the YouTube platform. Through its 
provision of the social plug- in105 for Pinterest, among other social media 
platforms, YouTube arguably anticipates and permits106 this use (ie, the 
sharing of a video clip on YouTube with users of such other platforms).
This indicates that Jane has not acted in breach of the YouTube Terms.
C. jane’s use of evangeline’s earlier commentary on facebook to 
create her own commentary
Whether Jane’s use complies with the Facebook Statement is less 
straightforward to evaluate than in the earlier two instances. Pursuant 
to the Facebook Statement, while an unencumbered licence is expressly 
granted to Facebook by a user in respect of his or her content, it is less 
clear what other users are permitted to do in relation to such user’s con-
tent.107 Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, Jane’s use is arguably per-
mitted under the Facebook Statement. An example is made, under the 
Facebook Statement, of a user who publishes content using the ‘Public’ 
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setting – this user is said to have allowed everyone, including others not 
on Facebook, to use the information shared.108 I  argue that Jane’s use 
falls within the wide definition of ‘use’ which includes the modification 
and translation of, as well as the creation of derivative works from, origi-
nal content.109 The Facebook Statement further emphasises that a user 
controls how content is shared with his or her privacy settings.110 In this 
instance, Evangeline’s Facebook settings are permissive enough to enable 
Jane to view and receive notifications of Evangeline’s posts on Facebook. 
Thus, in consideration of the Facebook Statement in its entirety, Jane’s 
use is likely to be licensed.
Based on the above, Jane has not acted in breach of the Facebook 
Statement.
d. jane’s use of multiple photographs of newborn babies available 
on the pin- boards of other Pinterest users to create a collage to 
share on Pinterest
Jane has modified the images of other Pinterest users to create the col-
lage, a derivative work. Her use is permitted under the licences granted 
by these users to Jane.111 Further, since the collage is shared on Pinterest, 
the condition that certain acts are permitted so long as they are carried 
out for the purpose of using the Pinterest service is satisfied.112
This suggests that Jane has not acted in breach of the Pinterest Terms.
e. jane’s simultaneous sharing of the collage on facebook 
and Twitter
The licences granted by the other Pinterest users to Jane, in respect of 
their images, permit acts for the limited purposes of developing or using 
Pinterest.113 At first glance, Jane’s sharing of the collage off the Pinterest 
platform does not fall within the scope of the licences granted. However, 
it is noted that users who access the ‘pin’ on Facebook are linked back to 
the Pinterest platform. This is the same for users who access the ‘tweet’ 
incorporating the link on Twitter.
Based on the above, Jane has not acted in breach of the Pinterest 
Terms. Also, as her use is licensed, she has not breached the Facebook 
Statement114 and the Twitter Terms115 (ie, for infringing the rights of oth-
ers in general) when she shares the collage hosted on Pinterest on these 
two platforms.
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f. jane’s use of the same collage in her blog post on wordPress
To ascertain if Jane is in breach of WordPress’s TOS, its terms will have to 
be examined separately. While WordPress is not one of five social media 
platforms selected for the purpose of this book, its mention in the case 
study serves to depict the common situation where content derived from 
one social media platform (ie, Pinterest) is reproduced on another plat-
form. In such an instance, the terms of the latter platform (ie, WordPress) 
will be relevant for consideration.
For the purpose of conducting a discussion distinct from that 
under sub- section (E), assuming that Jane directly attaches the collage 
to her blog post on WordPress – instead of sharing the link to the col-
lage on Pinterest – her use is not licensed under the Pinterest Terms.116 
Because Jane, as a user of WordPress, represents and warrants under 
its TOS that she does not infringe the intellectual property rights of any 
third party through her use,117 she is at first appearance in breach of 
WordPress’s TOS.
The above indicates that Jane has breached both the Pinterest 
Terms and WordPress’s TOS.
g. Zee’s contribution to wikipedia on ‘income inequality’ 
using what jane has written
Zee’s use is arguably permitted under the Facebook Statement, in view 
of its reference to a user who publishes content under the ‘Public’ set-
ting – such user is said to allow everyone, including non- Facebook users, 
to access and use the information.118 Zee’s use also falls within the broad 
definition of ‘use’ given under the Facebook Statement.119 In this instance, 
Jane’s Facebook settings are permissive enough to enable her colleagues, 
including Zee, to access her posts.
As is the case under sub- section (C), the above suggests that Zee has 
not acted in breach of the Facebook Statement considered in its entirety. 
On this basis Zee has also not breached the Wikipedia Terms.120
h. jane’s creation and sharing of a new video clip by way of 
‘vidding’ on youTube and subsequently on facebook
Jane’s ‘vidding’ to create a new video clip (being a derivative work) is 
not a permitted use under the limited licence granted by the relevant 
YouTube users to Jane, pursuant to the YouTube Terms.121 Moreover, 
Jane has not sought the consent of the copyright holder (ie, the producer 
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of the television series), although she is seen to have represented that the 
new video clip she shares on the YouTube platform does not contain the 
copyright- protected material of third parties.122 At the same time Jane is 
prohibited from posting content that infringes another person’s rights on 
Facebook.123
The above indicates that Jane has breached both the YouTube 
Terms and the Facebook Statement by her sharing of the new video clip 
on YouTube and Facebook.
i. Cheryl’s use of ‘stills’ from jane’s video clip as thumbnail images 
on her website
Similar to Jane’s ‘vidding’ discussed under sub- section (H), Cheryl’s use 
(being an adaptation) is not a permitted use under the limited licence 
granted by Jane to other users on YouTube, pursuant to the YouTube 
Terms.124 In this instance, the content is shared on another website. With 
reference to the discussion under sub- section (F), if this website happens 
to be a standard one hosting a blog such as WordPress, Cheryl is taken to 
represent and warrant – through her use – that she does not infringe the 
intellectual property rights of any third party.125
Regardless of which website Cheryl is displaying the images on, 
the above suggests that she has breached at least one set of TOS (ie, the 
YouTube Terms).
j. other users’ partial use of jane’s collage to create their own, and 
sharing the same on Pinterest, facebook and Twitter
The discussion under sub- section (D) can be referred to. In this instance, 
other users instead of Jane are creating the collages for sharing across 
the three social media platforms. Although multiple scenarios, depend-
ent on the social media platform on which the collage is first accessed, 
present themselves for consideration here, it is assumed  – for the pur-
pose of discussion in this sub- section – that the collage is first accessed 
on the Pinterest platform and thereafter edited for sharing on Pinterest, 
Facebook and Twitter by these users. Unlike the case under sub- section 
(E), the users are sharing their collages by uploading them directly on the 
Pinterest, Facebook and Twitter platforms. Facebook and Twitter users 
accessing these collages are not linked back to the Pinterest platform.
Each user’s modification of Jane’s collage and other users’ images to 
create his or her own collage, a derivative work, for sharing on Pinterest 
is a permitted use under the licences granted to him or her (ie, by Jane 
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and such other users) under the Pinterest Terms.126 Therefore the crea-
tion of a new collage for sharing on the Pinterest platform by such users 
does not (per se) breach the Pinterest Terms.
On the other hand, if the user accesses Jane’s collage on the Pinterest 
platform and creates a new collage to share on Facebook and Twitter, the 
licences granted to him or her will not extend to cover this sharing off 
the Pinterest platform.127 Under the Facebook Statement, a user is pro-
hibited from posting content that infringes another user’s rights.128 The 
Twitter Terms also contain a similar obligation to respect the intellectual 
property rights of others.129 In this respect the above indicates that the 
user has breached not only the Pinterest Terms, but also the Facebook 
Statement and the Twitter Terms.
K. editor jasper’s use of jane’s collage on the cover page of 
his magazine
It is not clear from which social media platform (ie, Pinterest, Facebook 
or Twitter) Jasper extracted Jane’s collage. Therefore the possibility 
of each platform being the platform on which Jasper accessed the col-
lage will be considered in turn. Consistent with the earlier discussion, 
any use that is not carried out for the purpose of developing or using 
the Pinterest service is unlicensed under the Pinterest Terms.130 The 
Facebook Statement, on the other hand, is equivocal as to the rights of 
other users to a user’s content:131 Jasper’s specific use of the collage for 
his magazine cover arguably falls outside the scope of the licence granted 
by Jane. Finally, the Twitter Terms are also fairly equivocal in this respect. 
Any use by a third party user of a user’s content, other than for the pur-
pose of ‘re- tweeting’, is likely to be unlicensed.132
Based on the above, Jasper has breached each of the Pinterest 
Terms, the Facebook Statement and the Twitter Terms by extracting the 
collage for commercial use.
III. Relationship with the copyright regimes
In this section, I will analyse the relationship that the TOS have with the 
copyright regimes, with reference to the discussions in this chapter and 
in Chapter Two. I argue that while the TOS are aligned with the copyright 
regimes to some extent, there are potential incompatibilities between the 
regimes in three areas. I have elaborated on the alignment and incompat-
ibilities in the following sub- sections.
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a. alignment with the copyright regimes
As evidenced by the discussion in Part I, a copyright holder who observes 
infringing use of his or her content on any of the five social media plat-
forms surveyed can initiate the notice and takedown process under the 
DMCA integrated into the copyright policy of each platform.133 The req-
uisite conditions for service providers, such as social media platforms 
hosting content online to qualify for protection under the safe harbour 
provision,134 give these platforms great incentive to incorporate the 
DMCA mechanism135 into their copyright policies  – in order to be free 
from liability for monetary relief, in relation to any secondary liability for 
copyright infringement.136
One way to assess the effectiveness of the contractual regime in 
deterring users against undertaking potentially copyright infringing 
activities when these users generate content is to look at the frequency of 
use of the DMCA mechanism on the social media platforms examined. In 
this respect, there is some information made available by these platforms.
In a transparency report published online by Twitter detail-
ing information including, among other things, the number of notices 
issued under the DMCA, it is recorded that between 1 July 2015 and 31 
December 2015 there were a total of 19,039 takedown notices received 
by Twitter  – 71 per cent of these notices resulted in the removal of 
content.137 That is more than a twofold increase in the number of take-
down notices received compared to two years earlier.138 In contrast, with 
reference to a similar report published by the Wikimedia Foundation for 
the same period, 20 notices were received by the Wikimedia Foundation 
for its various projects, including Wikipedia. Only 45 per cent of these 
notices (ie, less than one in two) resulted in the removal of content.139
On a related note, Facebook also has a transparency report – albeit 
a less useful one for the purpose of this book, since it records only the 
number of government requests,140 rather than the number of take-
down notices under the DMCA issued by copyright holders. Pinterest’s 
report has similar limitations.141 Although Google’s transparency report 
details information including, among other things, the requests to 
remove uniform resource locators (URLs) from various governments and 
copyright holders, the records furnished in the report exclude requests 
sent to Google’s search engine directed to other Google products, such 
as YouTube.142 The report also excludes requests relating to content 
appearing on other Google products, such as content accessible through 
YouTube URLs,143 and is therefore of little relevance to this book.
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Overall, social media platforms are solicitous about being per-
ceived to caution users, through their reminders, from undertaking 
content- generative activities that do not respect the copyrights held by 
copyright holders. In addition to the removal of content under the DMCA, 
these platforms are entitled to disable the accounts of users for repeated 
infringements. This right is usually exercised when more than one DMCA 
takedown notice has been received in relation to content from the same 
user.144 The possibility of expulsion from a social media platform for 
repeated infringements – noted to be a condition for the platform to be 
eligible for the safe harbour provision145 – could have an additional deter-
rent effect on users, in respect of their engaging in potentially copyright- 
infringing activities. I  argue that, where the TOS are aligned with the 
relevant copyright regime,146 the two regimes reinforce one another.
Where the regimes are not aligned, I argue that the effectiveness of 
copyright laws in securing compliance from social media users when they 
generate content is compromised. This non- alignment is represented by 
the inconsistencies between the two regimes, which will be outlined in 
the following sub- section.
b. Potential incompatibilities with the copyright regimes
There are three main areas of potential incompatibilities to be considered  
here.
1. Vesting of ‘ownership’ under the terms of service
The vesting of ‘ownership’ on a user of a post on Facebook, a ‘pin’ on 
Pinterest, a video clip on YouTube, a ‘tweet’ on Twitter and a contribution 
on the Wikipedia platform under the TOS does not per se entitle him or 
her to copyright protection of his or her content. A foreseeable barrier to 
the grant of copyright protection to content on social media is where it 
comprises banal words, phrases and language of widespread usage.147 As 
such, not all content on social media will qualify as independent works 
containing the requisite modicums of creativity entitling such content to 
copyright protection.
As mentioned earlier, the minimal originality threshold to be met 
for copyright protection in the US, the UK and Australia is not high.148 
While there can be no generalisations – all other things being equal – if 
the relevant content originates directly from the user, each of a post on 
Facebook, a ‘pin’ on Pinterest, a video clip on YouTube and a contribution 
on Wikipedia is more likely to meet the originality requirement than a 
‘tweet’ on Twitter, given the latter platform’s imposition on its users of a 
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limit of 140 characters or less, per ‘tweet’.149 Because there is a need for a 
higher level of creativity to qualify a short textual work for copyright pro-
tection, a brief work such as a ‘tweet’ is less likely to be copyrightable as it 
affords fewer opportunities for originality.150 It is nonetheless possible for 
some ‘tweets’ to cross the originality threshold and hence to be copyright 
protected.151
In addition, works such as status updates on Facebook, comments 
to ‘pins’ on Pinterest and to video clips on YouTube, as well as ‘tweets’ on 
Twitter, are less likely to be copyrightable for another reason – that of not 
meeting the fixation requirement or its equivalent.152 Unlike photographs 
and video clips on Facebook, such updates, comments and ‘tweets’ do 
not concurrently exist as stored formats in separate media. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that the Facebook Statement recognises the distinction 
between a) photographs and video clips and b) status updates, when it 
expressly states that photographs and video clips are content covered by 
intellectual property rights, but silently leaves open to debate the same 
question in respect of status updates.153 Status updates on Facebook and 
‘tweets’ on Twitter will arguably meet the general fixation requirement in 
the US154 or the equivalent requirements in the UK155 and in Australia,156 
particularly if they can still be found. For example, subject to a Facebook 
user’s privacy settings, status updates from years back may remain 
accessible on the Facebook platform. At the same time, although recent 
‘tweets’ by a Twitter user who ‘tweets’ frequently may be inaccessible for 
the reason that Twitter only allows retrieval of up to 3,200  ‘tweets’,157 
such ‘tweets’ can still be located through taking specific steps. In the case 
of transient (or inaccessible) content, the evidentiary purpose of fixation 
is argued to be defeated, as the author’s contribution to public discourse 
cannot be preserved nor can reliable proof of the bounds of his or her 
copyright- protected expression be provided.158
On the other hand, this non- fulfilment of the evidentiary purpose of 
fixation conceivably applies to the comments made to ‘pins’ on Pinterest 
and to video clips on YouTube. In the case of the Wikipedia platform, the 
fixation requirement, or its equivalent, will likely pose less of a challenge 
to the copyright- ability of content shared on Wikipedia. This is because of 
its purpose as a platform. Wikipedia serves as a repository of the cumula-
tive knowledge upon which its users build and consult for a longer period 
of time than the other social media platforms.
That a substantial volume of the content ‘owned’ is not copyright 
protectable in the first place leads to the inference that social media 
platforms are employing precautionary measures in their acquisitions of 
licences from their users.159 Furthermore, even if the relevant content is 
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copyright protected, the grant of an unencumbered licence to the social 
media platform means that the copyright holder (also a user of the plat-
form) has limited rights to his or her content.160 On this basis, I argue that 
the ‘ownership’ conferred on a user over his or her content under the TOS 
is not meaningful, as it does not mirror the exclusive rights to which a 
copyright holder is ordinarily entitled.
2. Imposition of the terms of service on third parties
Generally the doctrine of privity provides that contracts, such as the 
TOS entered into by social media users, cannot confer rights or impose 
obligations on any third party, other than the direct parties to such 
contracts. To varying degrees, the TOS of the respective social media 
platforms make reference to the rights of others161 to use the content 
made available by a user on the relevant platform. Accordingly, a strict 
application of the doctrine of privity means that third party users may 
not be able to invoke these provisions under the TOS to justify their 
uses of content.
There are exceptions to the doctrine of privity. This doctrine is 
relaxed, for example, by way of development of the common law in 
the US162 and the introduction of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999 in the UK.163 Therefore, in either of these two jurisdictions, a 
third party to a contract can enforce a contractual term if it is clearly 
intended to benefit him or her. With reference to the TOS examined, it 
can be argued that this intention to benefit third party users (ie, to confer 
licences on third party users which permit uses of a user’s content) is less 
clearly expressed under the Facebook Statement and the Twitter Terms 
than under the Pinterest Terms, the YouTube Terms and the Wikipedia 
Terms  – the latter platforms are more unequivocal in this respect.164 
On the other hand, in Australia, the exception to the doctrine of privity 
applies narrowly to insurance contracts.165
In this respect the Morel case166 lends support to the argument that 
the intention to benefit third parties is unclear under the Twitter Terms. It 
also confirms the copyright- ability of Twitter- related content (ie, a photo-
graph).167 In Morel the trial court rejected Agence France Presse’s (AFP) 
argument that there was an implied licence for AFP to use Morel’s works 
under the Twitter Terms, finding instead that the unencumbered copy-
right licence granted to Twitter under the Twitter Terms did not extend 
to benefit third parties.168 As such, AFP, which has its own user account 
on Twitter,169 was held liable for copyright infringement when – together 
with its distribution partner Getty Images in the US – it distributed and 
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licensed the photographs shared on Morel’s Twitter page, without his 
permission, for commercial use by other third party news agencies.
Although the licence granted by a user to Twitter under the Twitter 
Terms allows Twitter to make a user’s ‘tweets’ available to the public and 
to let others do the same,170 the licence did not extend to include AFP’s 
use in this instance. Moreover, Twitter has issued guidelines for the use 
of content shared by its users on Twitter – these guidelines remind other 
users, in disseminating images found on Twitter, to display the full text 
of ‘tweets’ with their accompanying images and to include the respective 
names of the user accounts.171 Through suggesting that content such as 
images should not be disassociated from the ‘tweets’ with which they are 
shared, the guidelines are found to support the interpretation that the 
Twitter Terms do not manifest the intention of a user to confer a benefit 
on the world at large commercially to use his or her content,172 other than 
for the limited purpose of ‘re- tweeting’.
Therefore, while US courts appear prepared to recognise a user’s 
rights to his or her copyrightable content on social media, they are 
inclined to interpret narrowly any incursions on a user’s rights. This will 
include the scope of licence to a user’s content granted under the TOS 
he or she accepts, particularly if the TOS are not adequately clear in this 
respect. The position is likely to be similar in the UK.173 On this note, 
Australian courts will be more likely than in the US or the UK to hold 
that a third party user of content on social media is not licensed to do so 
under the TOS, given that there is no general exception to the doctrine 
of privity.174
The provision for voluntary licensing by users under the TOS of 
social media platforms  – to obviate the risk of copyright infringement 
for other users who undertake content- generative activities in relation 
to the content shared – is premised on the assumption that such content 
is copyright protectable. As seen earlier, this is not always the case. Even 
if the content is copyright protected, the licensing terms under the TOS 
have to be clear enough for the use of (one user’s) content by third party 
users to be permitted. In this sense, the principles relating to contractual 
interpretation may render ineffective the attempt made by social media 
platforms to make legitimate their users’ interactions with copyright- 
protected content.
3. Choice of governing law and jurisdiction
The choice of governing law and jurisdiction clauses under the TOS may 
be unenforceable, as against a user resident in a state outside California 
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or in another country. In sub- sections (a) and (b) below, I will consider 
the application of conventions, treaties and mandatory domestic laws 
to which a user resident in a jurisdiction outside California is subject. 
Through this discussion, the contradictions between the TOS and other 
laws are highlighted.
I will also consider, in sub- section (c) below, the governing law 
for copyright- related disputes arising from content- generative activi-
ties on social media. The discussion will underscore the inconsisten-
cies between the TOS and the copyright regimes. It is convenient to 
conduct the analyses in these sub- sections together, although sub- 
sections (a)  and (b)  do not point to an inconsistency between the 
TOS and the copyright regimes, unlike sub- section (c). These analy-
ses are relevant to ascertaining the governing law that will apply to 
a copyright- related dispute, and the jurisdiction in which a court can 
adjudicate the dispute.
In these respects, I  confine my discussion to what is necessary 
to illustrate that the enforceability of the choice of governing law and 
jurisdiction provisions under the TOS is limited. The logical corollary of 
the non- enforceability of the choice of governing law and jurisdictions 
clauses is that the legal positions in other jurisdictions beyond that speci-
fied under the TOS – whether in the US (and outside of California), the 
UK, Australia or otherwise – and further, in relation to contract, copyright 
or other laws, are relevant to users of social media platforms. This sup-
ports this book’s approach of considering the copyright laws in jurisdic-
tions such as the UK and Australia, in addition to those of the US. There 
is no intention for the discussion below to accommodate the intricate 
details of broader conflict of laws issues, beyond what is needed for the 
narrower purpose of the book.
(a) Choice of law
Although the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in the US (Second 
Restatement) supports the application of the contractual choice of gov-
erning law under the TOS,175 an alternative governing law can apply, 
particularly where the contractually chosen governing law would be con-
trary to a fundamental policy of another state that has a materially greater 
interest.176 Therefore, if a user is resident in another state other than 
California in the US, the content of such state’s laws will be rele vant to an 
inquiry made on the applicable governing law. The Second Restatement 
further provides that a fundamental policy is a substantial one, which 
may be embodied in laws that make one or more kinds of contracts illegal 
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or which protect a person against the oppressive use of superior bargain-
ing power.177 An example of such a law is one that involves the rights of 
an insured individual against an insurance company.178
On the other hand, with respect to a user in the UK, Regulation 
(EC) No 593/ 2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome 
I Regulation)179 applicable to member states of the European Union 
(EU) has to be taken into account. While the freedom of the parties 
to choose a governing law for the contract entered into is to some 
extent respected, the rules under the Rome I  Regulation recognise 
that the contractual choice of law clause will not override provi-
sions that cannot be derogated from by way of private agreement.180 
These provisions are overriding mandatory provisions regarded as 
crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests and (similar 
to the position in the US) include the provisions which, on appli-
cation, can render the performance of some contracts unlawful.181 
Furthermore, the US- registered entities operating the relevant 
social media platforms are taken to direct their activities to users in 
Europe.182 Because there are mandatory provisions under the law of 
the country where the consumer has his or her habitual residence 
that cannot be derogated from,183 this means that the relevant court 
adjudicating the dispute  – in assessing the validity of the govern-
ing law contractually chosen – has to take into account the fact that 
there may be no similar protection of the British user under the man-
datory laws of the UK.184
There is no equivalent regime applicable to a user in Australia. 
However, since English and Australian choice of law rules are non- 
mandatory and there is no obligation on the part of plaintiffs in these two 
jurisdictions to plead foreign law, the implied permissible choice of gov-
erning law is effectively that of the forum or jurisdiction where the dis-
pute is heard.185 As a result of the closely connected relationship between 
the test for forum non conveniens and the pleading of foreign law, when 
the adjudicating court is an English or Australian court and there is a 
failure to plead foreign law effects, the governing law will likely be that 
of the UK or Australia, as the case may be.
Thus an alternative law may govern a dispute between a user resi-
dent in a state outside California, or in a country such as the UK and 
Australia, and the respective US- registered entity operating the social 
media platform, despite the express election of a governing law under 
the TOS.
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(b) Choice of jurisdiction
Notwithstanding that the governing law chosen under the TOS will likely 
be honoured, in relation to a dispute between a user in the US and the 
US- registered entity operating the relevant social media platform, state 
laws may limit the enforceability of a choice of jurisdiction clause with 
respect to users who are not resident in California.186
With respect to a user in the UK, Regulation (EU) No 1215/ 2012 
of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I  Regulation)187 
applicable to member states of the EU has to be considered. While the 
autonomy of parties to determine the court having jurisdiction over their 
dispute is respected – albeit within some limits – there are specific rules 
under the Brussels I Regulation188 which will apply to the TOS, in view 
that these TOS are consumer contracts and that the US- registered enti-
ties running the social media platforms have directed their activities to 
the UK where the user resides.189 For example, under the home court 
rule, proceedings against the user can only be brought in a court of the 
UK, although the user has the option of bringing proceedings either in 
the US or the UK.190 Even where the user does not exercise his or her right 
to sue the US- registered entity in an English court, it has been suggested 
that such a court will likely refuse to enforce a judgement if the user was 
summoned to a court in a distant forum such as the US for litigation.191
On a related note, an English court adopts the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, or the Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Consulex Ltd 
(Spiliada)192 test, and will only stay proceedings if there is clearly a more 
appropriate court for trial. Therefore a user resident in the UK is unlikely 
to be turned away by an English court at which he or she decides to com-
mence proceedings, in spite of the chosen jurisdiction under the TOS. 
The effect of this doctrine is consistent with the home court rule.
There is no equivalent regime applicable to a user in Australia.193 
In general the jurisdiction agreement incorporated under the TOS will 
likely be respected by an Australian court,194 although such a court may 
refuse to enforce a choice of jurisdiction clause where doing so would be 
tantamount to allowing the parties to contract out of applicable legis-
lation.195 Nonetheless, in light of Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd,196 
an Australian court is unlikely to order a stay of its proceedings against 
an Australian user who commences litigation proceedings in a court of 
Australia unless it considers itself a clearly inappropriate forum. As such, 
it appears to be rarer for an Australian plaintiff to be turned away by an 
Australian court on grounds of jurisdiction,197 in comparison to a British 
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plaintiff who brings proceedings in an English court under the Spiliada 
test.198
Thus, particularly in respect of a dispute concerning a user resident 
in a country such as the UK and Australia, the applicability of the choice 
of jurisdiction clause under the TOS is limited.
(c) Applicable copyright legislation
Outside the contractual elements of the TOS, conflict of laws issues 
in respect of the non- contractual elements, such as those relating to 
copyright, will be considered further. If the governing law is still deter-
mined to be the law of the state of California as contractually provided 
under the TOS, after taking into account the other factors above, the 
principle of presumption against extraterritoriality developed under 
US case law199 generally applies to limit the application of US copyright 
legislation to content- generative activities occurring within the terri-
torial limits of the US.200 This defeats the attempt made by social media 
platforms under their TOS to include such activities occurring outside 
of the US201 under the purview of US copyright legislation.
There is a dearth of detailed guidance on this issue in the UK 
and in Australia.202 The Berne Convention, to which the US, the UK 
and Australia are contracting parties, may shed some light on this. 
Although article 5(1) of the Berne Convention is not a conflicts rule, the 
principle of national treatment in the article requires a member state to 
treat foreign and domestic copyright holders alike.203 This means that, 
independent of the existence of protection in the country of origin of 
a copyright work,204 protection is conferred on the work by the law of 
the country for which protection is sought (or lex loci protectionis).205 
Such law will apply to issues pertaining to the extent of protection 
and redress available to the copyright holder, and could be different 
from the law governing the rights and obligations of the parties under 
the TOS.
At the same time, the difficulty of characterising issues arising 
under and relating to the TOS into contractual and non- contractual 
issues further complicates the determination of the governing law that 
applies to a copyright- related dispute, and the jurisdiction in which a 
court can adjudicate such dispute. For instance, the choice of governing 
law and jurisdiction clauses may be valid in relation to the grant of non- 
exclusive licences under the TOS.206 These licences are not seen to affect 
the proprietary rights of copyright holders – as such, the conventional 
choice of law principles continues to apply in this respect.207
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(d) Implications
In line with this book’s approach, I consider the implications of the earlier 
discussion on a user resident in the UK or in Australia. Notwithstanding 
the expected enforcement of the choice of governing law and jurisdiction 
clauses by courts in the US, the mandatory consumer protection provi-
sions comprised in the EU regimes discussed above208 could mean that 
the governing law and jurisdiction clauses under the TOS are largely 
unenforceable against users resident in most of Europe, including the 
UK – this is due to the potential violation of the Rome I Regulation and the 
Brussels I Regulation.209 A similar outcome will be reached with respect to 
a user resident in Australia because of the improbability of an Australian 
court turning a plaintiff away on grounds that it is clearly an ‘inappropri-
ate forum’.210
Where an English or Australian court adjudicates a copyright- 
related dispute involving a user in the UK or Australia (as the case 
may be) arising from or related to the TOS, such a court – even with 
the requisite jurisdiction for adjudication in respect of foreign copy-
rights,211 and in spite of having elected the governing law under the 
TOS – may apply an alternative law to the dispute at hand. Even where 
the applicable governing law is that elected under the TOS, different 
laws can apply to questions of subsistence and infringement of copy-
right.212 For instance, in respect of the originality requirement for a 
copyright- related dispute, a court in the US is not likely to apply the 
more lenient originality standard of another jurisdiction.213 With 
reference to the ownership214 requirement, the law of the country of 
origin, being the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship 
to the copyright- protected content, could be the law applied by a US 
court.215 On the other hand, the law of the state where infringement 
has occurred may apply to the infringement issue.216 These examples 
are in no way intended to be exhaustive. Instead, they demonstrate 
that there will be such foreseeable issues presenting themselves for 
consideration, in view of the reach of social media platforms in a 
‘flatter’217 globalised world.
I argue that the choice of governing law and jurisdiction clauses 
represents the unsuccessful attempts made by social media platforms 
to ameliorate the uncertainties posed by conflict of laws issues218 when 
it comes to determining the governing law applicable to a copyright- 
related dispute arising under and relating to the TOS, as well as the juris-
diction in which a court can apply such governing law. These clauses can 
be unenforceable if they are incompatible with the relevant copyright 
regime and other laws. Moreover, even if such clauses are valid, they 
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apply to disputes arising between the parties to the TOS (ie, the social 
media platforms and their users). This leaves open the question of the 
applicable governing law and the jurisdiction in which a court can adju-
dicate a copyright- related dispute which arises between a social media 
user and a copyright holder (whether another user or a third party who 
has not accepted the TOS).
IV. Conclusion
This chapter, together with  Chapter Two, form the basis for my evalua-
tion in this book of the consistency of the TOS with the copyright regimes 
in the US, the UK and Australia. I have identified the key terms of the 
five selected social media platforms that govern or have implications on 
users’ content- generative behaviours. I have also applied, under scenario 
two, the TOS to the content- generative activities undertaken by Jane and 
other users in the case study. Out of the total of eleven content- generative 
activities considered, the application of the TOS to as many as five of 
these activities results in breaches of the respective TOS.
I have further discussed the relationship the TOS have with the 
copyright regimes, in particular, the extent of alignment and incom-
patibility between the regimes. The TOS are aligned with the copyright 
regimes to some extent  – this is reflected by the incorporation of the 
notice and takedown mechanism under the DMCA into the copyright pol-
icies of the five social media platforms studied. In addition, each of these 
platforms has adopted a termination policy for repeat infringers, in order 
to be eligible for the DMCA safe harbour provision.219 I have argued that 
the TOS and the relevant copyright regime reinforce one another when 
they are in alignment. Copyright infringing acts by users can lead to legal 
consequences under the DMCA, and users who repeatedly receive copy-
right takedown notices may be expelled from such platforms.
On the other hand, three areas give rise to potential incompatibili-
ties between the TOS and the copyright regimes. These incompatibilities 
are arguably obscured by the oversimplification of complex contractual 
and copyright issues under the TOS.
The first is that the conferment of ‘ownership’ of content on a user 
who creates it under the TOS is not consistent with the concept of own-
ership under the copyright regime. This label of ‘ownership’ is mislead-
ing: it does not per se entitle the user to the exclusive copyrights to which 
a copyright holder is entitled under copyright laws, as not all content on 
social media will be copyright protectable in the first place. Even if the 
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content in question is copyright protected, such content will typically be 
subject to an unencumbered licence granted in favour of the relevant 
social media platform. This renders the reference to the ‘ownership’ of 
content a limited one for the copyright holder of the content, as he or she 
has few rights to such content.
The second is that there must be adequate clarity in order for the 
licensing clauses effectively to allow third party users to use the con-
tent shared on social media, in spite of the doctrine of privity. Such an 
inquiry as to whether these clauses are clear enough will be premised 
on an assumption that the relevant content is copyright protected in the 
first place. A strict application of the doctrine of privity can thus under-
mine the attempt made by social media platforms to confer permissions 
on third party users to use copyright- protected content.
The third is that the choice of governing law and jurisdiction clauses 
may be unenforceable, as against a user resident in a state in the US out-
side California or in another country. This is due not only to a potential 
incompatibility between the TOS and the relevant copyright regime, 
but also the contradictions between the TOS and other laws to which a 
user is subject. On the one hand, in spite of the governing law elected 
under the TOS, different laws may apply to questions of subsistence and 
infringement of copyright; on the other, a user from a jurisdiction outside 
California is subject to the application of conventions, treaties and man-
datory domestic laws, including consumer laws. The discussion on con-
flict of laws issues illustrates the difficulties of determining the governing 
law that applies to a dispute arising from or related to the TOS, as well 
as the jurisdiction in which a court can apply such law. Therefore laws in 
other jurisdictions – whether of contract, copyright or otherwise – may 
be relevant to a user. I have argued further that these incompatibilities 
between the TOS and the copyright regimes compromise the effective-
ness of copyright laws in regulating the content- generative behaviours 
of users (ie, in securing users’ compliance when they generate content).
Finally, I  note that while social media platforms can be exempt 
under the DMCA safe harbour provision from liability for monetary relief, 
in relation to secondary liability for copyright infringement by their users 
if conditions are met,220 users of such platforms remain vulnerable to the 
risks of copyright infringement arising from their content- generative 
activities on the platforms. Not only have these platforms excluded or 
limited their liabilities (to the fullest extent permitted by law) in rela-
tion to the activities of their users, but users of Facebook, Pinterest and 
YouTube also have the obligation to indemnify the platforms221 if losses 
are incurred by such platforms through their uses. Furthermore, the 
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ceding of control over content  generated by users to social media plat-
forms and other users under broad licences222 allows for users’ engage-
ment in content- generative activities on such platforms. This in turn 
leads to the consequent increase in the volume of content available, an 
outcome which helps these platforms to sustain the advertiser- supported 
business models that most adopt.223 Overall the TOS appear to reflect the 
unilateral interests of the social media platforms studied – at the expense 
of their users.
In the next chapter, I will survey the technological features of the 
five selected social media platforms that influence the content- generative 
activities undertaken by their users. I will also assess the interaction of 
these technological features with the copyright regimes in the US, the 
UK and Australia respectively for alignment and incompatibility. I then 
present the third of four scenarios in the book to illustrate how the tech-
nological features can influence the content- generative activities of Jane 
and other users in the case study.
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Chapter four
Influence of the technological 
features
As I have shown in Chapters Two and Three, each of the copyright regimes 
and the TOS (ie, terms of service) of social media platforms regulates 
the content- generative behaviours of social media users in its own way. 
In Chapter Four I continue this analysis by examining the technological 
features of the five selected social media platforms, namely Facebook, 
Pinterest, YouTube, Twitter and Wikipedia. I  begin by identifying the 
technological features that encourage, as well as those that constrain,1 the 
content- generative activities undertaken by users of these platforms. For 
ease of reference, the platform interfaces on which these technological 
features are made available to users are captured as screenshots and set 
out in Appendix 1.2 In particular I highlight the features that encourage 
the creation, modification and dissemination of content on the platforms 
surveyed, as well as the features that constrain the same activities. The lat-
ter group comprises those features that limit the modification of content; 
limit the opportunities to engage in further content- generative activities; 
allow for requests to remove content; and filter content.
I then illustrate, in the following section, under the third out of 
four scenarios examined in this book, how the identified technological 
features encourage the content- generative activities undertaken by 
Jane and other users in the case study. Next, in considering the extent of 
alignment and incompatibility that the technological features have with 
the copyright regimes, I discuss the implications of having the existing 
spread of technological features, which serve to encourage and con-
strain users in their engagement with content- generative activities. In 
this regard I argue that the features that encourage content- generative 
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activities on social media platforms can be incompatible with the copy-
right regimes, as they increase the opportunities for users to engage in 
content- generative activities, hence on occasion infringing the copy-
rights held by others. The other features that constrain content gener-
ation are in this respect aligned with the copyright regimes, as they 
reduce the opportunities for users to engage in content- generative 
activities. In respect of the latter, I elaborate further on how some of the 
technological features reflect copyright considerations. I make specific 
references to the copyright regimes in the US, the UK and Australia  – 
consistent with the approach taken in the rest of the book.
This chapter advances the argument in this book that the incon-
sistencies between the technological features and copyright regimes 
compromise the effectiveness of copyright laws in regulating the 
content- generative behaviours of social media users. On the whole, the 
technological features on social media are observed to ‘nudge’3 users 
towards engaging in content- generative activities  – which increases 
their likelihood of infringing the copyrights of others when they gen-
erate content. Finally, the influence of the technological features con-
sidered in the chapter, with reference to the case study, constitutes 
scenario three in the book. This allows for the juxtapositions of the 
outcomes reached under scenarios one (from Chapter Two) and three 
(from this chapter), as well as those reached under scenarios two 
(from Chapter Three) and three (from this chapter). The consistencies 
between the copyright regimes and the TOS, as well as between the two 
private regimes (ie, the TOS and the technological features), can then 
be respectively evaluated.
I. Technological features
In identifying the technological features on the five social media plat-
forms that encourage and constrain content- generative activities, 
I  relate both the enabling features to the activities they allow users 
to undertake and the technical constraints to the activities users are 
restrained from doing. I  also set out the screenshots of the platform 
interfaces incorporating these features in Appendix 1. Given the range 
of features available on each platform and the varied ends for which 
they may be employed, I am unable to be exhaustive in identifying and 
describing these features. Rather, I  wish to offer a more systematic 
way to think about the influence of the technological features on users’ 
content- generative behaviours.
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a. Technological features that encourage content- generative 
activities
1. Creation
The following are the ways in which users can create content, using the 
technological features available on the five platforms.
There are options on a user’s Facebook page to post a ‘status update’ 
that can comprise content in text, images or video clips, or any combin-
ation of these formats of content. Alternatively, a Facebook user can 
directly upload content for sharing with other users, in the form of an 
image or video clip, without writing a status update.4 A  user can also 
comment on the status update of another user.5
A user can share an image he or she has uploaded by ‘pinning’ it 
onto his or her pin- board on the Pinterest platform.6 Additionally, a user 
can comment on the images shared on the pin- boards of other users.7 
Although images constitute the majority of content shared on Pinterest, 
a user can also ‘pin’ audio and video clips on pin- boards and share them 
with other users.8
The YouTube platform is designed in such a way that a user who 
selects the ‘upload’ option is directed to tools that allow him or her to 
create a slideshow from photographs and edit a video clip.9 More specif-
ically, the video editing tool enables a user, among other things, to create 
new video clips conveniently by combining other uploaded video clips 
and images,10 as well as to add or substitute audio clips with a ‘swapping 
tool’ provided by YouTube, from YouTube’s library of approved tracks.11 
In addition, on the YouTube platform, a user can also choose to comment 
on a video clip shared by another user.12
On the Twitter platform, a user can easily compose and share 
a short message called a ‘tweet’ with his or her followers.13 A user can 
also respond to another user’s ‘tweet’.14 The ‘tweet’ or response to anoth-
er’s ‘tweet’ can comprise an image or video clip, if the user wishes to 
upload one.
On the Wikipedia platform a user can contribute text, insert links 
and embed images, audio and video clips within his or her contribution.15
2. Modification
The following are the ways in which users can modify content, using the 
technological features available on the five platforms.
A Facebook user can choose to modify the content from another 
user or website in several ways. One form of modification occurs when 
a user selects the ‘share’ option on his or her Facebook page to share the 
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post of another user, upon which he or she can comment on the shared 
post.16 If the user decides to do so, the comment, together with the orig-
inal post, is arguably a modified composite by the two users. Another 
form of modification occurs when the ‘download’ option, which is avail-
able when a user expands an image, is used.17 While Facebook does not 
provide any content editing tools that allow users to re- arrange text, 
images, video clips and so on, the user can modify an image after down-
loading it with external tools such as Gimp18 and Photoshop.19
When a Pinterest user fancies an image shared on another user’s 
pin- board, the user can choose to ‘pin’ the same image on his or her own 
pin- board. If this option is selected by the user, the description provided 
by the preceding user is automatically re- generated as a comment and 
can appear to be from the user (instead of from the preceding user). The 
source of the ‘pin’ is also displayed below it as a link.20 If the user decides 
to edit the information accompanying the image, he or she engages in an 
act of modification. The same can be said even if the user does not change 
this information, given that the comment and the image are presented on 
the user’s pin- board as originating from the user.
On the YouTube platform a user is prompted to comment on a video 
clip he or she decides to share on other social media platforms, such as 
Facebook, Pinterest and Twitter, by selecting the ‘share’ tab on YouTube.21 
Given that the user’s comment will be presented with the link to the rele-
vant video clip on the YouTube platform when the sharing occurs, the 
user arguably engages in an act of modification, in respect of the modi-
fied composite displayed on such other platform. The video editing tool 
discussed earlier also enables the modification of content, including 
content downloaded from YouTube.22 This happens, for example, when 
many video clips are modified to custom- create one new video clip.
A user on the Twitter platform arguably engages in an act of modi-
fication when he or she uses the ‘reply’ function available on Twitter to 
respond to a ‘tweet’ of another user.23 The user also modifies a ‘tweet’ 
when he or she adds a comment to the original ‘tweet’ in his or her ‘re- 
tweet’.24 There is little room for the user to engage in alternative forms of 
modification, in light of the fact that no content editing tools are made 
available to users on the Twitter platform.
There are sophisticated technical coordination mechanisms on 
the Wikipedia platform that separate contributions, mark them chrono-
logically and attribute them to specific usernames or internet protocol 
addresses,25 therefore allowing a contributor to edit content comfortably. 
The contributing user engages in an act of modification when he or she 
edits content. Modification can also occur when the user takes the option 
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to download an image, audio or video clip on the platform,26 and then 
stores the image for subsequent modification with external tools.27 In 
contrast to the other social media platforms, I note that Wikipedia does 
not allow its users to comment on content, so there is little room for this 
alternative form of modification.28
3. Dissemination
The following are the ways in which users can disseminate content to 
a wide audience, using the technological features available on the five 
platforms.
A user can disseminate content in multiple ways on Facebook. This 
happens when the user:  posts a ‘status update’; comments on another 
user’s post; uses the ‘share’ option; uses the ‘embed post’ option;29 chooses 
to embed an image; or uses the ‘send’ option for an image.30 Firstly, in 
respect of a status update, the user gets to choose the audience to whom 
his or her post is disseminated. This audience can be the public, the user’s 
group of ‘friends’31 on Facebook or people on a customised list created by 
the user. Secondly, when a user comments on the post of another user, the 
audience will instead be the selected audience of the latter user. Thirdly – 
if, for instance, a user decides to use the ‘share’ option available on 
Facebook – he or she can again select the audience to whom such content 
is disseminated. The constituent members of the audience will depend 
on whether the user shares the content on his or her own ‘Timeline’; on a 
friend’s ‘Timeline’; in a social group to which he or she belongs; or in a pri-
vate message to a few selected friends on Facebook. Fourthly, a user can 
also choose the ‘embed post’ option to place the code of a post on another 
website, such as his or her personal blog, if such post is publicly available 
on Facebook. The relevant content is then additionally disseminated to 
the audience of the other website incorporating the original post. Fifthly, 
a user can also choose to ‘embed’ an image put up by another Facebook 
user on another website. Sixthly, subject to the other user’s privacy set-
tings, a user can employ the ‘send’ option on Facebook to send an image 
put up by the first user to selected friends on Facebook.
On the Pinterest platform a user can disseminate content (be it an 
image, audio or video clip) to other users who access his or her pin- board 
simply by ‘pinning’ such content to the relevant pin- board. In respect of 
any specific image, audio or video clip, the platform also allows a user 
to send a ‘pin’ to another person’s email account or to share the ‘pin’ on 
platforms including Facebook and Twitter.32 Unless a user ‘pins’ content 
on secret boards, visible only to the user and other invited users,33 his or 
her ‘pins’ are generally available to other users.
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Similar to the Facebook platform, a user can disseminate content in 
multiple ways on YouTube. This happens when the user: uploads a video 
clip; comments on the video clip of another user; using social plug- ins, 
shares the video clip on other social media platforms such as Facebook, 
Pinterest and Twitter; uses the ‘embed’ option in respect of the video clip, 
so that the content is accessible to readers of another website; or uses the 
‘email’ option available to distribute the content.34 Firstly, when a video 
clip is uploaded, the user gets to decide on the audience who can view it – 
by selecting, using a drop- down menu, whether his or her video clip will 
be public, private or unlisted.35 Secondly, the audience to whom a user’s 
comment is disseminated will depend on whether the relevant video clip 
is made public, private or unlisted. Thirdly, when a video clip is shared on 
other social media platforms, the constituent members of the audience 
will depend on the user’s privacy setting on each of these platforms.36 
Fourthly, a video clip embedded on another website, such as a personal 
blog, will be accessible to readers of that blog. Fifthly, a user disseminates 
content to a select audience, whose email addresses are specified, when 
he or she emails the link to a video clip on YouTube to such addresses.
On the Twitter platform, a user has the option of embedding a 
‘tweet’.37 The user can place the ‘tweet’ on another website where he or 
she has administrative rights, such as a blog, by using the code given to 
him or her. The ‘tweet’ is therefore disseminated to readers of the web-
site. On the other hand, when a user chooses to ‘re- tweet’ a post, or to 
respond to another user’s ‘tweet’, he or she disseminates this content to a 
group of Twitter users – the constituent members of this group depends 
on the respective user’s privacy settings.38
Any content, once published on the Wikipedia platform, is available 
to the public  – this is consistent with the purpose of the project as an 
online encyclopedia. A  user can either share the link of the Wikipedia 
page on which content in the form of images, audio and video clips is 
hosted, or embed such content on a separate website.39 In the latter 
instance, the content can be accessed by the audience of the website. The 
user disseminates content in both cases.
b. Technological features that constrain content- generative 
activities
In identifying the technological features on the five platforms that con-
strain content- generative activities, I note that while a user interacts with 
some of these features at the point before the dissemination of content, 
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other features limit subsequent generative possibilities after the content 
is disseminated. Although many of the features are accessible to third 
parties (including the copyright holders of content) who are not users, 
I consider the features mainly from a user’s perspective for the purpose 
of this discussion.
1. Limiting the modification of content
The technological features on the platforms that allow for the retention 
of the initial presentation of the content and for the identification of the 
original generator40 of the content arguably constrain content- generative 
activities. This is so because no matter the amount of modification a user 
intends to effect to another user’s content, these technological features 
allow for limited modification or remixing of the content.
For example, when a user selects the ‘share’ option on Facebook and 
disseminates the content of another user in this way, the user who origin-
ally uploaded the content can still be identified by his or her username.41 
Also the post of user X, who shares the content of another user Y (who 
in turn extracts the content from another person’s ‘Timeline’ or website), 
will incorporate the link to the source website.
On the other hand, when a user ‘pins’ content from another user’s 
pin- board on the Pinterest platform, the preceding user is no longer 
attributed for the ‘pin’.42 While the comment accompanying the ‘pin’ is 
automatically generated, the user who ‘re- pins’ the content of the preced-
ing user can choose to modify such comment. Notwithstanding this, even 
if ‘pinning’ continues through a chain of users, the link to the source web-
site is retained just below the ‘pin’ and the identification of the original 
generator of the content remains possible.
Whether a YouTube user uses social plug- ins to ‘share’ a video clip 
on other social media platforms or simply to ‘email’ a video clip to a few 
email addresses, the link to the video clip on the YouTube platform is pro-
vided. As such, the user who originally uploaded the video clip can still 
be identified through his or her username.43 Even where the user decides 
to ‘embed’ the code of the video clip on another website such as a blog, 
viewers of the video clip on the blog can identify the YouTube user who 
originally uploaded the video clip through his or her username.
When a user decides to ‘re- tweet’ the content of another user on the 
Twitter platform, there is no change to the original ‘tweet’ in its entirety if 
he or she does not add a comment to the ‘re- tweet’.44 Even if a comment is 
added, the original ‘tweet’ is presented in an identical manner, just below 
the comment. Regardless of whether such comment is added, other users 
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on Twitter reading a user’s ‘re- tweet’ can identify the user who originally 
generated the ‘tweet’ through his or her username. Moreover, even if ‘re- 
tweeting’ continues through a chain of users, the original generator of 
the ‘tweet’ can still be identified if the ‘re- tweet’ feature is used.
When a file such as an image or audio clip is uploaded, an associ-
ated file page is automatically created on the Wikipedia platform. This 
file page reflects the modifications made to the page to date, the list of 
pages that embed the file and other technical information about the file. 
In general, the information on the file traces the activities undertaken in 
relation to it, although some information such as the file description and 
copyright information can be edited. This ensures that contributions can 
mostly be traced back to the original generators of the content with some 
due diligence.45
2. Limiting the opportunities to engage in further content- generative 
activities
On the Twitter platform, there are word constraints imposed by Twitter 
on a ‘tweet’, a ‘re- tweet’ and a response to a ‘tweet’.46 This essentially con-
fines a user to a brief message in either instance. The range of content- 
generative activities that can be taken in relation to a brief text message 
is therefore a narrow one.
Separately, if a user decides to write an article on a subject that does 
not already exist in the Wikipedia repository, there are requirements to be 
met before the article is published on Wikipedia – any article that is not 
acceptable is deleted promptly.47 These requirements make it impossible 
to access the article and hence arguably constrain a user from engaging 
in further generative activities in relation to the content in such article. 
Additionally, all content uploaded to the Wikipedia platform – whether 
in the form of images or otherwise – requires a source and a copyright 
tag, without which the relevant content will be deleted after a week.48 
The deletions obliterate the possibility of the user, and others, from 
engaging in further generative activities with respect to the same content 
on the platform.
There are no such equivalent features on the Facebook, Pinterest 
and YouTube platforms.
3. Allowing for requests to remove content
There are technological features on the platforms that a user can utilise 
to request the removal of content that he or she perceives to be harmful 
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to the user.49 This prevents others from interacting further with such 
content.
A user can, by selecting an option on a drop- down menu, report 
a post or image to Facebook for reasons including, among other things, 
offence to personal sensibilities and unauthorised use of intellectual 
property.50 Facebook can decide to remove the content based on its 
assessment of the user’s report. If the user proceeds with requesting the 
content’s removal on the basis of its violation of his or her copyrights, he 
or she will be presented with two options. The first is to contact the party 
the user believes has infringed his or her rights directly, to request the 
removal of the content. The second is to complete the DMCA51 compliant 
form, made available on the platform, to report a copyright violation on 
Facebook.52
A user on the Pinterest platform has the option to report a ‘pin’ 
(ie, of content such as an image, audio or video clip), for reasons 
including, among other things, that the ‘pin’ goes against Pinterest’s 
policies and that the ‘pin’ is his or her intellectual property.53 In the 
latter case, the user is directed to a page where he or she can complete 
a DMCA compliant online form to report a copyright infringement on 
Pinterest.54
On the YouTube platform, a user who would like a video clip removed 
can report it to YouTube for various reasons  – including, among other 
things, that the video clip contains violent content and that the video clip 
infringes his or her rights – by selecting a flag icon positioned under the 
video clip.55 If the user wishes to request the removal of the video clip on 
grounds of copyright infringement, he or she can use the DMCA compli-
ant form made available on the platform to submit a notice of copyright 
infringement.56 A user can also report the comment of another user to a 
video clip on YouTube, by clicking on a tiny arrow positioned at the top 
right- hand corner of the comment, for ‘spam or abuse’.57
On the Twitter platform, a user can report a ‘tweet’ of another user 
for various reasons  – including, among other things, that it displays a 
sensitive message or that it is abusive and harmful.58 While a user can 
utilise a DMCA compliant online form to request the removal of content, 
I note that the user is not offered a direct link to the web form when he or 
she decides to report a ‘tweet’, unlike the other platforms discussed ear-
lier. This is regardless of the options he or she selects from the lists given. 
This online form can, however, be accessed when the user searches for it 
on the platform.59
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regulaTing ConTenT on soCial Media146
  
A user of the Wikipedia platform can request the removal of content 
based on reasons such as inaccuracy or inappropriateness.60 The editor of 
an article can, for instance, initiate a contributor copyright investigation 
against a contributing user who is noticed to infringe the copyrights of 
others on a large scale. The content of this user will be subject to scrutiny 
and subsequently removed if suspected to be infringing.61 Further, if a user 
believes that his or her copyright work is infringed on the platform, he 
or she can send an email to the Wikimedia community to seek 
resolution, or post a notice stating his or her copyright concerns on a 
web page created for this purpose.62 Unlike the other platforms discussed 
above, no DMCA compliant form is made available to users on the plat-
form. This means that a DMCA compliant copyright notice has to be 
sent to the email address provided or dispatched by ordinary mail to the 
Wikimedia Foundation’s designated agent.63 In this sense the Wikipedia 
platform does not make the DMCA process readily available to its users 
through its technological features.
4. Filtering content
Filtering technologies such as YouTube’s content identification (Content 
Id) system64 that can apply at the point of dissemination of content, or 
after dissemination, limit subsequent generative possibilities.65
YouTube’s Content Id software automatically scans all video 
clips uploaded on its platform to identify content that may be used 
without the permission of copyright holders. For this system to work, 
copyright holders have to provide information about their copyright- 
protected content to the system upfront, as well as selecting the policy 
for YouTube to follow when matches with their copyright- protected 
content are found. In this respect, YouTube allows copyright holders to 
choose from the following policies: to mute the audio which matches 
their music in the relevant video clip; to block the content from fur-
ther access; to monetise the use of their content, by gaining revenue 
through advertisements; or to track the viewership statistics of such 
content.
C. summary
Table 4.1 below serves as a summary of the above discussion on techno-
logical features which have been identified as factors that encourage or 
constrain content- generative activities on Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube, 
Twitter and Wikipedia.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4.1 Summary of the technological features that influence the content- generative activities of users across the five selected social media 
platforms
Social 
media  
platform
Application of approach
Technological features that encourage 
content- generative activities
Technological features that constrain  
generative activities
Creation Modification Dissemination Limiting 
modification
Limiting
opportunities
Allowing for requests 
to remove content
Filtering content
Facebook ‘Status update’ or 
post (of text, images 
and/ or video clips)
Option to com-
ment on the post of 
another user
Prompt to comment 
on a ‘status update’ or 
post that a user shares 
using the ‘share’ 
option
Possible modifica-
tion with external 
tools after an image is 
downloaded using the 
‘download’ option
‘Status update’ 
or post
Option to com-
ment on another 
user’s post
‘Share’ option
‘Embed post’ option
‘Embed’ option for 
an image
‘Send’ option for an 
image
‘Share’ option Not applicable Option to report a 
‘status update’, post 
or image for various 
reasons, including for 
offence against personal 
sensibilities
Option for copyright 
holders to contact a 
Facebook user directly 
to request removal
Copyright holders also 
directed to DMCA com-
pliant online form
Not applicable
Pinterest ‘Pin’ (of image, 
audio or video clip)
Option to comment 
on the ‘pin’  
of another
Possible modifica-
tion if a user edits the 
information automati-
cally generated with 
a ‘pin’
‘Pin’
‘Send’ option
‘Share’ option for 
sharing on Facebook 
and Twitter
‘Pin.’ option (ie, 
when ‘pinning’ 
content from 
another user’s 
pin- board) – 
source website is 
still indicated
Not applicable Option to report a ‘pin’ 
for various reasons, 
including for violation 
of Pinterest’s policies
Copyright holders 
directed to DMCA com-
pliant online form
Not applicable
(continued)
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Table 4.1 (Cont.)
Social 
media  
platform
Application of approach
Technological features that encourage 
content- generative activities
Technological features that constrain  
generative activities
Creation Modification Dissemination Limiting 
modification
Limiting
opportunities
Allowing for requests 
to remove content
Filtering content
YouTube Tool to create a slide-
show from images
Video editing tool 
to create video 
clip with existing 
video clips
Option to comment 
on the video clip of 
another user
Prompt to comment on 
a video clip that a user 
shares on other social 
media platforms using 
the ‘share’ option
Video editing tool to 
modify existing video 
clips
Uploading a 
video clip
Option to com-
ment on the video 
clip uploaded by 
another user
‘Share’ option to 
share on other social 
media platforms
‘Embed’ option
‘Email’ option
‘Share’ option to 
share on other 
social media 
platforms
‘Email’ option
‘Embed’ option
Not applicable Option to report a video 
clip for various reasons, 
including for containing 
violent content
Copyright holders 
directed to DMCA com-
pliant online form, in 
relation to a video clip 
shared
Content Id system 
identifies through 
detecting matches 
of content which 
could be used 
without the con-
sent of copyright 
holders
The policy elected 
by the relevant 
copyright holders 
can be applied 
thereafter (ie, 
among other 
things, the muting 
of audio in a video 
clip or the block-
ing of access to 
such content)
Twitter ‘Tweet’ (of text, 
image and/ or 
video clip)
Option to comment 
on another user’s 
‘tweet’
Option to respond to 
another user’s ‘tweet’
Option to add a 
comment when ‘re- 
tweeting’ another 
user’s ‘tweet’
‘Tweet’
‘Embed’ option
‘Re- tweet’ option
Response to a ‘tweet’
‘Re- tweet’ option Word constraint 
of 140 charac-
ters applies to a 
‘tweet’,
‘re- tweet’ and 
response to a 
‘tweet’
Option to report a ‘tweet’ 
for various reasons, 
including for abusive 
and harmful content
DMCA compliant online 
form available – note 
that this form can be 
accessed only when 
searched for specifically, 
as a user is not directed 
to such form
Not applicable
Wikipedia Contribution of text 
and links
Option to embed 
images, audio and/ 
or video clips
Can edit content with 
the assurance that 
the contributions are 
marked and separately 
attributed
Possible modifica-
tion with external 
tools after an image is 
downloaded using the 
‘download’ option
Contribution of con-
tent (whether text, 
links, images, audio 
and/ or video clips)
‘Share’ option 
to share link to 
Wikipedia page
‘Embed’ option
File page created 
when content, 
such as an image 
or audio clip, is 
uploaded
Requirements 
to be met in an 
article contrib-
uted by a user, 
without which 
the article will be 
deleted shortly 
after publication
Media uploaded 
(ie, images or 
otherwise) each 
require a source 
and a copyright 
tag, without 
which they will 
be scheduled for 
deletion
Option to initiate a 
contributor copy-
right investigation 
for infringement on a 
large scale
Option to send email to 
the Wikimedia commu-
nity to seek resolution 
for infringement of con-
tent, or to post a notice 
on a web page created 
for this purpose
No DMCA compliant 
online form available for 
copyright holders, but 
there is always the option 
to send a copyright 
takedown notice to the 
designated agent at the 
email address or mailing 
address provided
Not applicable
  
Social 
media  
platform
Application of approach
Technological features that encourage 
content- generative activities
Technological features that constrain  
generative activities
Creation Modification Dissemination Limiting 
modification
Limiting
opportunities
Allowing for requests 
to remove content
Filtering content
YouTube Tool to create a slide-
show from images
Video editing tool 
to create video 
clip with existing 
video clips
Option to comment 
on the video clip of 
another user
Prompt to comment on 
a video clip that a user 
shares on other social 
media platforms using 
the ‘share’ option
Video editing tool to 
modify existing video 
clips
Uploading a 
video clip
Option to com-
ment on the video 
clip uploaded by 
another user
‘Share’ option to 
share on other social 
media platforms
‘Embed’ option
‘Email’ option
‘Share’ option to 
share on other 
social media 
platforms
‘Email’ option
‘Embed’ option
Not applicable Option to report a video 
clip for various reasons, 
including for containing 
violent content
Copyright holders 
directed to DMCA com-
pliant online form, in 
relation to a video clip 
shared
Content Id system 
identifies through 
detecting matches 
of content which 
could be used 
without the con-
sent of copyright 
holders
The policy elected 
by the relevant 
copyright holders 
can be applied 
thereafter (ie, 
among other 
things, the muting 
of audio in a video 
clip or the block-
ing of access to 
such content)
Twitter ‘Tweet’ (of text, 
image and/ or 
video clip)
Option to comment 
on another user’s 
‘tweet’
Option to respond to 
another user’s ‘tweet’
Option to add a 
comment when ‘re- 
tweeting’ another 
user’s ‘tweet’
‘Tweet’
‘Embed’ option
‘Re- tweet’ option
Response to a ‘tweet’
‘Re- tweet’ option Word constraint 
of 140 charac-
ters applies to a 
‘tweet’,
‘re- tweet’ and 
response to a 
‘tweet’
Option to report a ‘tweet’ 
for various reasons, 
including for abusive 
and harmful content
DMCA compliant online 
form available – note 
that this form can be 
accessed only when 
searched for specifically, 
as a user is not directed 
to such form
Not applicable
Wikipedia Contribution of text 
and links
Option to embed 
images, audio and/ 
or video clips
Can edit content with 
the assurance that 
the contributions are 
marked and separately 
attributed
Possible modifica-
tion with external 
tools after an image is 
downloaded using the 
‘download’ option
Contribution of con-
tent (whether text, 
links, images, audio 
and/ or video clips)
‘Share’ option 
to share link to 
Wikipedia page
‘Embed’ option
File page created 
when content, 
such as an image 
or audio clip, is 
uploaded
Requirements 
to be met in an 
article contrib-
uted by a user, 
without which 
the article will be 
deleted shortly 
after publication
Media uploaded 
(ie, images or 
otherwise) each 
require a source 
and a copyright 
tag, without 
which they will 
be scheduled for 
deletion
Option to initiate a 
contributor copy-
right investigation 
for infringement on a 
large scale
Option to send email to 
the Wikimedia commu-
nity to seek resolution 
for infringement of con-
tent, or to post a notice 
on a web page created 
for this purpose
No DMCA compliant 
online form available for 
copyright holders, but 
there is always the option 
to send a copyright 
takedown notice to the 
designated agent at the 
email address or mailing 
address provided
Not applicable
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II. Scenario three: the influence of the technological 
features
The case study on Jane in Chapter One serves as the basis upon which the 
technological features identified in this chapter can be considered – in 
relation to their encouragement or constraint of the content- generative 
activities undertaken by Jane and other users. I consider these activities 
in the same order as in Chapters Two and Three, where the copyright 
laws were discussed and the TOS applied to such activities respectively.
It is worth noting that the technological features considered are 
self- executing to an extent66 that copyright laws and the TOS are not. In 
this respect, the technological features that constrain content- generative 
activities are self- executing for a user who generates content. On the 
other hand, although the technological features that encourage content- 
generative activities facilitate the creation, modification and dissemina-
tion of content, the user retains his or her autonomy in deciding whether 
to do so.67 As such, I can keep the discussion in this section brief, since the 
technological features either enable or constrain a user from engaging in 
content- generative activities.
a. jane’s use of the music video clip on youTube as her 
morning alarm
The YouTube platform provides Jane with the option to download the video 
clip for later use (ie, as her morning alarm).68 To play the video clip as her 
alarm, Jane needs to use an external application on her mobile device.
b. jane’s ‘pinning’ of the youTube music video clip on her   
pin- board titled ‘My favourite Things’ on Pinterest
The option to ‘pin’ is a main function on the Pinterest platform and has 
enabled Jane to share the video clip on one of her pin- boards. Moreover, 
YouTube provides the social plug- ins that enable Jane to share the video 
clip directly on other platforms, including Pinterest.
C. jane’s use of evangeline’s earlier commentary on facebook to 
create her own commentary
It is noted that Jane did not choose to share or comment on Evangeline’s 
post using the relevant functions on Facebook; instead, she incorporated 
her views into Evangeline’s commentary to create her own. Jane is likely 
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to have woven her views into the original commentary first by using exter-
nal tools, such as the ‘copy and paste’ function on her operating system, 
before editing such commentary within the text box accessed (ie, using 
the function to post the ‘status update’). The latter function is the main 
function on Facebook around which the sharing of content is premised.
d. jane’s use of multiple photographs of newborn babies available 
on the pin- boards of other Pinterest users to create a collage to 
share on Pinterest
The Pinterest platform does not provide Jane with the option to down-
load the images shared on other users’ pin- boards for later use; further, 
there is no image editing tool available on the platform. However, this 
constraint experienced by Jane can easily be bypassed using external 
tools. For example, Jane can choose to use the ‘save image as’ func-
tion on her web browser to save the images. She can then modify the 
images for her collage with image editing tools such as Gimp and 
Photoshop, before going on to share the collage on Pinterest.
e. jane’s simultaneous sharing of the collage on facebook 
and Twitter
The social plug- ins available on the Pinterest platform give Jane the 
option to share a ‘pin’ on platforms including Facebook and Twitter. Here 
they have enabled her to share her collage on both platforms.
f. jane’s use of the same collage in her blog post on wordPress
Although WordPress is not one of the five social media platforms studied 
in this book, reproducing content derived from one social media plat-
form on another platform is a common situation. In such an instance, the 
technological features on the WordPress platform will have to be exam-
ined. Similar to Facebook, the technological features on WordPress have 
enabled Jane, as a user, to write a textual post and to attach an image, 
such as the collage, with the post.69
g. Zee’s contribution to wikipedia on ‘income inequality’ 
using what jane has written
If the specific content page on Wikipedia is unprotected and open for 
editing, Zee can select the ‘edit’ option available at the top of the page 
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and type in his contribution. However, if the page is protected and locked, 
Zee can only request to edit the page by submitting an ‘edit request’ to 
the editor of the page.70 In addition, there is a substantial amount of 
information on the Wikipedia platform for users who are keen to edit 
entries.71 In this sense, the Wikipedia project has enabled Zee to make 
his contribution.
h. jane’s creation and sharing of a new video clip by way of 
‘vidding’ on youTube, and subsequently on facebook
The YouTube platform provides Jane with the option to download the 
video clips from which the scenes are extracted. The video editing tool 
on YouTube can then be used to modify these video clips to create the 
new video clip. Jane can customise the lengths of incorporated video 
clips, as well as add special effects and songs from an approved library 
on YouTube, to such a video clip.72 Further, while the ‘upload’ function 
can be used to share the new video clip on YouTube, the ‘share’ function 
allows Jane to share the video clip on other social media platforms such 
as Facebook. The technological features on both platforms have enabled 
Jane’s use here.
i. Cheryl’s use of ‘stills’ from jane’s video clip as thumbnail images 
on her website
Cheryl can download Jane’s new video clip on YouTube. In order to 
extract ‘stills’ from Jane’s video clip, however, she may choose to use 
YouTube’s video editing tool first to pause the video clip at appropriate 
junctures, after which she can use the screen capture function of her 
device’s operating system to capture the ‘stills’. With reference to the 
discussion under sub- section (F), the technological features available on 
Cheryl’s website are relevant for consideration. If Cheryl’s website is a 
standard blog hosted on WordPress, her re- sizing and sharing of these 
‘stills’ as thumbnail images on her blog are likely to be enabled by the 
technological features available. Notwithstanding this, because Cheryl 
needs to use an external tool to extract the ‘stills’ in the first place, her 
use is not enabled solely by the technological features on both platforms.
j. other users’ partial use of jane’s collage to create their own, 
and sharing the same on Pinterest, facebook and Twitter
As multiple scenarios present themselves for consideration here, depend-
ing on which platform the collage is first accessed, it is assumed that the 
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collage is first accessed on the Pinterest platform and thereafter shared 
by these users on Facebook and Twitter.73 Although Pinterest does not 
provide such users with the option to download Jane’s collage, this con-
straint can be easily bypassed with external tools such as the ‘save image 
as’ function available on their web browsers. Because there is no image 
editing tool available on all three platforms, the modifications of Jane’s 
collage to create new collages will have to be carried out using other 
tools. The downloading and subsequent modifications of Jane’s collage, 
as well as the sharing of the new collages across the three platforms, are 
not enabled solely by their technological features.
K. editor jasper’s use of jane’s collage on the cover page of 
his magazine
It is not clear from which social media platform Jasper downloaded Jane’s 
collage. While the ‘download’ option is available to a user accessing the 
collage on the Facebook platform, this is not the case for the Pinterest 
and Twitter platforms. To download the collage from either of these two 
platforms, Jasper can choose to use the ‘save image as’ function available 
on his web browser. The constraint experienced by users such as Jasper 
can therefore be easily bypassed with the external tools integrated into 
their web browsers, operating systems, and so on. In any case, even if the 
collage is extracted from Facebook, Jasper will still have to rely on exter-
nal tools to edit Jane’s collage for use on his magazine cover.
III. Relationship with the copyright regimes
In this section I will analyse the relationship the technological features 
have with the copyright regimes, with reference to the discussions in this 
chapter and Chapter Two.
As illustrated by the discussion in sub- section (A) of Part I, there 
are multiple ways in which a user can employ the technological features 
on the five social media platforms to create, modify and disseminate 
content. The technological features identified arguably contribute to 
the overall ‘generativity’74 on these platforms,75 facilitating users in their 
generation of content. This enhanced ‘generativity’ distinguishes social 
media from cyberspace in general, and allows for social media’s provision 
of the technological facilities, or ‘affordances’,76 that further extend the 
internet’s power in connecting people without the need for intermediar-
ies. Such ‘generativity’ of social media platforms, owing in part to the 
technological features available on such platforms, encourages users to 
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engage in content- generative activities.77 The technological features that 
encourage content- generative activities  – through increasing exponen-
tially the volume of content on social media and users’ opportunities to 
interact with such content – result in an increase of the possibilities for 
copyright infringement when users engage in content- generative activi-
ties on social media platforms.78 I argue that these features can be incom-
patible with the copyright regimes.
On the other hand, there are technological features identified in 
sub- section (B) of Part I  that constrain content- generative activities. 
These features limit the opportunities of users to interact with the rel-
evant content, whether at or after the point of dissemination of such 
content. I argue further that such features can reduce the risks of cop-
yright infringement by social media users, and are hence aligned with 
the copyright regimes. In any case, as illustrated under scenario three in 
Part II, any constraint on social media experienced by a user when he or 
she engages in content- generative activities can be readily bypassed with 
the external tools available on web browsers, operating systems, and so 
on. On balance, the social media platforms surveyed encourage content- 
generative activities more than they constrain them.
In addition, I  also elaborate on how some of the technological 
features that constrain content- generative activities reflect copyright 
considerations.
a. attribution of generator of content
The technological features that limit the modification of content argu-
ably reflect copyright principles. In particular, these features operate to 
ensure, to some extent,79 the identification of the original generator of 
content (ie, the first user who shares the material on a social media plat-
form, who may or may not be the original author of such content), and 
also the source of the content. This is limited to the extent that a user 
can rely on external tools on his or her web browser, operating system 
and so on to edit the content. An example is Twitter’s deletion of ‘tweets’ 
incorporating the jokes of freelance writer Olga Lexell after receipt of the 
copyright notices she submitted.80 Although Twitter users can choose to 
share the jokes by using the ‘re- tweeting’ function that will ensure the 
attribution of Olga as the original author of such jokes, users may often 
choose to do otherwise. Olga will not be attributed for her authorship of 
the ‘tweets’ in situations where users decide to re- type the entire jokes 
out as ‘tweets’ or to use the ‘copy and paste’ functions available to them 
on their operating systems to share the jokes.
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With reference to the earlier discussion in Chapter Two81 and the 
earlier discussion in this chapter,82 I note that the technological features 
of four out of five platforms (ie, excluding Pinterest)  – subject to the 
adoption of external tools by users – accommodate the right of an author 
to the attribution for his or her authorship of the relevant copyright work, 
through identification by username. These features apply consistently 
regardless of where the generator of content is based, the status of such 
content (whether copyright protected or not) and the different scopes of 
application of moral rights in different jurisdictions.
On the other hand, in respect of other moral rights such as the 
right of integrity, the same features that limit the modification of con-
tent83 may nonetheless allow a user to modify a work by commenting 
on it, before sharing it with others – a situation that could compromise 
an author’s right of integrity to his or her work.84 This happens, for 
example, when a user modifies a work through commenting in such 
a manner that it could be prejudicial to the reputation of the author, 
whose username allows for his or her identification. It is paradoxical 
that the features that generally safeguard the right of an author to be 
attributed for the authorship of his or her work also create the oppor-
tunities for other moral rights to be violated, such as the author’s right 
of integrity.
Social media platforms therefore appear to recognise that the clear 
attribution of contributions to individual users is important for users who 
identify with the content they create on platforms and wish to retain con-
trol over such material. This encourages continuing user- led creation, 
modification and dissemination of content, a key aspect of social media.85 
Notwithstanding this, the possibility of using the relevant features for 
purposes that conflict with copyright principles (in this instance, to vio-
late the right of integrity to a work) dilutes their strength in upholding 
copyright considerations.
b. notice and takedown mechanisms
As illustrated earlier,86 the DMCA notice and takedown mechanism has 
been integrated into the interfaces with which a user interacts on four 
of the five platforms – namely Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube and Twitter. 
Each of these platforms make available to copyright holders DMCA com-
pliant online forms that they can easily complete to notify the platforms 
of copyright infringement and to request the removal of content deemed 
to be copyright infringing. On the other hand, while the DMCA mecha-
nism is part of the copyright policy of Wikipedia, the Wikipedia platform 
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does not provide a similar online form to make the process of initiating 
the DMCA mechanism more convenient for copyright holders. Instead a 
copyright holder has to complete a notification of copyright infringement 
manually and arrange for this to be sent to the designated agent, through 
email or by post.
While social media platforms need to make the DMCA mecha-
nism available to copyright holders in order to be exempt under the 
safe harbour provision from liability for monetary relief, in relation 
to secondary liability for copyright infringement by their users,87 the 
accessibility to web forms on each of the Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube 
and Twitter platforms is a convenience granted to copyright holders on 
the initiatives of these platforms. On a related note, it is plausible that 
a substantial volume of non- copyright infringing content (for example, 
because the use resulting in such content falls under a copyright excep-
tion such as fair use in the US) is permanently removed pursuant to this 
mechanism. A  user who receives a notification of copyright infringe-
ment may choose not to exercise his or her legal rights by responding 
with a counter- notice,88 even if the relevant content has been mistak-
enly removed.89
The DMCA mechanism is only one of a few notice and takedown 
measures highlighted in sub- section (B3) of Part I.  Among the five 
platforms studied, Facebook and Wikipedia additionally offer other 
self- help or community options through which copyright holders can 
request the removal of potentially infringing content without the initia-
tion of the DMCA mechanism. Overall, the measures taken by the five 
platforms are found to extend beyond the prescriptions of copyright 
legislation. I argue that these measures reflect and reinforce copyright 
considerations.
There are similar mechanisms to the DMCA mechanism under the 
UK Copyright Act90 and the Australian Copyright Act,91 although these are 
not specifically considered in this book.
C. filtering out content
Through the Content Id system mentioned above,92 YouTube has inte-
grated filtering technologies on its platform with the intention of filter-
ing out potentially copyright- infringing content. As filtering is a form of 
technological control that applies automatically, there is often little room 
to raise disputes against its application, nor to exercise discretion in its 
implementation.93 In the same vein, automatic enforcement through fil-
tering results in an over- inclusive ‘all or nothing’ approach to governance 
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that is non- proportionate; most filtering systems are not specific enough 
to restrict their application only to the targeted content.94 Moreover, 
given that filtering technologies are better at implementing rules than 
imposing standards,95 the relevant filtering software can be efficient in 
detecting matches with content claimed by copyright holders, but cannot 
assess – with reference to standards – whether a use is exempted under 
copyright laws, as a fair use or otherwise.96
Because of this limitation of filtering technologies in imposing 
standards on a case- by- case basis, many of the Content Id claims that 
result in the removal of content are erroneous. The policies elected by the 
copyright holders are immediately implemented, and no separate consid-
eration is given to the possible application of copyright exceptions under 
these claims. It is only when the respondent user files a dispute to a claim, 
and the copyright holder does not respond within 30 days or chooses to 
release the claim, that the content and its previous settings are restored 
on YouTube.97 Although this process shares some similarities with the 
DMCA mechanism that allows a respondent user to file a counter- notice 
in response to a copyright notice he or she receives, there are variations 
between the two.98 Essentially, the Content Id system is a self- help sys-
tem99 that exists independently of the DMCA mechanism.
With respect to the use of the DMCA mechanism discussed earlier and 
the Content Id system, a case in point is Lawrence Lessig v Liberation Music 
Pty Ltd.100 Lessig, with the backing of the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF), filed a complaint in a US federal court against Melbourne- based 
Liberation Music Pty Ltd (Liberation Music) for its aggressive enforce-
ment of copyright – in insisting that YouTube remove the video clip of a 
lecture uploaded by Lessig featuring clips from the song ‘Lisztomania’ by 
the French band Phoenix (on Liberation Music’s label).101 The clips were 
included in Lessig’s lecture delivered at a Creative Commons conference 
to demonstrate how young people are expressing themselves on the 
internet. Lessig’s video clip was initially blocked by YouTube’s Content 
Id system as having content licensed by US- based Viacom International 
Inc., and Lessig responded by filing a notice to dispute the block. Just as 
YouTube was about to restore access to the clip, Liberation Music sub-
mitted a copyright notice under the DMCA; in response Lessig filed a 
counter- notice, although he retracted this when Liberation Music threat-
ened to sue him in the Massachusetts court. Subsequently Lessig and 
the EFF decided to file a complaint against Liberation Music, relying on 
the argument that Lessig’s use of the clips for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, teaching and scholarship qualified as fair use.
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The case was finally settled in favour of Lessig in February 2014 – 
with Liberation Music agreeing under a settlement agreement that 
Lessig’s use qualified both as fair use under the copyright laws of US and 
as fair dealing under the copyright laws of Australia.102 This case brings 
to light the possibility that a large volume of non- copyright infringing 
content can be removed under the DMCA mechanism and the Content Id 
system without due consideration being given to the application of copy-
right exceptions, including fair use. It is a unique situation, in that Lessig 
happens to be a renowned theorist on cyberspace who dared to challenge 
Liberation Music’s claim.
Just as is the case with the requests to remove content – whether 
under the DMCA or otherwise – if the majority of Content Id claims go 
undisputed, the subsequent generative possibilities in relation to the 
content unjustifiably removed103 will be obliterated. Thus the Content 
Id system results in a similar effect to the notice and takedown meas-
ures discussed in the earlier sub- section. Again I  argue that it reflects 
and reinforces copyright considerations over and beyond legislative 
prescriptions.
IV. Conclusion
This chapter, together with Chapter Two, forms the basis for this book’s 
evaluation of the consistency of the technological features of social 
media platforms with the application of copyright laws. I have identified 
the technological features that both encourage and constrain content- 
generative activities undertaken by users of these platforms. I  have 
also illustrated, under scenario three, how the identified technological 
features on such platforms enable the content- generative activities of 
Jane and other users in the case study. Out of a total of eleven content- 
generative activities considered, as many as four of these activities can 
be carried out using solely the technological features on the relevant 
platforms. I have further noted that where Jane and the other users face 
constraints in their content- generative activities, these constraints can be 
readily bypassed with external tools.
I have discussed the relationship the technological features have 
with the copyright regimes of the US, the UK and Australia. I have argued 
that the ‘generativity’104 of social media platforms, in part due to their 
integration of technological features that encourage the creation, modi-
fication and dissemination of content, can increase the possibilities for 
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copyright infringement on such platforms. These features can be incom-
patible with the copyright regimes. On the other hand, the technological 
features that constrain content- generative activities limit the opportuni-
ties for users to interact with content and hence correspondingly reduce 
the risks of copyright infringement by users of the platforms. These fea-
tures are aligned with the copyright regimes, although their influence 
is limited since the constraints experienced by users can easily be over-
come with the other tools available on their web browsers, operating 
systems and so on. Thus, on balance, the social media platforms encour-
age content- generative activities more than they constrain them.
I have additionally elaborated on how some of the features 
that constrain content- generative activities reflect copyright con-
siderations, beyond limiting the opportunities for users to engage in 
content- generative activities. These are the features which: ensure the 
attribution of the authorship of content; allow for copyright holders 
to request the removal of content; and filter out content with direct 
matches to the content of copyright holders. While the first category 
of features safeguards the moral right of an author to be attributed for 
his or her authorship of a work, the same features create opportunities 
for the violation of another moral right (ie, the right of integrity to a 
work) – this dilutes the strength of such features in upholding copyright 
considerations. In contrast, the latter two categories of features distinc-
tively reflect and reinforce copyright considerations beyond legislative 
prescriptions.
I observe that users are, to a large extent, ‘nudged’105 to engage in 
content- generative activities on social media platforms. However, both 
the availability of the notice and takedown mechanisms, as well as the 
employment of filtering technologies on platforms such as YouTube, are 
strong reminders of the potential application of copyright laws to the 
content- generative activities on social media.
In the next chapter I will discuss prior empirical studies that illumi-
nate the perceptions and awareness users have of intellectual property in 
general, or of copyright laws more specifically. I will also draw on scenar-
ios one, two and three – in Chapters Two, Three and Four respectively – to 
examine how the regulatory factors of copyright laws, the TOS and the 
technological services impact, in toto, on the content- generative behav-
iours of users across the five selected social media platforms. I will then 
analyse the findings from these studies, together with the arguments 
made in the earlier chapters.
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Notes
 1. I draw, to some extent, from Yeung’s method of classifying various design- based techno-
logical instruments that regulate the behaviours of people within an environment. This 
method focuses on the modalities of design; see Karen Yeung, ‘Towards an Understanding of 
Regulation by Design’ in Roger Brownsword and Karen Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies 
(Hart Publishing, 2008) 85– 7. The ways in which the desired objectives are sought define this 
manner of classification proposed by Yeung, such as encouraging desired changes in behav-
iours, changing the impact of harm- generating behaviours and preventing the harm- generat-
ing behaviours altogether. I have decided to identify only two main categories of technological 
features (ie, those that encourage and constrain content- generative activities), given that the 
features on social media that can reduce the harmful impact caused by the content- generative 
activities of a user to a third party can also constrain content- generative activities. An exam-
ple is the notice and takedown mechanism under the DMCA that facilitates the convenient 
removal of content reported to be harmful to a third party, which arguably constrains subse-
quent content- generative activities.
 2. My focus is on the platform interfaces with which users interact when they generate content 
on social media. Given the confined focus of this book, the chapter is not concerned with 
technology in general that has an effect on user behaviours. Thus the functions (for example, 
the ‘copy image’ function) available to users on web browsers that make it easy for them 
to, among other things, modify and disseminate content originally created by others will be 
omitted from consideration. In the same vein, the chapter is not concerned with the fea-
tures of applications on operating systems (for example, Android, Linux, iOS and Microsoft 
Windows) that can be used independently or in conjunction with these functions to generate 
content.
 3. See Thaler, R. and Sunstein, C. 2008.
 4. See image 1 in Appendix 1.
 5. See image 2 in Appendix 1.
 6. See image 3 in Appendix 1.
 7. See image 4 in Appendix 1.
 8. See, for example, Pinterest Blog, Pin a Video! (22 May 2013) <https:// blog.pinterest.com/ en/ 
pin- video>.
 9. See image 5 in Appendix 1.
 10. See images 6 and 7 in Appendix 1.
 11. See image 8 in Appendix 1. See also Joshua Cohen, YouTube Gives Creators Updates and Tools 
to Help with Content ID (18 March 2014) <http:// www.tubefilter.com/ 2014/ 03/ 18/ youtube- 
content- id- updates- tools>; Cynthia Boris, YouTube calms angry vidders with new tweaks in 
Content ID process (19 March 2014) <http:// www.marketingpilgrim.com/ 2014/ 03/ youtube- 
calms- angry- vidders- with- new- tweaks- in- content- id- process.html>.
 12. See image 9 in Appendix 1.
 13. See image 10 in Appendix 1.
 14. See image 11 in Appendix 1.
 15. See image 12 in Appendix 1.
 16. See image 13 in Appendix 1.
 17. See image 14 in Appendix 1.
 18. Gimp, GNU Image Manipulation Program <http:// www.gimp.org/ >.
 19. Photoshop, Photoshop.com <http:// www.photoshop.com/ >.
 20. See images 15, 16 and 17 in Appendix 1.
 21. See image 18 in Appendix 1. Social plug- ins (ie, tools used so that experiences on YouTube, for 
instance, can be shared on Facebook) are used. Whether the user uses the Facebook, Pinterest 
or Twitter social plug- in, he or she will be prompted to write something at the same time.
 22. This can be done using external tools. See, for example, ClipConverter.cc, Free Online Media 
Recorder <http:// www.clipconverter.cc>.
 23. See image 19 in Appendix 1.
 24. See image 20 in Appendix 1.
 25. See, for example, Adam Hyde et al, ‘What is Collaboration Anyway?’ in Michael Mandiberg 
(ed.), The Social Media Reader (New York University Press, 2008) 53, 54.
 26. See image 21 in Appendix 1.
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 27. There are no elaborate content editing tools available, beyond tools that are used to modify 
existing articles.
 28. The platform is, after all, an online encyclopedia intended to provide information on various 
topics to the public. It is not meant to provide as much interaction among users as other social 
media platforms do.
 29. See image 22 in Appendix 1.
 30. See image 23 in Appendix 1.
 31. These are the Facebook users who are part of a user’s defined network of ‘friends’ on Facebook.
 32. See image 24 in Appendix 1.
 33. See Pinterest, Pinterest basic:  All about boards <https:// help.pinterest.com/ en/ articles/ 
all- about- boards?qa=3#Web>.
 34. See image 25 in Appendix 1.
 35. Public video clips are those that are made publicly available to all; private video clips can only 
be seen by the people a user selects – they do not show on search results and are invisible to 
other users; and unlisted video clips are those that can be seen by people to whom the relevant 
links are sent: again, they do not show on search results. See YouTube, Video privacy settings 
<https:// support.google.com/ youtube/ answer/ 157177?hl=en>.
 36. For example, when a YouTube video clip is shared on Facebook, the constituent members of 
the audience will depend on a user’s privacy setting on Facebook.
 37. See image 26 in Appendix 1.
 38. In respect of ‘re- tweeting’, the privacy setting of the user who ‘re- tweets’ is relevant. In respect 
of responding to another user’s ‘tweet’, the privacy setting of the latter user is relevant instead. 
If a user’s ‘tweets’ are protected, the ‘tweets’ are only visible to a user’s approved ‘followers’. 
On the other hand, if a user’s ‘tweets’ are not protected, they are available to the public. See 
Twitter, Help Center: About public and protected Tweets <https:// support.twitter.com/ articles/ 
14016#>.
 39. See image 27 in Appendix 1.
 40. This original generator refers to the user who first shares the content on the relevant social 
media platform, whether or not he or she is the original creator of the relevant content.
 41. See image 28 in Appendix 1.
 42. See images 29 and 30 in Appendix 1.
 43. See image 31 in Appendix 1.
 44. See image 32 in Appendix 1.
 45. Wikipedia, Help: File Page <http:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Help:File_ page>.
 46. See images 33, 34 and 35 in Appendix 1. The word limit is 140 for a ‘tweet’, a ‘re- tweet’ and a 
response to a ‘tweet’.
 47. These requirements are, among other things, that the subject must be considered ‘worthy 
of notice’ and that it is written with reference to reliable published sources. See Wikipedia, 
Wikipedia: Your first article <https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Wikipedia:Your_ first_ article>.
 48. Wikipedia, Wikipedia: Basic copyright issues <http:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Wikipedia:Basic_ 
copyright_ issues>.
 49. Content may be deemed harmful for many reasons, including that it is offensive or that its 
availability on the relevant platform is an infringement of another’s intellectual property 
rights.
 50. See images 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 in Appendix 1. The options for reporting an image are as fol-
lows: ‘It’s annoying or not interesting’; ‘I’m in this photo and I don’t like it’; ‘I think it shouldn’t 
be on Facebook’; and ‘It’s spam’. If the user selects ‘I think it shouldn’t be on Facebook’, he 
or she gets directed again to another, longer list of options. The options include, inter alia, 
the following: ‘This is nudity and pornography’; ‘This humiliates me or someone I know’; and 
‘Something else’. If the user selects ‘Something else’, he or she gets asked to choose again from 
yet another list of options. One of the options on this list reads ‘I think it’s an unauthorized use 
of my intellectual property’. The options are similar in respect of reporting a post.
 51. DMCA § 512.
 52. Alternatively, such party can also submit a notice of copyright infringement by post to 
Facebook’s designated agent. See Facebook, Help Center: What is the contact information for 
your Digital Millennium Copyright Act designated agent? <https:// www.facebook.com/ help/ 
www/ 190268144407210>.
 53. See images 41 and 42 in Appendix 1. The other options presented are as follows: ‘I don’t want 
to see this’; ‘This is spam’; and ‘This Pin isn’t useful’.
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 54. See image 43 in Appendix 1. See also Pinterest, Copyright Infringement Notification <http:// 
www.pinterest.com/ about/ copyright/ dmca- pin/ >.
 55. See images 44 and 45 in Appendix 1. The other options presented are as follows: ‘Sexual con-
tent’; ‘Hateful or abusive content’; ‘Harmful dangerous acts’; ‘Child abuse’; ‘Spam or mislead-
ing’; and ‘Captions issue’. If the user proceeds on the basis that the video clip infringes his or 
her rights, there is a second drop- down menu from which three other options are presented. 
The three options are as follows:  ‘Infringes my copyright’; ‘Invades my privacy’; and ‘Other 
legal claim’.
 56. YouTube, Copyright Infringement Notification <https:// www.youtube.com/ copyright_ com-
plaint_ form>. See also YouTube, Submit a copyright takedown notice <https:// support.
google.com/ youtube/ answer/ 2807622/ >. Alternatively the user, or any party for that mat-
ter, can choose to notify YouTube of copyright infringement via email, fax or post instead.
 57. See images 46 and 47 in Appendix 1. The options are as follows: ‘Unwanted commercial con-
tent or spam’; ‘Pornography or sexually explicit material’; ‘Hate speech or graphic violence’; 
and ‘Harassment or bullying’. Here, unlike the case with a video clip, the user is not given 
the option to report a comment for copyright infringement. This could be because YouTube 
anticipates fewer instances where comments are copyright infringing than it does with video 
clips on the same platform. The user can, however, still choose to visit YouTube’s web page that 
incorporates its copyright policy, and locate the online form to report copyright infringement. 
See YouTube Copyright Policy.
 58. See images 48, 49, 50, 51 and 52 in Appendix 1. The other options presented are as fol-
lows:  ‘I am not interested in this Tweet’; and ‘It’s spam’. If the user proceeds on the basis 
that the content is abusive and harmful, he or she is directed to another list of options 
which includes the following:  ‘Includes private information’; ‘Involves targeted harass-
ment’; ‘Threatening violence or physical harm’; and ‘This person might be contemplating 
suicide or self- harm’.
 59. Twitter, Report copyright infringement <https:// support.twitter.com/ forms/ dmca>.
 60. Wikipedia, Wikipedia: Content Removal <https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Wikipedia:Content_ 
removal>.
 61. Wikipedia, Wikipedia: Contributor copyright violations <http:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ 
Wikipedia:Contributor_ copyright_ investigations>.
 62. Wikipedia Terms 2014, cl 8.
 63. Wikipedia Terms 2014, cl 8.
 64. YouTube Help.
 65. As of now Facebook, Pinterest, Twitter and Wikipedia do not use a similar system to detect 
potential instances of copyright infringement by pre- emptive filtering. This could change in 
the near future.
 66. The technological features constitute part of the architecture of the social media sites sur-
veyed. Lessig notes that the constraints of architecture are self- executing, unlike the other 
modalities of regulation. See Lessig, L. 2006, 342.
 67. This is consistent with Yeung’s description of the modality- based taxonomy in Part I of this 
 chapter – in particular, her description of the first category comprising design instruments that 
encourage desired changes in behaviours. See Yeung, K. 2008, 85.
 68. See image 53 of Appendix 1.
 69. See image 54 of Appendix 1.
 70. See image 55 of Appendix 1.
 71. Wikipedia, Help: Editing <https:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Help:Editing>.
 72. YouTube Help, YouTube Video Editor <https:// support.google.com/ youtube/ answer/ 
183851?hl=en>.
 73. A similar assumption is made in Part II of Chapter Three, sub- section J.
 74. In this respect I find that Zittrain’s theory of generativity is useful in supplementing my under-
standing of how the technological features encourage users’ content- generative behaviours. 
The term ‘generativity’ has been defined by him to denote a technology’s capacity to produce 
spontaneous changes driven by mass uncoordinated audiences, with reference to four spe-
cific criteria: leverage across a range of difficult tasks through making them more achievable; 
adaptability to different tasks through offering additional kinds of uses; ease of mastery; and 
accessibility. See Jonathan Zittrain, ‘The Generative Internet’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 
1974, 1980– 2.
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 75. The extent of ‘generativity’ varies across the platforms. All things considered, the techno-
logical features of YouTube are argued to be more generative than those of the other 
platforms. This is because the technological features on YouTube provide more leverage, 
are more adaptable and more accessible to a user than is the case with the other four plat-
forms. For instance, the video editing tool and the automatic generator of transcripts on 
YouTube allow a user to create and modify content conveniently and with minimal effort 
on the YouTube platform. On the other hand, in respect of Facebook, Pinterest, Twitter and 
Wikipedia, with the general exception of text, images and video clips uploaded often have to 
be created and modified using external tools.
 76. See William W. Gaver, ‘Technology Affordances’ (1991), CHI’91 Conference Proceedings 79, 
where the notion of ‘affordances’ was explored as a way of looking at the strengths and weak-
nesses of technologies with respect to the possibilities they might offer to the people who 
use them. The term ‘affordance’ was first introduced by James J.  Gibson, ‘The Theory of 
Affordances’ in Robert Shaw and John Bransford (eds), Perceiving, Acting and Knowing (John 
Wiley & Sons, 1977) 127.
 77. The term ‘generativity’ in the Zittrain sense and the term ‘generative’ to describe behaviours 
and activities are distinct from one another. In the context of this book, it is the generativity 
of social media platforms that encourages users to engage in content- generative activities.
 78. This echoes the sentiment that generativity is also vulnerability, in the sense that content 
in a generative environment is more vulnerable to copyright infringement. See Zittrain, 
J. 2006, 1995.
 79. This identification is limited, given that the actual identity of the author of content is not usu-
ally apparent from an identification through his or her username and further investigation is 
required. Also, on the Pinterest platform, although the preceding user cannot be identified 
from an image a user ‘pins’ from another user’s pin- board, the identification of the original 
generator remains possible as the source website is indicated along with the ‘pin’. See Part I of 
this chapter, sub- section B1.
 80. See, for example, The Guardian 2015; D’Orazio 2015.
 81. On the moral rights that authors have which allow them to control the treatment and presen-
tation of their works, see Part I of Chapter Two, sub- section F.
 82. Part I, sub- section B1.
 83. This includes: the ‘share’ option on Facebook; the ‘pin’ option on Pinterest (where the source 
website is indicated and the original generator can be identified); the ‘share’, ‘email’ and 
‘embed’ options on YouTube; the ‘re- tweet’ option on Twitter; and the automatically gener-
ated file page on Wikipedia.
 84. See VARA, § 106A(a)(3)(A); UK Copyright Act, ss 80(1) and 80(2); Australian Copyright Act, 
ss 195AI, 195AJ- AL.
 85. See Bruns, A. and Bahnisch, M. 2009.
 86. Part I of this chapter, sub- section B3.
 87. DMCA, § 512(c)(1).
 88. DMCA, §§ 512(g)(2) and (g)(3). For example, out of a total of 16,648 DMCA takedown notices 
issued over six months from 1 July to 31 December 2014, a total of only 13 counter- notices were 
issued on the Twitter platform. See Twitter, Copyright Notices: DMCA takedown notices (July 1 – 
December 31, 2014) <https:// transparency.twitter.com/ copyright- notices/ 2014/ jul- dec>.
 89. The user may wish to avoid copyright litigation, since the next logical step a copyright holder 
can choose to take (in response to a counter- notice received) is to file a copyright action; see 
DMCA, § 512 (c)(1). Another conceivable reason for this passivity could be the user’s lack 
of understanding of copyright laws that will allow him or her to defend the relevant use in a 
counter-notice confidently.
 90. UK Copyright Act, s 97A.
 91. Australian Copyright Act, ss 116AE, 116AF and 116AH. It is not clear if a social media plat-
form falls under the definition of a ‘carriage service provider’ in the Telecommunications Act 
1997 (Cth) s 87.
 92. Part I of this chapter, sub- section B4.
 93. See T.J. McIntyre and Colin Scott, ‘Internet Filtering’ in Roger Brownsword and Karen Yeung 
(eds), Regulating Technologies (Hart Publishing, 2008) 109, 112.
 94. McIntyre, T.J. and Scott, C. 2008, 115.
 95. See James Grimmelmann, ‘Regulation by Software’ (2005) 114 Yale Law Journal 1719, 1732, 
for a discussion on the application by software of rules, rather than standards.
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 96. McIntyre, T.J. and Scott, C. 2008, 116.
 97. YouTube Help, Dispute a Content ID claim <https:// support.google.com/ youtube/ answer/ 
2797454/ >.
 98. With respect to the Content Id system, the copyright holder is given 30 instead of 10 days to 
respond to a notice disputing his or her Content Id claim. See DMCA, § 512(g)(2).
 99. For a discussion on self- help systems see generally Kenneth W. Dam, ‘Self- Help in the Digital 
Jungle’ (June 1999) 28(2) Journal of Legal Studies 1.
 100. Lawrence Lessig v Liberation Music Pty Ltd, Case 1:13- cv- 12028- NMG (USDC Mass, 22 
August 2013).
 101. Lawrence Lessig v Liberation Music Pty Ltd, Case 1:13- cv- 12028- NMG (USDC Mass, 22 
August 2013). See also Corinne Hui Yun Tan, ‘Lawrence Lessig v Liberation Music Pty 
Ltd:  YouTube’s Hands (or Bots) in the Overzealous Enforcement of Copyright’ (2014) 
36(6) European Intellectual Property Review 347; Electronic Frontier Foundation, Lawrence 
Lessig Strikes Back Against Bogus Copyright Takedown <https:// www.eff.org/ press/ 
releases/ lawrence- lessig- strikes- back- against- bogus- copyright- takedown>; PCWorld, 
Creative Commons co- founder wages ‘fair use’ war over YouTube takedown notice <http:// 
www.pcworld.com/ article/ 2047320/ copyright- guru- claims- fair- use- to- fight- youtube- 
takedown- notice.html>.
 102. See, for example, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Lawrence Lessig settles fair use lawsuit over 
Phoenix music snippets <https:// www.eff.org/ press/ releases/ lawrence- lessig- settles- fair- 
use- lawsuit- over- phoenix- music- snippets>; Michaela Fox, Australian music label Liberation 
to pay damages to Harvard professor Lawrence Lessig in copyright battle (28 February 2014)  
<http:// www.smh.com.au/ digital- life/ digital- life- news/ australian- music- label- liberation- 
to- pay- damages- to- harvard- professor- lawrence- lessig- in- copyright- battle- 20140228- 33pnj.
html>.
 103. This will be the case if copyright holders largely elect to block access to the content, among 
the other choices given.
 104. See Zittrain, J. 2006. See also David G. Post, ‘The Theory of Generativity’ (2010) 78(6) 
Fordham Law Review 101, 106. Post comments that ‘Generativity has been said to be 
both the good and the bad, at war with itself, bearing within itself the seeds of its own 
destruction’.
 105. See Thaler, R. and Sunstein, C. 2008.
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Chapter five
How the terms of service and 
technological features affect 
copyright’s regulation of   
content- generative behaviours
At the beginning of this chapter I consider earlier empirical studies con-
ducted on the perceptions and awareness users have of intellectual prop-
erty in general, or of copyright laws more specifically. This enables me to 
analyse the findings from these studies along with the arguments made 
in the earlier chapters of this book from three angles. Firstly, I  discuss 
how users relate to copyright laws and how this affects their awareness of 
such laws. Secondly, I examine how the TOS (ie, terms of service) affect 
users’ awareness of copyright laws. Thirdly, I consider the influence of 
the technological features on users’ perceptions of copyright laws. I also 
refer to the earlier discussions on the relationship between each of the 
TOS and the technological features vis- à- vis the copyright regime.
I then bring together the conclusions arrived at under scenarios 
one,1 two2 and three3 in the earlier chapters, in respect of the application 
of copyright laws, the TOS and the technological features respectively. 
The purpose of this is to evaluate the consistency of regulatory signals 
users receive from the following pairs of regulatory factors: the copyright 
regimes and the TOS; the copyright regimes and the technological fea-
tures; and the TOS and the technological features.
I. Perceptions and awareness of copyright laws
I examine the following studies on the assumption that users are more 
likely to comply with copyright laws in generating content on social media 
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when such laws are perceived to restrict what is illegitimate4 and when 
users understand how these laws apply to regulate their content- generative 
activities. The studies are selected for the purpose of this book as they are of 
relatively recent vintage and their findings can illuminate the perceptions 
and awareness of copyright laws in users of social media platforms. These 
findings pertain to:  the perceived irrelevance and poor understanding of 
copyright laws displayed by many users; the expectation for digital content 
to be free; and the greater impact of perceptions over awareness of copy-
right laws on users’ compliance with copyright laws. The findings will be 
analysed together with the arguments made in the earlier chapters.
a. Prior studies
1. Perceived irrelevance and poor understanding of copyright laws
A study conducted on the perceptions and awareness of European users 
of intellectual property between December 2012 and August 2013 
reveals that there is a gap between the subjective understanding which 
such users claim to have of intellectual property and the objective know-
ledge which they actually possess.5 Under this study, 73 per cent of the 
EU citizens surveyed claimed to have a good understanding of the term 
‘intellectual property’, although only 13 per cent of the respondents dem-
onstrated a good knowledge of what it actually means.6 Similarly, 85 per 
cent of those surveyed stated that they have a good understanding of the 
term ‘copyright’.7 However, their objective knowledge again painted a 
different picture. For example, when presented with the statement ‘copy-
right allows all the creators to share freely everything they create’, 49 per 
cent of the respondents stated that this statement is true and 12 per cent 
did not know.8 Only 39 per cent of those surveyed answered that this 
statement is false.9 Furthermore, the study found that 42 per cent of the 
respondents considered it acceptable to download copyright- protected 
content when it was for personal use.10 In showing that users’ objective 
levels of knowledge of intellectual property and its components is sub-
stantially lower than their declared understanding,11 this study supports 
the observation made by the cartoonist and film- maker Nina Paley that 
people ‘do not know that they do not know’ how copyright laws work; 
they have only a vague idea that copyright laws protect their rights in 
their intellectual property.12 The qualitative research carried out in the 
study, in addition to its quantitative research, also reflected that notions 
of intellectual property were perceived by many respondents to be irrele-
vant to them, and instead to affect mainly a small part of society, includ-
ing large corporations, successful artists and lawyers.13
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The study illuminates the poor understanding of copyright laws that 
users have.14 It also reveals their perceptions of the acceptability of accessing 
digital copyright- protected content illegally for personal use, as well as the 
disconnection they experience with intellectual property in general. These 
findings are reflective of the awareness and perceptions of copyright laws 
that users have on social media when they engage in content- generative 
activities. The limitations of this study’s applicability to this book are that 
the questions were posed to those surveyed to gauge their perceptions and 
understanding of intellectual property in general, including of patents and 
trademarks, rather than of copyright laws in particular. Moreover, while 
references were made in the study to the explosion of digital content and 
technology15 – the circumstances that allow for the proliferation of social 
media platforms  – the study was not specifically designed to gauge the 
awareness and perceptions of social media users to copyright laws.
2. Expectation that digital content is free
Another survey conducted in 2012 by the Pew Research Center16 in the 
US gauged the views of arts organisations on the overall impact of tech-
nology on arts.17 Of the arts organisations surveyed, 74 per cent agreed 
that the internet and related technologies have created an expectation 
among some audiences that all digital content should be free.18 Notably, 
this survey draws on the views of right- holder arts organisations, rather 
than their audiences.
Similarly, a YouGov19 report released in 201420 in the UK reveals 
the consensus held by its respondents that digital content should be 
free, or at least cheaper than the physical equivalent. This view is noted 
to be more prominent among children and young adults.21 Of the chil-
dren aged between 8 to 15 years old who were interviewed, 49 per cent 
strongly agreed that a person should be able to download or access 
content for free from the internet. Similarly, 49 per cent of the young 
adults between 16 to 24 years old who were interviewed held the view 
that online content should be free.22 Cost concerns and the availability of 
content, as well as the convenience of accessing content, are identified 
as key motivators explaining why file- sharing continues to occur among 
children and young adults.23 The group of children aged between 8 and 
15 years old was found to have an above average propensity to agree that 
file- sharing websites are easy to use and that file- sharing has become ‘a 
normal thing to do’.24 Separately, while up to 16 per cent of the same 
group strongly agreed that it is ethically wrong to access content without 
the creator’s permission, only 7 per cent of the interviewees agreed that 
file- sharing is a form of theft.25
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Although the survey was conducted in relation to the use of file- 
sharing websites by children and young adults, the discovery of a con-
sensus within this group that digital content should be free is relevant to 
this book. I argue that this general expectation that such content is free 
accounts, to some extent, for users’ responses to copyright laws. I also 
argue that the convenience and ease of using the technological features 
available on social media platforms – just as is the case with file- sharing 
websites – encourage users to engage in content- generative activities on 
social media. Such users are more likely to see their content- generative 
activities as ‘the normal thing to do’ – in this sense conflating what they 
perceive to be ‘normal’ with what is actually legitimate.
Yet another survey conducted in 2014 by the Intellectual Property 
Office of Singapore26 shows that the percentage of respondents surveyed 
who viewed downloading from unauthorised sources or unauthorised 
file- sharing as forms of theft has dropped since 2010.27 This is in spite of 
the fact that most of the users surveyed were both aware that infringe-
ments of intellectual property rights could result in penalties under 
existing laws and agreed that it is important to protect the works of intel-
lectual property creators.28 The findings from this survey are relevant to 
the book insofar as they further exemplify how users generally expect to 
be able to use digital content available on the internet freely.
3. Greater impact of perceptions on compliance with copyright laws
Finally, a study conducted before 2009 to assess the factors that deter 
online copyright infringement  – on a sample of university students in 
the US – reveals that consensus with copyright laws plays a more impor-
tant role in deterring future file- sharing activities than an awareness of 
copyright laws.29 ‘Consensus with copyright laws’ was defined under this 
study as the degree to which a user of a file- sharing service agrees that 
copyright laws on file- sharing are reasonable and updated, in the light 
of existing technologies. On the other hand, an ‘awareness of copyright 
laws’ was defined as the extent to which the same user is informed of 
copyright laws in relation to his or her file- sharing activities.30
The scope of the study here is confined to file- sharing activi-
ties, rather than broader content- generative activities on social media. 
Nonetheless, its finding is relevant to this book. In this respect I argue 
that the consensus with copyright laws referred to under this study con-
tributes to users’ perceptions of the relevance and legitimacy of copyright 
laws in regulating their content- generative activities. I argue further that 
such perceived legitimacy contributes to the effectiveness of copyright 
laws in securing compliance from social media users when they generate 
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content.31 This means that these users are more likely to comply with 
copyright laws when they perceive such laws to be reasonable in regulat-
ing their content- generative activities on social media.
b. users’ perceptions and awareness of copyright laws
In this sub- section I analyse the findings of the earlier studies highlighted 
above with the arguments made in Chapter Two, in relation to the regula-
tion of users’ content- generative behaviours by copyright laws. The pur-
pose of this analysis is to understand better how users relate to copyright 
laws on social media. The effectiveness of copyright laws in regulating 
users’ content- generative behaviours on social media depends on their 
ability to secure compliance from users, including deterring users from 
undertaking potentially copyright- infringing activities when they gener-
ate content.32 With reference to the last study cited in sub- section (A), 
users’ perceptions of legitimacy have a bigger impact in deterring behav-
iours not compliant with copyright laws than the awareness of copyright 
laws per se. In this respect, users’ lack of consensus that copyright laws 
are reasonable and updated, as well as their expectations that digital 
content is free, could contribute to the perceived illegitimacy of copyright 
laws. Where copyright laws are perceived as illegitimate, their effective-
ness in securing compliance from users will foreseeably be compromised.
At this juncture, I postulate that:
 (i) Users’ perceptions of the relevance and legitimacy of copyright 
laws, including whether they are reasonable and updated – as well 
as their expectations that digital content is free – are shaped by the 
technological features on social media platforms. In this respect, 
users are more likely to perceive copyright laws as reasonable and 
updated if such laws are aligned with the existing technologies.33 
I will consider how the technological features shape social media 
users’ perceptions of copyright laws in sub- section (D).
 (ii) In addition, users’ awareness of how copyright laws can actually 
apply to their content- generative activities on social media will 
affect their compliance with such laws. I will consider this in the 
latter part of this sub- section.
 (iii) Further, users’ awareness of how copyright laws apply to their 
content- generative activities on social media platforms are 
affected to some extent by the understandings of copyright laws 
incorporated into the TOS of such platforms. I will consider this in 
sub- section (C).
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Users’ awareness of copyright laws (ie, an understanding of how they 
apply to their content- generative activities) has an impact on their com-
pliance with copyright laws on social media. Copyright laws have been 
criticised for being counter-intuitive to ordinary people who are not cop-
yright lawyers.34 Many people do not believe that copyright laws can be 
applied to their activities and are hence of relevance to them.35 Litman 
has suggested that this is because there is ‘paucity’, or inadequacy, of lan-
guage under the copyright statutes in the US, the UK and Australia that 
relates back to the behaviours of individuals who are consuming rather 
than exploiting copyright- protected material.36
Moreover, particularly in relation to content- generative activities on 
social media, the focus against exploitation of copyright- protected content 
draws an artificial distinction between copyright holders and users. In mod-
ifying the content shared on social media to create new content, users may 
be inclined to assume that their conduct is lawful; once the content created 
by these users qualifies for copyright protection, such users  – now copy-
right holders of the resulting new content – could be keen to enforce their 
copyrights against other users. As can be seen, users who actively engage 
in content- generative activities are also copyright holders of some content.
In addition, copyright laws comprise mainly complex rules. In this 
respect I find Black’s characterisation of a rule useful. According to her, 
a rule’s structure is made up of three main ‘elements’ or characteristics – 
precision, complexity and clarity.37 The variation of these three ‘elements’ 
within the rules creates rules of three broad types – ‘bright line’ rules,38 
principles39 and complex rules.40 The level of complexity within detailed 
copyright rules framed in favour of copyright holders gives rise to uncer-
tainties of interpretation41 in their application to the content- generative 
activities they purport to regulate.
With reference to the discussion conducted on how copyright rules 
in the US, the UK and Australia apply to content- generative activities 
in Chapter Two,42 ascertaining whether these activities are copyright 
infringing requires the issues of copyright subsistence and infringement 
set out below to be addressed:
 (i) Whether the original content falls under the categories of content 
protected by copyright laws,43 and how copyright laws’ protection 
of expressions, not ideas,44 apply, if at all, to determine which con-
tent is copyright protectable;
 (ii) The satisfaction of the originality requirement,45 as well as the 
applicability of the de minimis principle,46 in relation to the content 
and its successive versions;47
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 (iii) The applicability of the human- centred authorship concept48 to 
collaborative practices resulting in content, and further, to situa-
tions in which there is no human author;49
 (iv) The satisfaction of the requirement of fixation,50 recording51 or 
reduction to material form,52 as the case may be;
 (v) The identification of the specific right that is infringed, whether 
of reproduction,53 preparation of derivative works,54 distribution,55 
performance and display56 in the US (and their equivalent rights in 
the UK and in Australia);
 (vi) The consideration as to whether moral rights of attribution and 
integrity,57 as well as the copyright management provisions in the 
US (and their equivalent provisions in the UK and in Australia),58 
are breached;
 (vii) Whether there is any bar to the copyright holders’ claim for rem-
edies, because of non- registration (in the US)59 or because there 
were no reasonable grounds for copyright infringement by the 
defendant- users (ie, because there was no reason to believe that 
copyright subsisted in the content in the UK, or because such users 
had no reasonable grounds to suspect that their acts constituted 
infringement in Australia);60 and
 (viii) Whether defences including the fair use doctrine61 or the fair deal-
ing exceptions62 apply, as the case may be, to excuse the uses of the 
relevant content.
The above issues have to be resolved with reference to the complex 
rules set out under the respective copyright statute. These complexities 
will prove challenging for courts, let  alone regular social media users, 
to resolve. In addition, the application of copyright rules to content- 
generative activities and the corresponding outcomes are at times unpre-
dictable, due to the uniqueness of each circumstance resulting in the 
generation of content on social media.
To compound the difficulties further, the copyright rules applicable 
to the content- generative activities of users based in different jurisdic-
tions may vary, due to conflict of laws considerations. Scenario one has 
shown that the application of copyright rules in three jurisdictions – the 
US, the UK and Australia – to the content- generative activities of users 
can result in different outcomes being reached on the copyright liabilities 
of the respective users.63 Moreover, even if the choice of governing law 
and jurisdiction made under the TOS in a copyright- related dispute is 
upheld, different laws may apply to questions of subsistence and infringe-
ment of copyright.64
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In the absence of copyright rules that users can relate to, and the 
overall complexity of those rules,65 I argue that the low levels of public 
awareness or understanding of copyright laws are amplified in social 
media users. It is therefore not surprising that a large majority of such 
users will not know how to apply the complex copyright rules to their 
content- generative activities, in order to ascertain whether they are act-
ing in contravention of copyright laws.
C. Terms of service and users’ awareness of copyright laws
In this sub- section I consider how the TOS of social media platforms can 
affect users’ awareness of copyright laws. In doing so, I refer to the dis-
cussion of the relationship between the TOS and the copyright regimes 
in Chapter Three.66 The purpose of this is to acquire a better understand-
ing of how the TOS can influence, through affecting social media users’ 
awareness of copyright laws, their compliance with those laws when they 
generate content.
In that chapter I  have argued that while any alignment with the 
copyright regimes will reinforce the latter, any potential incompatibility 
with the copyright regimes compromises the effectiveness of copyright 
laws in regulating users’ content- generative behaviours.67 The TOS and 
the relevant copyright regime68 are aligned to the extent that the DMCA 
notice and takedown mechanism is integrated into each of the copy-
right policies of the social media platforms studied.69 In addition, such 
platforms reserve their rights to disable the accounts of users who have 
received more than one DMCA takedown notice.70 Apart from limiting 
the monetary relief available from social media platforms arising in 
relation to potential secondary liability for the copyright infringement 
of their users under the safe harbour provisions,71 these provisions in 
the TOS arguably remind users undertaking content- generative activi-
ties on the platforms to be mindful of complying with copyright laws. If 
this reminder is effective, the TOS exemplify how private ordering can 
promote users’ compliance with copyright laws, through increasing their 
awareness of those laws.72
Notwithstanding the above, there are potential incompatibilities 
between the two regimes.73 Pursuant to the ownership and licensing 
clauses of the TOS of the social media platforms studied, a user grants the 
relevant platform an unencumbered licence to use the content he or she 
owns, as well as another (typically more limited) licence to other users to 
use his or her content. In the case of the latter, the scope of permission 
granted varies under the TOS of the platforms surveyed. The grant of 
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a licence by a user who generates content to the relevant social media 
platform and its users is necessary because of the advertiser- supported 
business models that many social media platforms, including Facebook, 
Pinterest, YouTube and Twitter, adopt. Reliance on advertising revenue 
would mean, as mentioned earlier,74 that these platforms have an inter-
est in attracting more users and accumulating more content, generated 
through their activities.
Further, the references made to the ownership of content by its 
users under the TOS may lead such users to assume that the content they 
generate is copyright protected and that they hold rights to restrict their 
use. However, the majority of such content on social media may not qual-
ify for copyright protection in the first place, due to a failure to meet copy-
right subsistence requirements such as for originality75 and fixation (or 
recording and reduction to material form).76 Even if the content shared 
on social media meets the subsistence requirements and is hence copy-
right protected, its uses may be unrestricted. No further consent is to be 
sought, either because the elements of infringement are not made out or 
because the infringing uses fall under existing copyright exceptions such 
as fair use and fair dealing.
In other instances, where content is copyright protected, the licence 
granted under the relevant TOS may not cover the uses by third parties 
of such content, particularly when the intention to benefit these third 
parties is less clearly expressed. This is the case under the Facebook 
Statement and the Twitter Terms.77 Because of these potential incompat-
ibilities, I posit that the TOS, through their incorporation of ownership 
and licensing clauses, are responsible for fostering the following expecta-
tions in social media users:
 (i) (In a ‘copyright holder’) The content a ‘copyright holder’ (also a 
user) generates on social media receives copyright protection.
 (ii) (In a user) In the event that content is copyright protected, a 
user who modifies and/ or disseminates another user’s content is 
licensed to do so under the TOS.
The term ‘copyright holder’ in paragraph (i) above has a particular mean-
ing in this context, and is intended to refer to users who believe that their 
content is accorded copyright protection even if this is not actually the case. 
‘Copyright holders’ also include copyright holders of copyright- protected 
content who overreach their copyrights without considering the appli-
cation of copyright exceptions. I  further posit that the first expectation 
encourages ‘copyright holders’ to overreach by issuing copyright notices 
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under the DMCA for alleged infringements of their rights. The threat of a 
copyright lawsuit in the form of a copyright notice could deter further legit-
imate uses of such content by other users.78 The second expectation con-
tradicts the first. On a plain reading of the TOS, a user of another’s content 
may be led to believe that his or her use is contractually licensed, although 
the TOS may be too narrowly drafted to sanction such use.79 Given that the 
provisions of these TOS could be incompatible with the copyright regime, 
they have the potential to encourage ‘copyright holders’ to overreach their 
rights under copyright laws, as they concurrently mislead users to think 
that their uses of copyright- protected content are licensed.
The TOS regulate users’ content- generative behaviours by way of 
rules, just as is the case with copyright laws. Also, the TOS fit the descrip-
tion of principles (ie, the second type of rules) identified by Black in sub- 
section (B).80 While the TOS are concise, the outcomes reached pursuant 
to the application of the TOS are not certain. This is because the applica-
tion of the TOS to copyright- related activities necessarily refers back to 
the detailed rules under copyright laws – in particular, the TOS examined 
incorporate copyright policies that are aligned with the DMCA. Therefore 
the application of the TOS is less straightforward than it appears.
An assessment by a user as to whether a copyright- related activity 
has breached the relevant TOS could arguably be affected by the under-
standings of copyright laws embodied in the TOS – these are the expec-
tations outlined which the TOS foster in ‘copyright holders’ and users. 
Such expectations, which potentially lead ‘copyright holders’ to mis-
understand the scope of copyright protection and users to assume that 
copyright laws will not apply to their content- generative activities, could 
have an adverse impact on users’ awareness of, and henceforth compli-
ance with, copyright laws.
d. Technological features and users’ perceptions of copyright laws
In this sub- section I  consider how the technological features of social 
media platforms shape users’ perceptions of copyright laws. I will refer 
to the discussion of the relationship between the technological features 
and the copyright regimes in Chapter Four.81 This is done to acquire a 
better understanding of how the technological features both influence 
the content- generative behaviours of users and, at the same time, shape 
users’ perceptions of copyright laws.
In that chapter I  argued that the technological features which 
encourage the creation, modification and dissemination of content 
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contribute to the ‘generativity’82 of the social media platforms examined 
and can be incompatible with the copyright regimes. This is because these 
features increase the possibilities for copyright infringement on social 
media.83 I  also argued that the technological features which constrain 
content- generative activities are aligned with the copyright regimes, as 
they reduce the risks of copyright infringement by social media users. 
In addition, I elaborated on how some of these features reflect copyright 
considerations, as set out below:
 (i) The features that limit the modification of content when such con-
tent is shared, so that the original generator (ie, the user who first 
shares the content on the relevant social media platform, whether 
or not he or she is the original author) of the content and the source 
of the content are more likely to be attributed;84
 (ii) The DMCA- compliant online forms available on the Facebook, 
Pinterest, YouTube and Twitter platforms that provide conveni-
ence to copyright holders who wish to initiate the DMCA notice 
and takedown mechanism in respect of their content shared on 
these platforms, as well as other self- help and community options 
offered on the Facebook and Wikipedia platforms, through which 
copyright holders can request the removal of content;85 and
 (iii) The Content Id system employed by YouTube that detects matches 
in content shared on YouTube and automatically implements the 
policy chosen by the relevant copyright holder (ie, to mute the 
audio, block the content, monetise the use of the content or to 
track viewership statistics).86
The technological features limiting the modification of content ensure 
that a consistent approach in terms of attribution is applied. This is 
regardless of where the generator of content is based, the copyright 
protect- ability of such content or the different scopes of application of 
moral rights in the US, the UK and Australia.87 On the other hand, the 
same features permit the modification of the content that could occur 
at the expense of the right of integrity a copyright holder has to his or 
her content. This happens when a user modifies the content to the extent 
that it is prejudicial to the reputation of the copyright holder. Whether 
the technological features available to a user are employed in a way that 
respects or infringes the moral rights of others ultimately depends on the 
choice the user makes when he or she generates content.88
At the same time, the ease with which content can be removed pur-
suant to the use of the notice and takedown mechanisms made available 
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to copyright holders, as well as the Content Id system on YouTube, can 
result in the unjustified removal of a large volume of non- copyright 
infringing content.89 Given the convenience of using these techno logical 
features, such features make it easy for ‘copyright holders’ to request 
content to be removed – whether under the DMCA or otherwise – while 
concurrently allowing them to make claims that go beyond their proper 
entitlements. In this respect it has been suggested that users receiv-
ing erroneous notices requesting the removal of content, or of content 
matches under a filtering system (such as the Content Id system on 
YouTube), are inclined towards avoiding the risk of copyright litigation.90 
As such, these users are less likely to respond with counter- notices.91
I argue further that the encouragement of content- generative 
behaviours by the technological features identified, combined with the 
overall ‘generativity’ of social media platforms,92 reinforce the expect-
ation of users that digital content is free. This is particularly so as the 
technological features make it convenient, easy and ‘normal’ for users to 
engage in content- generative activities. In line with the findings from the 
YouGov report on file- sharing services discussed above,93 the availability 
of technological features on social media may have the effect of fostering 
the expectation in users that the digital content available on social media 
is free. It is conceivable that many users could be inclined to assume that 
the content- generative activities they are ‘nudged’94 to undertake are 
legitimate and will not attract liabilities under copyright laws.
Therefore there is a disjunction between what ‘copyright holders’ can 
do to restrict use of their content and what users expect. The expectations 
of users may vary from the actual practices of ‘copyright holders’ on social 
media. I argue that this disjunction has an adverse impact on users’ per-
ceptions of, and hence compliance with, copyright laws. The gap between 
users’ expectations and the practices of ‘copyright holders’ makes it likely 
that social media users will perceive copyright laws as unreasonable, out-
dated and irrelevant, in relation to their content- generative activities.
Although the technological features do not consist of express rules, 
unlike copyright laws and the TOS,95 their impact on users’ content- 
generative behaviours is akin to the influence of bright- line rules.96 
Because of the self- executing nature of the technological features sur-
veyed in this book (ie, these features either enable or constrain specific 
activities), there is more certainty in the outcomes reached via their 
usage. On balance, the technological features on social media plat-
forms encourage content- generative activities more than they constrain 
them.97
Notwithstanding this, the features ‘copyright holders’ can use to 
request the removal of content or to filter out content (for instance, with 
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the Content Id system on YouTube) could result in the obliteration of 
subsequent generative possibilities in relation to content unjustifi ably 
removed. Such features can operate over- inclusively,98 as they enforce 
copyright rules in a bright- line manner and may not take into account the 
complex rules that copyright laws comprise. For example, the Content Id 
system notifies the ‘copyright holder’ of content matches, upon which he 
or she can choose to block other users’ access to the relevant contact. This 
can happen regardless of whether the use constitutes a fair use in the US.
Overall, the technological features arguably have a significant 
impact on users’ compliance with copyright laws when they generate 
content, through their shaping of users’ perceptions of copyright laws. 
This is supported by the finding discussed earlier: that users’ consensus 
with copyright laws (ie, that they are reasonable and updated) plays a 
more important role than their awareness of copyright laws in deterring 
them from undertaking copyright- infringing activities.99
II. Scenario four: regulation by copyright laws, the terms 
of service and technological features
The premise of the inquiry in this section is to compare copyright laws 
with other regulatory factors on social media. Here I  recall how copy-
right laws and the TOS could apply to the activities of Jane and the other 
users in the case study. I also recall how the technological features could 
influence these activities. I do so to illustrate how social media users can 
be pulled in different directions by these regulatory factors. For this pur-
pose, under scenario four, the consistency of the regulatory signals given 
by each of copyright laws, the TOS and the technological features to 
users, in relation to the specific content- generative activity, will be evalu-
ated in a systematic way. The extent to which the positions reached 
are the same will be assessed through applying the following pairs of 
factors:  firstly, the copyright laws and the TOS; secondly, the copy-
right laws and the technological features; and thirdly, the TOS and the 
technological features. These activities will be considered in the same 
order as under the respective scenarios in Chapters Two, Three and Four. 
The extent of consistency between any pair of factors examined – in rela-
tion to each activity – will be represented using ‘Harvey Balls’100 in tables 
following the discussions. Where there is consistency between the pair of 
factors examined, a completely shaded ‘Harvey Ball’ is used to represent 
this; where there is inconsistency between the pair of factors examined, an 
unshaded ‘Harvey Ball’ is used instead. This allows me to consider the extent 
to which copyright laws remain an effective regulator of content- generative 
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behaviours, and can hence secure compliance from social media users such 
as Jane.
a. jane’s use of the music video clip on youTube as her 
morning alarm
The earlier discussion suggested that Jane’s use has infringed copyright 
laws in the UK and in Australia, but not in the US.101 Further, her use is 
licensed under the YouTube Terms.102 Where there is copyright infringe-
ment (ie, under the UK Copyright Act and the Australian Copyright Act) 
and yet Jane has not acted in breach of the relevant TOS, the copyright 
regimes and the TOS are inconsistent. Therefore unshaded circles are 
used to represent these inconsistencies between the respective copyright 
regimes and the TOS. With respect to the copyright regime in the US, as 
against the TOS, a shaded circle is used to represent the consistency.
Although the YouTube platform allows Jane to download the video 
clip, she needs to use an external application on her mobile device to play 
the video clip as her alarm.103 Where there is copyright infringement and 
Jane’s use is not enabled by the relevant platform, the copyright regimes 
and the technological features are consistent. Here shaded circles repre-
sent these consistencies with respect to each of the UK Copyright Act and 
the Australian Copyright Act, and to the technological features. On the 
other hand an unshaded circle represents the inconsistency between the 
copyright regime in the US, as against the technological features.
The TOS and the technological features are inconsistent. Jane’s use, 
although licensed under the YouTube Terms, is not enabled solely by YouTube’s 
technological features. An unshaded circle represents this inconsistency.
Similar representations for the consistencies and inconsistencies of 
the regulatory signals given by each of copyright laws, the TOS and the 
technological features will be adopted in respect of the other content- 
generative activities set out below.
Table 5.1 Consistency table 1
Regulatory factors Consistency
Copyright: TOS US •
UK ◦
Australia ◦
Copyright: Technological  
features
US ◦
UK •
Australia •
TOS: Technological features ◦
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b. jane’s ‘pinning’ of the youTube music video clip on her   
pin- board titled ‘My favourite Things’ on Pinterest
The earlier discussion indicated that Jane’s use has infringed copyright 
laws in the US, the UK and Australia.104 Further, her use is licensed under 
the YouTube Terms.105 Because there is copyright infringement in all 
three jurisdictions, although there is no breach of the relevant TOS, the 
copyright regimes are inconsistent with the TOS in all three instances.
The ‘pin’ option on Pinterest has enabled Jane to share the video 
clip with other users on this platform. Moreover, YouTube provides social 
plug- ins that enable Jane’s sharing of the video clip directly on other plat-
forms, including Pinterest.106 Where there is copyright infringement and 
yet Jane’s use is enabled on the relevant platforms, the copyright regimes 
and the technological features are inconsistent. There are hence incon-
sistencies across all three jurisdictions.
The TOS and the technological features are consistent. Jane’s use, 
licensed under the YouTube Terms, is also enabled by the technological 
features on Pinterest and YouTube.
C. jane’s use of evangeline’s earlier commentary on facebook to 
create her own commentary
The earlier discussion suggested that Jane’s use has infringed copyright 
laws in the UK and in Australia, but not in the US.107 Further, her use is 
likely to be licensed under the Facebook Statement.108 Where there is cop-
yright infringement (ie, under the UK Copyright Act and the Australian 
Copyright Act) and yet Jane has not breached the relevant TOS, the 
respective copyright regimes and the TOS are inconsistent. However, the 
copyright regime in the US is consistent with the TOS.
Jane has to use external tools, such as the ‘copy and paste’ func-
tion on her operating system, before she can weave her comments into 
Table 5.2 Consistency table 2
Regulatory factors Consistency
Copyright: TOS US ◦
UK ◦
Australia ◦
Copyright: Technological  
features
US ◦
UK ◦
Australia ◦
TOS: Technological features •
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Evangeline’s commentary and share the new commentary using the func-
tion on Facebook to post the ‘status update’. 109 Where there is copyright 
infringement and Jane’s use requires external tools on the relevant plat-
form, the copyright regimes and the technological features are consistent. 
While the UK and Australian copyright regimes are hence consistent with 
the technological features, the US copyright regime is inconsistent.
The TOS and the technological features are inconsistent. Jane’s 
use, although licensed under the Facebook Statement, is not one enabled 
solely by the technological features on Facebook.
d. jane’s use of multiple photographs of newborn babies available 
on the pin- boards of other Pinterest users to create a collage to 
share on Pinterest
Based on the earlier discussion, Jane’s use has infringed copyright laws in 
Australia, but not in the US and the UK.110 Further, her use is licensed under 
the Pinterest Terms.111 Where there is copyright infringement (ie, under the 
Australian Copyright Act) and yet Jane has not acted in breach of the relevant 
TOS, the copyright regime and the TOS are inconsistent. However, each of 
the copyright regimes in the US and the UK is consistent with the TOS.
Jane has to use external tools, such as the ‘save image as’ function 
on her web browser, as well as image editing tools, before she can create 
and share her collage on Pinterest.112 Where there is copyright infringe-
ment and Jane’s use requires external tools on the relevant platform, the 
copyright regime and the technological features are consistent. While the 
Australian copyright regime is hence consistent with the technological 
features, the US and the UK copyright regimes are inconsistent.
The TOS and the technological features are inconsistent. Jane’s use 
is licensed under the Pinterest Terms, but is not enabled solely by the 
technological features on Pinterest.
Table 5.3 Consistency table 3
Regulatory factors Consistency
Copyright: TOS US •
UK ◦
Australia ◦
Copyright: Technological  
features
US ◦
UK •
Australia •
TOS: Technological features ◦
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e. jane’s simultaneous sharing of the collage on facebook and 
Twitter
For the same reasons as under sub- section (D), Jane’s use has infringed 
copyright laws in Australia, but not in the US and the UK.113 Further, her use 
is licensed under each of the Pinterest Terms, the Facebook Statement and 
the Twitter Terms.114 Where there is copyright infringement (ie, under the 
Australian Copyright Act) and yet Jane has not acted in breach of the relevant 
TOS, the copyright regime and the TOS are inconsistent. However, each of 
the copyright regimes in the US and the UK is consistent with the TOS.
Jane is enabled by the social plug- ins on the Pinterest platform to 
share a ‘pin’ directly on Facebook and Twitter.115 Where there is copyright 
infringement and Jane’s use is enabled on the relevant platform, the 
copyright regime and the technological features are inconsistent. While 
the Australian copyright regime is hence inconsistent with the techno-
logical features, the US and the UK copyright regimes are consistent.
The TOS and the technological features are consistent. Jane’s use, 
licensed under each of the relevant TOS, is also enabled solely by the 
technological features on Pinterest.
Table 5.4 Consistency table 4
Regulatory factors Consistency
Copyright: TOS US •
UK •
Australia ◦
Copyright: Technological  
features
US ◦
UK ◦
Australia •
TOS: Technological features ◦
Table 5.5 Consistency table 5
Regulatory factors Consistency
Copyright: TOS US •
UK •
Australia ◦
Copyright: Technological 
features
US •
UK •
Australia ◦
TOS: Technological features •
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f. jane’s use of the same collage in her blog post on wordPress
For the same reasons as under sub- section (D), Jane’s use has infringed 
copyright laws in Australia, but not in the US and the UK.116 Further, her 
use is not licensed under the Pinterest Terms and WordPress’s TOS.117 
Where there is copyright infringement (ie, under the Australian Copyright 
Act) and Jane has breached the relevant TOS, the copyright regime and 
the TOS are consistent. However, each of the copyright regimes in the US 
and the UK is inconsistent with the TOS.
Jane’s use (ie, the attaching of the collage to her blog post) is enabled 
by the technological features on WordPress.118 Where there is copyright 
infringement and yet Jane’s use is enabled on the relevant platform, the 
copyright regime and the technological features are inconsistent. While 
the Australian copyright regime is hence inconsistent with the techno-
logical features, the US and the UK copyright regimes are consistent.
The TOS and the technological features are inconsistent. Although 
Jane’s use is not licensed under the Pinterest Terms and WordPress’s 
TOS, it is enabled solely by the technological features on WordPress.
g. Zee’s contribution to wikipedia on ‘income inequality’ using 
what jane has written
Based on the earlier discussion, Zee’s use has infringed copyright laws in 
the UK and in Australia, but not in the US.119 Further, his use is likely to 
be licensed under the Facebook Statement and the Wikipedia Terms.120 
Where there is copyright infringement (ie, under the UK Copyright Act 
and the Australian Copyright Act) and yet Zee has not breached the rele-
vant TOS, the respective copyright regime and the TOS are inconsistent. 
However, the copyright regime in the US is consistent with the TOS.
Table 5.6 Consistency table 6
Regulatory factors Consistency
Copyright: TOS US ◦
UK ◦
Australia •
Copyright: Technological  
features
US •
UK •
Australia ◦
TOS: Technological features ◦
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Zee’s contribution of content is enabled by the technological fea-
tures on Wikipedia.121 Where there is copyright infringement and yet 
Zee’s use is enabled on the relevant platform, the copyright regime and 
the technological features are inconsistent. While the UK and Australian 
copyright regimes are hence inconsistent with the technological features, 
the US copyright regime is consistent.
The TOS and the technological features are consistent. Zee’s use, 
licensed under both the Facebook Statement and the Wikipedia Terms, 
is also enabled solely by the technological features on Wikipedia.
h. jane’s creation and sharing of a new video clip by way of 
‘vidding’ on youTube, and subsequently on facebook
The earlier discussion indicated that Jane’s use has infringed laws in the 
US and Australia, but not in the UK.122 Further, her use is not licensed 
under the YouTube Terms and the Facebook Statement.123 Where there is 
copyright infringement (ie, under the US Copyright Act and the Australian 
Copyright Act) and Jane has breached the relevant TOS, the copyright 
regimes and the TOS are consistent. However, the copyright regime in 
the UK is inconsistent with the TOS.
Jane’s ‘vidding’ and sharing of the new video clip on YouTube and 
Facebook are enabled solely by the technological features on both plat-
forms.124 Where there is copyright infringement and the use is enabled 
on the relevant platform, the copyright regime and the technological 
features are inconsistent. While the US and Australian copyright regimes 
are hence inconsistent with the technological features, the UK copyright 
regime is consistent.
The TOS and the technological features are inconsistent. Jane’s 
use, unlicensed under the YouTube Terms and the Facebook Statement, 
is enabled solely by the technological features on YouTube.
Table 5.7 Consistency table 7
Regulatory factors Consistency
Copyright: TOS US •
UK ◦
Australia ◦
Copyright: Technological  
features
US •
UK ◦
Australia ◦
TOS: Technological features •
 
 
 
 
 
 
regulaTing ConTenT on soCial Media184
  
i. Cheryl’s use of ‘stills’ from jane’s video clip as thumbnail images 
on her website
The earlier discussion suggested that Cheryl’s use has infringed copyright 
laws in the UK and in Australia, but not in the US.125 Further, her use is not 
licensed under the YouTube Terms and possibly not under the TOS of a 
standard website.126 Where there is copyright infringement (ie, under the 
UK Copyright Act and the Australian Copyright Act) and Cheryl has breached 
the relevant TOS, the respective copyright regime and the TOS are consist-
ent. However, the copyright regime in the US is inconsistent with the TOS.
Cheryl’s use is not enabled solely by the technological features on 
both platforms.127 Where there is copyright infringement and Cheryl’s 
use is not enabled on the relevant platform, the copyright regime and 
the technological features are consistent. While the UK and Australian 
copyright regimes are hence consistent with the technological features, 
the US copyright regime is inconsistent.
The TOS and the technological features are consistent. Cheryl’s 
use, unlicensed under the YouTube Terms (and probably also unlicensed 
under the TOS of a standard website), is not enabled by the technological 
features on YouTube or on such a website.
Table 5.8 Consistency table 8
Regulatory factors Consistency
Copyright: TOS US •
UK ◦
Australia •
Copyright: Technological  
features
US ◦
UK •
Australia ◦
TOS: Technological features ◦
Table 5.9 Consistency table 9
Regulatory factors Consistency
Copyright: TOS US ◦
UK •
Australia •
Copyright: Technological  
features
US ◦
UK •
Australia •
TOS: Technological features •
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j. other users’ partial use of jane’s collage to create their own, 
then sharing the same on Pinterest, facebook and Twitter
Based on the earlier discussion, these uses have infringed copyright laws 
in Australia, but not in the US and the UK.128 Further, such uses are not 
licensed under each of the Pinterest Terms, the Facebook Statement and 
the Twitter Terms.129 Where there is copyright infringement (ie, under 
the Australian Copyright Act) and these users have breached the relevant 
TOS, the copyright regime and the TOS are consistent. However, each of 
the copyright regimes in the US and the UK is inconsistent with the TOS.
The users have to use external tools, such as the ‘save image as’ 
function on their web browsers and other image editing tools, to down-
load and modify Jane’s collage to create versions of their own.130 Where 
there is copyright infringement and such uses require external tools 
on the relevant platforms, the copyright regime and the technological 
features are consistent. While the Australian copyright regime is hence 
consistent with the technological features, the US and the UK copyright 
regimes are inconsistent.
The TOS and the technological features are consistent. The uses 
which are not licensed under the TOS of all three platforms are similarly 
not enabled by the technological features on the platforms.
K. editor jasper’s use of jane’s collage on the cover page of his 
magazine
The earlier discussion suggested that Jasper’s use has infringed copyright 
laws in the US, the UK and Australia.131 Further, his use is not licensed 
under the Pinterest Terms, the Facebook Statement or the Twitter Terms, 
as the case may be.132 Because there is copyright infringement in all three 
jurisdictions, where the relevant TOS are also breached, the copyright 
regime is consistent with the TOS in each of the three instances.
Table 5.10 Consistency table 10
Regulatory factors Consistency
Copyright: TOS US ◦
UK ◦
Australia •
Copyright: Technological  
features
US ◦
UK ◦
Australia •
TOS: Technological features •
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Jasper has to use external tools, such as the ‘save image as’ 
function on his web browser, if he downloaded the collage from the 
Pinterest and Twitter platforms. Even if Jasper downloaded the collage 
from the Facebook platform, he will have to rely on external tools to 
edit Jane’s collage for use on his magazine cover.133 Where there is cop-
yright infringement and Jasper’s use requires the adoption of external 
tools, the copyright regimes and the technological features are consist-
ent. There are hence consistencies across all three jurisdictions.
The TOS and the technological features are consistent. Jasper’s use, 
which is not permitted under the TOS of all three platforms, is also not 
enabled by their technological features.
l. Concluding observations
The following table, with reference to the tables above, summarises the 
number of instances – out of a total of eleven content- generative activi-
ties selected for consideration from the case study – where the regulatory 
signals given by each of copyright laws, the TOS and the technological 
features to users are assessed to be consistent, vis- à- vis the other regu-
latory factor concerned. While each shaded circle is counted as one 
instance of consistency, each unshaded circle is counted as one instance 
of inconsistency.
To explain further, in relation to the US copyright regime and the 
TOS, seven out of a total of eleven of the instances examined are consist-
ent.134 This figure is indicated in the relevant cell under the second main 
column below, as are the relevant figures in the respective rows.
Given that the consistency of copyright laws with each of the TOS 
and the technological features is considered across all three jurisdictions, 
the number of instances where the regulatory factors are consistent (ie, in 
relation to copyright laws vis- à- vis the TOS, and copyright laws vis- à- vis 
Table 5.11 Consistency table 11
Regulatory factors Consistency
Copyright: TOS US •
UK •
Australia •
Copyright: Technological  
features
US •
UK •
Australia •
TOS: Technological features •
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the technological features) has to be divided by the figure of three. This 
will ensure that the figure provided in the first two rows of the last main 
column is the equivalent of the figure provided in the last row (ie, where 
the pair of regulatory factors evaluated comprises the TOS and the 
techno logical features).
Each of the figures given in this last main column is given over a 
total of eleven content- generative activities. As such, the average num-
ber of instances where a pair of regulatory factors acts inconsistently can 
be easily calculated. For example, if there is an average of 5.3 instances 
where the factors act consistently (ie, in evaluating copyright laws and 
the TOS), there is a corresponding average of 5.7 instances (out of 
eleven) where these factors act inconsistently.
I observe that the regulatory factors in the three pairs are inconsist-
ent in just slightly under half out of the total number of instances consid-
ered,135 and argue that this exposes users to mixed signals regarding the 
activities that are legitimate on social media.
III. Regulation of content- generative behaviours by 
copyright laws
In this section I question whether copyright laws can effectively regulate 
content- generative behaviours of social media users by relating the ear-
lier analyses to the observations made under scenario four. I note that:
 (i) Because perceptions have a bigger impact on users’ compliance 
with such laws than an awareness of copyright laws does, and 
further, as the technological features shape users’ perceptions 
of copyright laws, these features could play a more important 
Table 5.12 Summary of consistency tables
Regulatory factors Consistency Average 
consistencyi
Copyright: TOS US 7.0 5.3
UK 4.0
Australia 5.0
Copyright: Technological  
features
US 4.0 5.7
UK 7.0
Australia 6.0
TOS: Technological features 6.0 6.0
i. The actual figures are rounded up or down to one decimal place.
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role either than copyright laws per se or the TOS in securing the 
compliance of users with these laws.136 Such compliance is there-
fore achieved when users are unable to undertake potentially 
copyright- infringing activities on social media as the features are 
self- executing.
This is consistent with the general observation drawn from scenario 
four that the technological features are a significant contributor of 
mixed signals on social media platforms.137 These signals confuse users 
regarding the activities that are legitimate on such platforms under 
copyright laws.
 (ii) Users, including social media users, are inclined towards claiming 
to know more about copyright laws than they actually do. Their 
objective levels of awareness of copyright laws – in particular, how 
these laws apply to their specific activities – is typically low.138
In this respect Chapter Two has demonstrated,139 through its discussion 
of the application of copyright subsistence and infringement rules and 
the challenges posed to the content- generative activities on social media, 
why it is not possible for regular social media users to have the level of 
understanding of copyright laws required to know how they apply to the 
activities such users undertake. Moreover, conflict of laws issues have to 
be resolved to ascertain which laws apply to questions of subsistence and 
infringement of copyright,140 in a copyright- related dispute around con-
tent on social media. Further, scenario one141 has shown that the applica-
tion of the copyright laws of the three selected jurisdictions – the US, the 
UK and Australia – to the same content- generative activities under the case 
study can lead to differing conclusions. This book cannot determine with 
finality, even with reference to the relevant legislation and cases under 
scenario one, how the copyright subsistence and infringement issues 
will be resolved. In particular, where copyright infringement is found at 
first appearance on the facts given, there remains great uncertainty as to 
whether any exceptions to copyright laws apply.142 The purpose of scen-
ario one is instead to provide a general overview of the interaction between 
copyright laws and the generation of content in the social media context.
 (iii) The TOS and the technological features foster the conflicting 
expectations in ‘copyright holders’ and users,143 as discussed in 
Part II. The provisions of the TOS which are incompatible with 
the copyright regime have the potential to encourage ‘copyright 
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holders’ to overreach their rights under copyright laws, as they 
concurrently mislead social media users to think that their uses 
of copyright- protected content are licensed. In this case, the 
expectation of the ‘copyright holder’ contradicts that of a user on 
social media. In respect of the technological features, the notice 
and takedown mechanisms and the Content Id system available 
to copyright holders facilitate ‘copyright holders’ in requesting 
the removal of content  – and incidentally in permitting them to 
make claims that go beyond their legal entitlements. On the other 
hand, different technological features that make it easy for users to 
generate content serve to reinforce their expectation that digital 
content available on social media is free.144 A  user’s expectation 
that content is free varies from the actual practices of a ‘copyright 
holder’ on social media. These expectations, whether fostered by 
the TOS, the technological features or in some other way, will be 
generally discussed as conflicting expectations.
This is consistent with the general observation drawn from scenario four 
that users are at the receiving end of mixed signals as to the content- 
generative activities that are legitimate on social media platforms under 
copyright laws.
In light of the above, copyright laws appear to play a limited role in 
regulating the content- generative activities of users and in securing their 
compliance. This is due to the environment of mixed signals and conflict-
ing expectations in which users on social media platforms are immersed. 
Such a situation can have the effect of pulling users in different directions 
regarding whether they should engage in specific activities on these plat-
forms. In this respect the technological features on social media platforms 
make a significant contribution to the mixed signals to which users are 
subject, and henceforth to influencing content- generative behaviours.
IV. Conclusion
In this chapter I have highlighted the findings from prior empirical stud-
ies that can illuminate the perceptions and awareness of copyright laws 
in users of social media platforms. I have analysed these findings together 
with the arguments made in Chapters Two, Three and Four. Pursuant to 
these analyses I  have argued that the low levels of awareness of copy-
right laws in people generally are amplified in social media users. This is 
due to the combined effect of the inadequacy of copyright rules to which 
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social media users can relate and the complex rules that copyright laws 
comprise – as well as the need to address the multiple issues set out in 
Chapter Two145 to ascertain whether content- generative activities are 
indeed copyright infringing.
With scenario four, I  have shown that the regulating factors of 
copyright laws, the TOS and the technological features apply inconsist-
ently – in relation to slightly under half of the eleven content- generative 
activities considered from the case study. Users are exposed to mixed sig-
nals regarding the activities that are legitimate on social media platforms.
In relation to the TOS’s effect on users’ awareness of copyright laws, 
I have argued that the TOS foster conflicting expectations in ‘copyright 
holders’ and users. While ‘copyright holders’ expect that the content they 
generate on social media is copyright protected, users may expect that 
their content- generative activities are licensed under the TOS. The under-
standings of copyright laws that the TOS appear to embody – in particu-
lar as a result of the latter’s potential compatibilities with the copyright 
regime set out in Chapter Three146 – give rise to these expectations that 
contribute to users’ poor awareness of copyright laws. Similarly, in rela-
tion to the influence of the technological features on users’ perceptions of 
copyright laws, I have argued further that the technological features fos-
ter conflicting expectations in both ‘copyright holders’ and users. On the 
one hand, the availability of the notice and takedown mechanisms and 
filtering systems (such as the Content Id system on YouTube) facilitate 
‘copyright holders’ in making their requests for content to be removed – 
whether under the DMCA or otherwise – and concurrently allow them 
to make claims that go beyond their proper entitlements under copy-
right laws. On the other hand, the encouragement of content- generative 
activities (ie, the creation, modification and dissemination of content) by 
the technological features identified in Chapter Four to be incompatible 
with the copyright regime,147 as well as the overall ‘generativity’ of social 
media, reinforce the expectation of users that digital content is free and 
can be readily used.
With reference to the concept of ‘nudging’148 that I have adapted for 
the purpose of this book, many users appear to assume that the content- 
generative activities they are ‘nudged’ to undertake on social media plat-
forms are legitimate and will not attract liabilities under copyright laws. 
These expectations of users vary from the actual practices of ‘copyright 
holders’. Such conflicting expectations can contribute to users’ nega-
tive perceptions of copyright laws – that copyright laws are illegitimate 
for being unreasonable, outdated and irrelevant. At the same time, the 
significant influence of the technological features on users’ compliance 
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with copyright laws when they generate content is reinforced by the fact 
that their impact is analogised to the application of bright- line rules, in 
contrast to the impact of the principles- based TOS (which also requires 
one to refer back to copyright laws) and the complex, rules- based 
copyright laws.
In view of the environment of mixed signals and conflicting expec-
tations in which users on social media platforms are immersed, I ques-
tion if it is unfair for users to be widely exposed to the risks of copyright 
infringement for the content- generative activities they undertake on 
these platforms. Further, given the significance of the technological 
features in influencing content- generative behaviours and their overall 
‘nudging’ and encouragement of users to engage in the creation, modi-
fication and dissemination of content, the vulnerability of users to the 
risks of copyright infringement for the activities they engage in on social 
media needs to be given more consideration by legislators and policy 
makers. Users should not be expected to behave counter-intuitively (ie, 
against the direction of the ‘nudges’) on social media platforms to avoid 
the risks of copyright infringement altogether, while those platforms that 
wield great influence over their users’ content- generative behaviours are 
afforded the shelter of safe harbour legislation.149  
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Conclusion
In this book I have set out to provide an analysis as to how the content- 
generative behaviours of social media users are regulated from a copy-
right perspective. For this purpose I compare copyright laws with other 
regulatory factors such as the TOS (ie, terms of service) and the techno-
logical features on social media platforms. I  have selected five social 
media platforms  – namely Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube, Twitter and 
Wikipedia – for survey in the book. Each of these platforms falls under 
one of the four (out of six) categories of social media under Kaplan and 
Haenlein’s classification system, being respectively social networking 
sites, content communities, blogs and collaborative projects.1 These plat-
forms serve as a good sample to survey how users’ compliance with copy-
right laws can be influenced by the user policies and design choices of the 
platforms. In this respect, the case study detailing the content- generative 
activities of Jane Doe and other users on the selected social media plat-
forms acts as an anchor for the discussions on how copyright laws, the 
TOS and the technological features of social media platforms regulate 
the content- generative behaviours of users.
I have considered the application of copyright laws to various 
uses on social media, and how this application is aligned with the TOS 
and the technological features of the selected social media platforms. 
In particular, I  have examined the copyright laws of the US, the UK 
and Australia. I  have argued that the effectiveness of copyright laws 
as a regulator of content- generative behaviours is compromised by 
the uncertainties in the application of copyright laws and variations 
between those laws in different jurisdictions, as well as by inconsisten-
cies between the application of either of the regulatory factors or the 
copyright laws.
I recognise that it is important to expand our understanding 
of how social media platforms can alter  – through their TOS and 
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technological features – the effectiveness of the regulation of content- 
generative behaviours by copyright laws. This is especially so as 
internet users now spend more time on social media platforms than 
before.2 Many users are also observed to engage regularly in behav-
iours that potentially fall within the scope of copyright infringement.3 
Despite the ubiquity of the use of social media platforms, there is a 
dearth of rigorous consideration given to how specific social media 
platforms affect the role laws, including copyright laws, play in secur-
ing compliance from their users. Moreover, social media platforms 
have their unique characteristics and business models that deserve 
separate analyses.
The conclusions drawn throughout this book highlight the need 
to address the vulnerability of social media users, widely exposed to the 
risks of copyright infringement in the content- generative activities that 
they are ‘nudged’4 to undertake on social media platforms. In particu-
lar, in Chapter Two, I demonstrated why it is not possible for any regular 
social media user to have the level of understanding of copyright laws 
required to assess the legitimacy of the content- generative activities he 
or she undertakes, through the application of copyright laws to these 
activities. In Chapter Three I  noted that the TOS are aligned with the 
copyright regimes to some extent, and argued further that the TOS and 
the relevant copyright regime reinforce one another when they are in 
alignment. I also argued that three areas5 give rise to potential incompat-
ibilities between the TOS and the copyright regimes, and so compromise 
the effectiveness of copyright laws in regulating the content- generative 
behaviours of users.
In Chapter Four I  argued that the ‘generativity’6 of social media 
platforms, in part due to their integration of technological features that 
encourage the creation, modification and dissemination of content, 
can increase the possibilities for copyright infringement on such plat-
forms. These features can therefore be incompatible with the copyright 
regimes. On the other hand, I noted that the technological features that 
constrain content- generative activities limit the opportunities for users 
to interact with content and can reduce the risks of copyright infringe-
ment by users of the platforms. I argued further that although these fea-
tures are aligned with the copyright regimes, their influence is limited 
since the constraints experienced by users can easily be overcome with 
external tools – on balance, the platforms encourage content- generative 
activities more than they constrain them. In addition, I  elaborated on 
how some of the features that constrain content- generative activities 
reflect copyright considerations. Finally, in Chapter Five, I argued that 
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users are exposed to mixed signals and conflicting expectations on social 
media platforms regarding the content- generative activities legitimate 
on these platforms.
I. Fairness from a user’s perspective
A recurring theme throughout the chapters of this book has been the 
unequal positions of social media platforms and users relative to one 
another. In particular, while these platforms seek alignment with the 
copyright regime to secure the availability of the safe harbour pro-
vision for themselves,7 users do not have the same privilege. I  have 
argued that more attention needs to be paid to the vulnerability of 
users who are exposed to the risks of copyright infringement for the 
content- generative activities they undertake regularly on these plat-
forms.8 This is in view of the significance of the technological fea-
tures in encouraging content- generative behaviours, as well as the 
environment of mixed signals and conflicting expectations in which 
users on social media platforms are immersed. Users are pulled in dif-
ferent directions by the examined regulatory factors on social media, 
with regard to the content- generative activities in which they engage. 
Further, I  have argued that the conflicting expectations adversely 
shape users’ perceptions and awareness of copyright laws in this envir-
onment, therefore compromising their effectiveness in securing com-
pliance from users who generate content. These users may not take 
copyright laws seriously.9
Given that social media platforms wield great influence over the 
content- generative behaviours of their users, it is undesirable that 
users are widely exposed to the risks of copyright infringement for 
their everyday engagement in content- generative activities on these 
platforms. Together with the uncertainties users face in ascertaining 
how complex copyright rules (including exceptions to such rules) can 
apply to their content- generative activities on social media, these con-
siderations give rise to the question of whether it is unfair for users to 
be exposed to the risks of copyright infringement for these activities. 
This is especially so since most of the social media platforms10 are oper-
ated around advertiser- supported business models made viable by rea-
son of the content generated by users of such platforms. Users receive 
the shorter end of the (copyright) stick:  they face the risks of copy-
right infringement for the content- generative activities which they are 
‘nudged’ to undertake, and which they believe to be legitimate on the 
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platforms. The question as to whether this is unfair, and how it will be 
measured, are issues requiring further exploration outside the scope 
of the book.
II. Why regulating social media matters
This book contributes to the debate in the following ways. Firstly, the 
research conducted demonstrates the influence the selected five social 
media platforms could have over users’ content- generative behaviours, 
by virtue of their TOS and technological features. In this respect the book 
is the first account using the approach it has adopted (ie, in comparing 
copyright laws with other regulatory factors on social media) to assess 
how specific social media platforms affect the ability of copyright laws 
to regulate content- generative behaviours effectively. Secondly, the ques-
tion of unfairness to users that the book raises in view of its conclusions 
on the influence of social media can furnish an alternative angle for legis-
lators and policy makers to consider when they reform existing copyright 
legislation. This will go beyond the usual reference made to balancing 
the rights of copyright holders and users. A distinction between these two 
groups is less meaningful on social media, where a copyright holder of 
any content on social media could also be a user of the content shared 
by others.
Therefore the specific course of copyright reform to which the book 
points may lie in expressly providing for the occurrence of content gen-
eration on social media as a factor to be considered,11 or as a specific pur-
pose exempt from copyright infringement (as the case may be), under 
the respective copyright statute.12 In that event the provision has to be 
compliant with international obligations under the respective treaties to 
which the US, the UK and Australia are parties, including the three- step 
test.13 In particular, relevant considerations will include the specificity 
of the provision and whether content- generative activities are seen to 
constitute a narrow category of cases,14 as well as whether the content 
generated through these activities – leading to direct or indirect commer-
cial benefits15 for the authors of such content on social media – is seen to 
conflict with normal exploitations of the relevant copyright works.16
Copyright reform in this direction will benefit social media users 
more in jurisdictions such as Australia, in comparison with the US17 and 
the UK. As scenario one has shown, seven out of eleven content- generative 
activities will not infringe the US Copyright Act, pursuant to the appli-
cation of the fair use doctrine.18 Thus, because of the availability of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regulaTing ConTenT on soCial Media202
  
doctrine in the US, users are arguably less exposed to the risks of copy-
right infringement than they are in Australia. Under the UK Copyright 
Act, five out of eleven content- generative activities are probably exempt 
as fair dealings, by virtue of the application of the new exception for 
the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche.19 In contrast, under the 
Australian Copyright Act, none of the content- generative activities is 
exempt as a fair dealing.20
If the adoption of existing solutions is preferred, jurisdictions such 
as Australia could consider providing an exception for fair use – this may 
reduce the exposure of social media users to the risks of copyright infringe-
ment.21 Although the fair use exception in the US has been criticised for 
its open- ended nature, it has been applied by courts extensively over dec-
ades.22 To this end, the Australian Law Reform Commission has recom-
mended in its report on copyright reform that the fair use exception be 
introduced as an extension of Australia’s existing fair dealing exceptions – 
as, among other things, the flexible fair use exception would be more 
responsive to technological changes.23 This recommendation has been 
provisionally endorsed by the Productivity Commission.
If fair use is not enacted, an alternative will be to introduce a more 
specific exception to copyright infringement for UGC (ie, user- generated 
content) which allows a user to create new content using publicly avail-
able copyright works under specific conditions, as in Canada.24 Although 
there are some uncertainties brought forth by its qualitative conditions 
(ie, whether it is reasonable in the circumstances to mention the source of 
a copyright work, and whether a user had reasonable grounds to believe 
that the existing copyright work, or copy of it, does not infringe copy-
right),25 such an exception can have the effect of exempting more content- 
generative activities on social media from copyright infringement than is 
the case in its absence.26 Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the exception 
can provide social media users with the greater peace of mind they need 
to engage in content- generative activities, unlike the fact- based analyses 
leading to uncertain applications in many fair dealing scenarios.27
In the UK, while no specific exception for UGC has been introduced, 
the status of UGC was considered in two recent reviews of copyright 
laws in the UK, both of which recommended the adoption in the UK of 
new fair dealing exceptions.28 Following subsequent consultations, copy-
right law reforms were implemented in 2014, including the introduction 
of new fair dealing exceptions for the purposes of quotation, as well as 
for caricature, parody or pastiche.29 As illustrated under scenario one, 
some content- generative activities are probably exempt from copyright 
infringement by virtue of the latter exception (ie, for caricature, parody 
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or pastiche),30 and in certain limited circumstances might also, or alter-
natively, benefit from the former (ie, for quotation).31
The UK reforms suggest that another alternative to fair use is to 
expand the fair dealing exception for the purpose of parody or satire in 
Australia32 to include pastiche, as in the case of the UK.33 Arguably, fur-
ther consideration should also be given to designing an exception for the 
purpose of quotation which is along the lines of the limited form adopted 
in the UK.34 Indeed, a quotation exception appears to be mandated under 
article 10 of the Berne Convention.35 The introduction of an exception 
for the purpose of quotation has been explored in Australia.36 Such an 
exception, I note, will only exempt social media uses in the limited cir-
cumstances that the conditions for its availability are satisfied. This may 
be difficult for the conditions which relate to the compatibility of the rele-
vant use with fair practice,37 and to the justification of the extent of the 
use by its purpose.38
While I  have highlighted earlier that the condition of availability 
to the public is not likely to bar an exemption,39 the last condition (ie, 
the need to attribute the source and the author)40 might well in many 
instances. Nonetheless, my view is that these conditions, including that 
for attribution in a quotation exception, should remain, since they seem-
ingly reflect fair practices and preferences. As mentioned earlier, social 
media users like to identify with the content they create.41 Although 
I have outlined some approaches to copyright reform that can reduce the 
risks of copyright infringement to which social media users are exposed, 
the specific direction copyright reform (whether in Australia or in any 
other jurisdiction) should take and its implications on content- generative 
activities on social media fall beyond the scope of this book. Instead, this 
could be the subject of future research.
Yet another possible solution to address any potential unfairness of 
exposing social media users to copyright infringement for their content- 
generative activities is to acknowledge more explicitly the regulatory role 
of social media platforms. This provides a basis upon which one can call 
upon these platforms to play their part in ensuring the continuing rele-
vance of laws such as copyright in regulating content- generative behav-
iours – and additionally in safeguarding users’ rights in this digital space. 
In line with what Elkin- Koren has argued, granting online intermediaries 
that benefit from the distribution of copyright- protected content immu-
nity from infringement under safe harbour provisions is no longer suf-
ficient to ensure the free flow of information.42 Because of the risks users 
face, including the risk of partial enforcement by the online intermediar-
ies themselves,43 online intermediaries should be subject to duties owed 
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to users to honour the rights of users – among other things, to share and 
access content.44
The first step in this direction will be for social media platforms to 
take more care in ensuring that the regulatory factors that they design 
and with which users interact – such as the TOS and the technological 
features – convey a more consistent message to their users as to the activ-
ities that are legitimate on these platforms.45 Given that such platforms 
are observed to have a huge influence over the content- generative behav-
iours of their users, any solution arrived at should see them shoulder a 
fairer burden of the risks resulting from the business models from which 
they have selected and benefited.46 Social media platforms can continue 
working towards making their TOS more comprehensible for social 
media users. This may, however, be of limited effect, in view of the fact 
that many users do not read the TOS.47 Among the five platforms studied 
in this book, YouTube makes the most resources on copyright laws avail-
able to its users.48 These resources provide useful information to assist 
discerning users with navigating the risks of copyright infringement on 
the YouTube platform.49
Another way is to rely on the influence of the technological features 
as a regulatory factor, and to use these features to prompt users to consider 
specific copyright issues at suitable junctures when they create, modify or 
disseminate content on social media.50 For instance, when a user down-
loads the video clips of other users on YouTube and creates a new video 
clip using snippets from each of the downloaded video clips with the 
video editing tool available to him or her, prompts could be given to the 
user along with his or her creation of the new video clip, ensuring that 
the user makes an informed decision when generating content. Beyond 
prompting users to take copyright issues into account, technological fea-
tures can potentially be designed to eliminate user autonomy altogether, 
such that the decision to engage in content- generative activities which 
can infringe copyright laws no longer lies with the user in question.51
The copyright policies incorporating copyright laws such as the 
DMCA can thus be reinforced, in different ways, through the use of smart 
technologies embodied within the technological features available to 
users. Adopting such solutions reflects the understanding that users are 
vulnerable to influence from social media platforms. It also acknowledges 
that copyright laws may have to be backed by the technological features 
on these platforms in order to continue to be an effective regulator of the 
content- generative behaviours of social media users. The specific steps 
the platforms should take fall beyond the scope of this book, and again 
could be the subject of future research.
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In this sense the book provides cause to reflect on the potential 
widespread illegality of the content- generative activities in which social 
media users engage with regularity. It also points to examining the 
underlying core policy behind the regulation of online intermediaries, 
such as social media platforms. Ideally the book will stimulate more crit-
ical reflections on how laws (including laws other than copyright) should 
develop to take into account the influence of social media platforms on 
user behaviours through reform that gives users more leeway for the 
activities in which they engage. This could give rise to interesting insights 
that will benefit law reformers and scholars interested in legal issues on 
social media; it will also appeal to a broader audience (including users 
of social media platforms) interested in the application of laws to their 
activities on these platforms. These reflections are crucial – not just to 
secure the survival of laws such as copyright, but also to ensure the con-
tinuing attraction of social media platforms as enabling avenues for crea-
tive play and free expression.
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Appendix 1
Screenshots of the technological features
I. Technological features
A. Technological features that encourage content- generative activities
1. Creation
Image 1 Facebook
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1 231
  
Image 2 Facebook
Image 3 Pinterest
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Image 4 Pinterest
Image 5 YouTube
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Image 6 YouTube
Image 7 YouTube
Image 8 YouTube
Image 9 YouTube
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Image 10 Twitter
Image 11 Twitter
Image 12 Wikipedia
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2. Modification
Image 13 Facebook
Image 14 Facebook
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Image 15 Pinterest
Image 16 Pinterest
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Image 17 Pinterest
Image 18 YouTube
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Image 19 Twitter
Image 20 Twitter
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3. Dissemination
Image 21 Wikipedia
Image 22 Facebook
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Image 23 Facebook
Image 24 Pinterest
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Image 25 YouTube
Image 26 Twitter
Image 27 Wikipedia
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B. Technological features that constrain content- generative activities
1. Limiting the modification of content
Image 28 Facebook
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Image 29 Pinterest
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Image 30 Pinterest
Image 31 YouTube
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2. Limiting the opportunities to engage in further content- generative activities
Image 32 Twitter
Image 33 Twitter
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Image 34 Twitter
Image 35 Twitter
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3. Allowing for requests to remove content
Image 36 Facebook
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Image 38 Facebook
Image 37 Facebook
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Image 39 Facebook
 
APPENDIX 1250
  
Image 40 Facebook
Image 41 Pinterest
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Image 42 Pinterest
Image 43 Pinterest
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Image 44 YouTube
Image 45 YouTube
Image 46 YouTube
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Image 47 YouTube
Image 48 Twitter
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Image 49 Twitter
Image 50 Twitter
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Image 51 Twitter
Image 52 Twitter
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II. Scenario three:  the influence of the technological 
features
A. Jane’s use of the music video clip on YouTube as her morning alarm
F. Jane’s use of the same collage in her blog post on WordPress
Image 53 YouTube
Image 54 WordPress
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G. Zee’s contribution to Wikipedia on ‘income inequality’ using what Jane 
has written
Image 55 Wikipedia
Note: Screenshots taken on the Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube, Twitter and Wikipedia platforms 
respect ively, as of 7 June 2017.
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account disabling 
for repeated infringements 118
adaptations of works 
right in UK and Australia 44, 72
adapted content, copyright infringement 19
advertiser-supported business models 4, 200
adoption by social media platforms 173
Agence France Presse (AFP) 
use of Morel’s works 120–21
Agence France Presse v Morel (Morel) case 52
‘amateur creative digital content’ (ACDC) 
reference to UGC 18
American Law Institute (ALI Principles) 58
architectural works 33
‘artistic work’, recording on any medium 39
arts organisations’ views on copyright 166
audio clip, ‘swapping tool’ by YouTube 139
‘audiovisual work’ 33
films or cinematographic films 77–8
Australian Copyright Act 53, 156, 178, 180, 
183
infringement 73, 74
moral rights 49
performance of work, rights 47
removal or altering of electronic rights 
information 51
right of adaptation 44
same goal as the UK 32
Australian court 
Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd 124
Australian fair dealing exceptions 55
Australian Law Reform Commission 55
fair use exception 202
‘author’ definition in Australia  
photograph under Australian Copyright 
Act 37
authorship designation dilemmas 38
automatic enforcement through filtering 156–7
banal words, phrases, language of   
widespread usage 
barrier to copyright protection 118
behaviour influence from social media 3
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works 32, 41, 57, 125
principle of national treatment 41
‘bespoke’ alarm call on Jane’s mobile phone 21
breach of YouTube terms 
use of ‘stills’ from video clip 115
broadcasting of work 46
‘broadcast’ in UK, transmission on internet 33
Brussels I Regulation, potential violation of 124
business models, advertiser-supported 4
of social media platforms 5
California, law of the state 125
celebrity blogger Small-Steps 
‘tweet’ about newborn baby 22
Cheryl’s use of ‘stills’ from Jane’s video clip 
as thumbnail images on her website 184
choice of law  
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws  in 
the US (Second Restatement) 122–3
choice of social media platforms 20
collaborative projects 1, 39
blogs, content communities 20
collage creation from photographs taken by 
others, of sculptures, etc. 54
collage of newborn babies, by Jane Doe 
access on Pinterest platform and shared 
152–53
forming with aid of photo-editing 
on mobile phone 22–3
‘Remedy for an Aging Population’ 
shared on Pinterest, pin-board 23
collage sharing in blog post on WordPress  
infringement in Australia 76
commentary of Evangeline’s posted  
Facebook 
creating her own 21, 112–13
comments to video clips on YouTube 119
commercial use of Jane’s collage 80
communication rights and social media 47
complex rules of copyright laws 190
computer science 7
concept of authorship 34
Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property  ClIP 
Principles 56–8, 126–7, 188
consensus with copyright laws  
deterrence of future file-sharing activities 
168–9
consent of copyholder 
need for communication to  
‘new public’ 47
Consistency tables 1 to 12 178–87
content communities 1, 9, 27
content creation 3
‘status update’ (Facebook) 139
content dissemination 
social rather than financial motivations 4
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content-generative activities 20, 44, 47
across social media 25
behaviour of users 198
collaborative, blogs, content communities  
social networking sites 28
copyright holding 9, 170
copyright laws applications 20
creation, modification, and  dissemination 
of content 190
encouraged by technological features 176
of Jane and other users 24, 127, 198
licensed under TOS 190
‘nudged’ to undertake 197
on social media 1, 6–7, 32, 46, 79–80, 138
technological features, impact of 153–4
content-generative behaviours by 
technological features 
regulation by copyright laws 5–8, 187
reinforcement of expectation of users 
Content Id software, scanning video clips 146
available to copyright holders 189
by YouTube 175–6
filtering technologies 156–7
content in social media programmes 
prejudicial to reputation of copyright holder 
175
protected by copyright or not 79–80, 170
published works in Australia 40
removal sometimes erroneous 157
rights to make available to public 54
shared on Facebook, Pinterest, Twitter 
WordPress and YouTube 
published works in UK 40
on Twitter, speedy deletion 38–9
textual, image, audio and visual forms 33
content on Wikipedia platform 
need for source or copyright tag 144
‘works of joint authorship’ 37
contracting parties, to Berne Convention 41
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 
UK 120
contractual choice of governing law, support 
122
contributor copyright investigation, user 
request 
Wikipedia 146
‘copies’ term, communicable work 42
copyholders’ claim for remedies 
in US non-registration 171
copyrightable content on social media 121
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) Australian 
Copyright Act 32
Copyright Act of 1976 in US 32
Copyright and Rights in Performances   
(Personal Copies for Private Use) 55, 71
Copyright (Application to Other Countries) 41
copyright considerations 138
Copyright (International Protection)  
Regulations 1969 in Australia 41
copyright laws, application 59–72
Copyright, Patents and Designs Act 1988 
UK Copyright Act 32
‘Copyright Center’ (YouTube), self-help 
options 105
copyright disputes relating to content 107–8
‘copyright holder’  
copyright protection not always the case 173–4
guidance questions 58
posting copyright concerns 105
right to perform publicly 45, 119, 174
overreaching rights 188–9
users, conflicting expectations 190
copyright in Australia 
works to any form of storage, sound, films 
39
copyright infringement 5, 183, 183
activities 169, 188
behaviours 199
exceptions to 31
possibilities 154
under Australian Copyright Act 182
copyright issues, US, UK , Australia 59–70
copyright laws 4, 5, 79–80
application in US, UK, Australia 7, 198
comparison with other regulatory factors  
on social media 201
content-generative behaviours of 
social media users 24
differing conclusion, US, UK, Australia 
188–9
perception and awareness 165–77
regulation by 21
reform 6
terms of service, technological features uncertain 
legitimacy 57
copyright legislation, 5, 125
‘copyright management information’ 50–51
copyright policies 102–105, 117–18, 127
copyright laws Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act 204
copyright policy, key terms 109–11
copyright protection 32, 119–20, 121, 127–8, 
175
from copyright holders to YouTube 146
granting, foreseeable barrier 118
licence may not cover uses by third parties 
173
material that is original from author, 
including copies in US 34, 39
none in UK and Australia, for song titles, 
advertisements, short, headlines 35
ownership of content by users, not always 
qualifying 173
proviso de minimis (no trifling matters) in UK 35
result of skill, labour, experience 35 
in UK and Australia 
copyright regimes 79–80
potential incompatibilities 118–27, 137–8
relationship with 116–27, 153–8
copyright-related disputes 
adjudication of, in UK and Australia 126
copyright rules 
applicable to content-generative activities 
variable jurisdictions 171
absence and complexity of 171–2
inadequacy 189–90
copyright subsistence 76–7, 80
copyright systems, mature 
protection of expressions,  
not ideas, facts 33
copyright technological features 178–87
copyright violation 
contact party direct, complete DMCA 
compliant form 146
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creation and sharing of new video clip  
‘vidding’ on YouTube 77–8
‘creative content’ definition, Facebook, 
Pinterest,  Twitter, YouTube,  
Tumblr, Flickr 20
creativity, ambiguity of 34
cyberlaw and cyberspace 3, 8
damages awards 53
de minimis use (too trivial) 35, 42
derivative works, no infringement 72, 73
under US Copyright Act 43
digital audio transmission 46
digital communications expansion 
cyberspace, inherently borderless 56
digital content 32, 167
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 50, 98, 102 
compliant online forms 173
mechanism 
available to copyright holders 105
in copyright policies counter-notice 157
frequency of, social media platforms 117
notice and takedown mechanism 127, 
155–6, 172
in respect of shared content 175
notifying of copyright infringement 155–6
process not readily available  
on Wikipedia 146
safe harbour provision, exemption from 
liability for monetary relief 128–9
YouTube 104
digital or machine-readable format 42
dissemination 141–2
extended reach of platforms 3–4
infringement of rights in UK 46
distortion, mutilation, modification 
prejudicial to author 48
distribution and display rights 75
DMCA  see Digital Millennium  
Copyright Act
doctrine of merger, scènes à faire 
US, Goldstein and Hugenholtz 33
doctrine of privity 120
domestic laws, mandatory 128
double intent standards, in US 51
dramatic works 33
drop-down menu, option selection 
report to Facebook, on offensive 
content for removal 144–5
editor Jasper’s use of Jane’s collage 
on cover page of his magazine 80, 116, 
185–6
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)  
Lawrence Lessig v Liberation Music Pty 
Ltd  complaint against 157
electronic rights management  
information 51
electronic transmission 46
e-mails, bilateral messages 18
‘embed post’ option, Facebook 141
‘encouragement of learning’ 32
enforcement of copyright 
clips of song Lisztomania 157–8
European Max Planck Group 58
Evangeline’s commentary, copyright  
protected 73
exemption from liability for monetary  
relief 128–9
expectation of users that digital content is 
free 176
expressions not copyright protected 33–4
external application, use of,  
on mobile device  
to play video clip as alarm 178
external tools use, ‘save image’ 
copyright infringement 185
on web browser 180
extraterritoriality 125
Facebook 
copyright policy, user warnings 103–4
dissemination, multiple ways 141
laws of state of California 107
modification 139–40
no breach in collage sharing 113
non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free  
worldwide license 99
rights of one as original author 22
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities 99
technological features 230–31, 234,  
239–40, 242, 247–50
terms and technological features  
copyright protection, availability 22
transparency report, number of government  
requests recorded 117
user content upload for sharing, image 
video clip 137
fair dealing exceptions 
new in UK 202
untested by litigation 56
UK and Australia, more prescriptive  than in 
US 55, 56
fair dealing exception expansion  
for parody or satire in Australia 
including pastiche 31, 203
for purpose of private study, quotation, 
caricature, parody, pastiche 55
for quotation, limited use in 
exempting social media uses 56
fairness from user’s perspective 200–201
fair use 
analysis in US, comment or criticism  
of work 54
fair dealing, copyright exceptions 80
doctrine in US 31, 71, 77, 202
false attribution, in UK and Australia 49
file-sharing activities 167–8
filtering, a form of technological control 146, 
156–7
final clip from different video clips 
availability on YouTube 23
financial incentive for content share  
increasing 5
fixation requirement 119
fixation standards 38–40
forum non conveniens 
and pleading of foreign law 124
Spiliada Maritime Corporation v 
Consulex Ltd (Spiliada) 124
free digital content expectation  
189
freedom of expression 
expansion through social media 2
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freelance writer Olga Lexell  
Twitter’s deletion of ‘tweets’ 154    
Friend, Rupert (Homeland’) 247
Getty Images in US 120–21
Gimp, Photoshop,  
image modifying 151
re-arranging texts 140
governance, privatised by social media 2
governing law and jurisdiction 98, 107–8, 
109–11
governing law and jurisdiction, choice of 
California 121–7
governing law and jurisdiction clauses 126–7
Haitian earthquake, photographs 
by photojournalist, Danel Morel 52
‘Harvey Balls’ in tables 177–8
Homeland’s Photos 
Facebook 248
human-centre authorship concept 171
human factors, on social media 2, 7
hypothetical user, Jane Doe 8
day in the life of 20–30
identification 
of authors on social media 36
of original generator of content 143
of specific right infringed 171
illegality, widespread  
of content-generative activities 205
image editing tools for collage creation 180
images, comments on 139
image sharing 2
income equality commentary on Facebook  
transfer to ‘Timeline’ 21
‘income inequality’ comment  on Wikipedia 23
income inequality comment on Facebook 
Jane Doe, colleague, Zee, adds page 
to Wikipedia, no attribution to Jane 23
indemnification 
and liability of platforms 98–9
limiting of liability 105–7, 109–11
of platforms for losses incurred 128–9
individual images from  
‘audiovisual works’ 78
influences on social media, 
‘nudges’, 7
‘nudged’, 3
infringement 
copyright, content-generative activity 9
copyright in Australia, not US or UK 180
fair use and fair dealing exceptions 53–6
remedies 52–3
reproduction of whole 43
scope of protection 41–7
Instagram, modified images on 36
‘intellectual property’ 166
Intellectual Property Office of Singapore 
survey results 168
intellectual property rights 11, 159
in the US Constitution  
promotion of progress of  
science, useful arts 31–2
 international obligations, compliance with 
US, UK and Australia, three-step test 
201
internet’s power, connecting people 153
internet users 1, 7, 199
Jane Doe  
collage, other users’ partial use, sharing 
79–80, 151, 184
rights against Zee and Cheryl under 
copyright laws 24
infringement of copyright laws in Australia 181
use of collage in blog post on WordPress 182
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own 73–4
Facebook copyright infringement in UK, 
Australia, not US 150, 179
use of multiple photographs of newborn 
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collage creation on Pinterest 74–6, 151
use of music video-clip on YouTube, 
morning alarm 71
copyright infringement, UK, Australia 178
usage licensed under the YouTube terms 178
video clip, taken by Cheryl (stranger) to  
display with different story 23
Jasper etc., external tools 186
Jasper’s use of Jane’s collage 
on cover page of magazine 153
joint authorship 37–8
‘joint work’ definition 37, 74      
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rights management information 51
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laws and copyright laws 8, 31
difficulty of finding applicable law 79–80
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legislation restrictions 5
Lessig, Lawrence,  renowned theorist on 
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lex loci protectionis 57, 125
liability disclaiming 105–107
Liberation Music copyright notice 
settlement of case, fair use, fair dealing 
agreement, US and Australia 157–8
liberties, civil, individual 
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licensed use under Pinterest terms 180
licensing of photographs 120–21
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Australian Copyright Act 42
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magazine editor, Jasper 
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‘This book makes an important contribution to the field of social media 
and copyright. It tackles the real issue of how social media is designed to 
encourage users to engage in generative practices, in a sense effectively 
“seducing” users into practices that involve misuse or infringement of 
copyright, whilst simultaneously normalising such practices.’ 
– Melissa de Zwart, Dean of Law, Adelaide Law School
‘This timely and accessible book examines the regulation of content-
generative activities across five popular social media platforms.... Its in-
depth, critical and comparative analysis of the platforms’ growing efforts 
to align terms of service and technological features with copyright law 
should be of great interest to anyone studying the interplay of law and 
new media.’ 
– Peter K. Yu, Director of the Center for Law 
and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University
How are users influenced by social media platforms when they 
generate content, and does this influence affect users’ compliance 
with copyright laws?
These are pressing questions in today’s internet age, and Regulating 
Content on Social Media answers them by analysing how the behaviours of 
social media users are regulated from a copyright perspective. Corinne Tan, 
an internet governance specialist, compares copyright laws on selected 
social media platforms, namely Facebook, Pinterest, YouTube, Twitter and 
Wikipedia, with other regulatory factors such as the terms of service and 
the technological features of each platform. This comparison enables her to 
explore how each platform affects the role copyright laws play in securing 
compliance from their users. Through a case study detailing the content- 
generative activities undertaken by a hypothetical user named Jane Doe, 
as well as drawing from empirical studies, the book argues that – in spite of 
copyright’s purported regulation of certain behaviours – users are ‘nudged’ 
by the social media platforms themselves to behave in ways that may be 
inconsistent with copyright laws. 
Corinne Tan holds a PhD and LLM from the Melbourne Law School, 
as well as a LLB from the National University of Singapore. She is an 
internet governance, intellectual property and media law scholar and has 
published widely in international law journals.
